Less than a month after India’s Operation Sindoor rattled Pakistan, Islamabad secured a set of roles in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) subsidiary bodies, including the Chair of the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee and Vice Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.
Not surprising that it triggered a round of chest-thumping back home. For a country under increasing international scrutiny over its terror financing record, this was hailed by the Pakistani establishment as a diplomatic coup. But the reality is far less flattering. These appointments are more ceremonial than substantive, and Pakistan’s ability to exploit them against India is sharply curtailed by the very structure of these institutions and the baggage of its own terror-linked past.
Despite loud claims, Pakistan's roles within the UNSC remain strictly limited to coordination and facilitation. It cannot dictate terms, pass resolutions, or weaponize these committees to target India. In fact, its presence in these sensitive panels, particularly those related to counter-terrorism, is more ironic than empowering. What Pakistan considers a seat at the table is, in truth, a spotlight on its own duplicity. If anything, this development offers India an opportunity to highlight Pakistan’s contradictions more forcefully in global forums.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh aptly dubbed Pakistan’s CTC vice-chair role as “like asking the cat to guard milk,” arguing Pakistan’s documented record of harbouring terrorists renders it unfit for leadership in counter-terrorism initiatives
Chairing a committee it should be sanctioned by
The Taliban Sanctions Committee (established under UNSC Resolution 1988) focuses on imposing and enforcing sanctions against individuals and entities affiliated with the Taliban. For Pakistan, accused of shielding Taliban leaders on its soil and enabling their resurgence in Afghanistan post-US withdrawal, to chair this very committee is not just ironic; it is grotesque. But that irony isn’t lost on the rest of the international community.
The position, however, does not confer veto power or any exclusive privilege to Pakistan. All decisions in the UNSC’s subsidiary bodies, including the 1988 Sanctions Committee, are consensus-based. Any action—whether listing or delisting an individual, must be agreed upon by the broader committee, which includes P5 nations like the US, France, and the UK, who are fully aware of Pakistan’s long-standing links with the Taliban and other terror outfits. India, too, remains active in diplomatic consultations and intelligence sharing, ensuring no unilateral mischief goes unchecked.
Vice-chair of a counter-terror committee?
Pakistan’s appointment as Vice Chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee, a body created in the wake of 9/11 to ensure that all nations take strong action against terrorism, has rightly raised eyebrows. The contradiction is staggering: a state that has long served as a sanctuary for UN-designated terrorists like Masood Azhar and Hafiz Saeed, now placed in a role meant to uphold international counter-terror norms.
Yet again, the vice-chair role is not a position of control but of administrative coordination. The chair, held by a different member state, leads the agenda, and Pakistan merely participates in supporting the committee’s work. More importantly, such roles come with responsibility and scrutiny. If anything, Pakistan will be under greater pressure to demonstrate compliance with international counter-terror frameworks. Failing to do so will not just damage its already brittle global image, but also fuel demands from nations like India to highlight its duplicity on the world stage.
Limited powers for Pakistan
The role of UN Security Council committees, particularly those dealing with Taliban sanctions and counterterrorism, has evolved due to major political changes.
First, the 1988 Sanctions Committee now operates in a very different context than in 2011. The Taliban have been Afghanistan’s de-facto rulers since 2021 and are seeking international legitimacy. India, which once helped block travel waivers for top Taliban leaders like Amir Khan Muttaqi, now engages with the same individuals without officially recognizing the Taliban regime. The Taliban's ties with Pakistan have also cooled but remain functional, as seen in meetings with both Indian and Pakistani officials.
The 1988 Committee monitors and updates a list of about 130 sanctioned Taliban figures. Its decisions require consensus, so Pakistan cannot unilaterally add or remove names.
Second, Pakistan’s recent Vice Chair role in the UNSC’s Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) is largely symbolic. The CTC is a technical body that helps countries build capacity to fight terrorism, in line with UNSCR 1373. It doesn’t investigate attacks or impose sanctions. Ironically, Pakistan itself continues to violate UNSCR 1373 by sheltering terrorists.
Third, Pakistan's main influence in these committees has been obstructive, often working with China to block Indian proposals—like the failed 2022 bid to sanction JeM’s Abdul Rauf Azhar. But Pakistan holds little direct sway and no leadership roles in key bodies like the 1267 Committee, which lists over 50 Pakistan-linked terrorists.
No power to harm India
India has every reason to be vigilant, but none to be anxious. The UNSC committees operate with clearly defined mandates and protocols. They are not free-for-alls where members can unilaterally push national agendas. Any attempt by Pakistan to subvert the process will be blocked by other members, many of whom are strategic partners of India. Moreover, India's own diplomatic heft, as demonstrated during its 2021–2022 UNSC term, ensures it has a solid network of support.
India previously chaired the very same Taliban Sanctions Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee during its UNSC stint. It played a leading role in shaping the debate on cross-border terrorism, maritime security, and Afghanistan’s future. Compared to that, Pakistan’s recent appointments appear more like symbolic concessions than strategic gains.
What’s more, the current geopolitical climate works against Pakistan. Its credibility is at an all-time low, FATF grey-listing only just behind it, and economic dependence on countries like China and Saudi Arabia has curbed its ability to maneuver independently. Attempts to target India through multilateral platforms will not only fall flat but could further expose Pakistan’s inconsistencies, inviting fresh scrutiny into its state-sponsorship of terror groups.
Pakistan’s new UNSC committee roles may provide domestic optics of legitimacy and relevance, but they carry little real weight. These are bureaucratic posts in multilateral bodies where transparency, rules, and consensus override personal ambition. For India, these developments are neither alarming nor strategically dangerous.
In fact, India can, and should, use Pakistan’s presence in these forums as an opportunity to underline its long-standing double standards: a state that presents itself as a global partner against terrorism, while continuing to shield and sponsor those very forces behind closed doors.
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