Opinion | Amidst India-Pakistan tension, let’s not forget the crisis in Kashmir

Supporters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) shout slogans during a protest against the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), in Srinagar. (REUTERS)

To an outside observer of the heated media debates and talk of a possible India-Pakistan war, it would seem strange that the starting point of all this — which was a suicide attack in Kashmir on February 14 — has nearly been forgotten. That it is the malaise affecting the disturbed districts of Kashmir that has led to the present impasse has somehow become a secondary issue. Instead, the spotlight is on India’s riposte to terror, the number of militants killed, and the alleged politicisation of the whole issue.

The Centre has instituted a five-year-ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami, it has put the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on the track of the separatist lobby or the so called Joint Resistance Leadership, and launched yet another operation to root out supporters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in the Valley. In one such operation, another potential suicide bomber was killed in Kulgam with a video of his plans aired on social media. This highlights the most dangerous aspect of the situation. Militancy in the Valley has moved towards something more resembling the conflicts of West Asia, than the rather less bloody and violent phenomenon seen so far.

The fact that young people, some even below 20 years of age, are being recruited has been highlighted in the media and acknowledged by the authorities. Adil Ahmad Dar, the Pulwama suicide bomber, was one such, a barely 20 something school dropout, and an easy target for terrorist recruiters.

Young men like Dar, who appeared on social media brandishing an AK47, are rarely given any serious training, but are instead sent out into the field to become gun fodder, sometimes in just a few months. This provides the impetus for others to join. Police in Anantnag and Pulwama say that many have little stomach to fight and will return quietly if they are persuaded to do so. Those, however, are the lucky few.

For the JeM recruiters and their sponsors, this is a new and highly-successful method. It saves the need for training in Pakistan – a risky enterprise that actually proves India’s assertions of outside help – and it is far more effective. Kill one, and two more will join. However, that’s only one part of the story.

Below the smoke, stone-pelting, and rallies is a poisonous — and nurtured — belief system that shifts the whole blame on New Delhi. Anyone who has travelled extensively in Kashmir will acknowledge that while the average Kashmiri is courteous to tourists, his/her embittered side comes to the fore when talking politics and militancy.

In the 1990s, there was at least some trust in local leaders such as Farooq Abdullah and Mufti Mohammad Sayeed to deliver justice and development. Today there is recognition that local politicians are more adept at adding fuel to the fire than making an effort at governance. In this they are not far wrong.

For example, look at Niti Aayog’s district-wise statistics. Lohit district in Arunachal Pradesh, way away from New Delhi, has provided full data on all parameters, and is showing considerable progress. Compare this with Srinagar, which is much closer to New Delhi. There is no data available on most parameters, be it electrification of houses or vaccinations administered. In terms of local governance, the disturbed areas show regression. The condition of the much-needed roads and the various stages at which even sanctioned projects under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana are stuck is another example. The sorry saga of the panchayat system is another instance of abject failure.

This is not just due to militancy. A dislike of delegating power and interference by mid level officials stalls development projects. Put simply, militancy in Kashmir is not going to reduce anytime soon unless the politicians decide to play ball. A governor, however efficient can only do so much.

At a second level, the Kashmiris are not backing the separatist leadership, who are seen as corrupt and self-serving. Though they no longer lead the new militancy raging in at least five districts, a Syed Ali Shah Geelani is still important in terms of issuing a ‘protest calendar’ and calling for hartals. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq has a large audience in terms of his religious status, Shabir Shah because of his history, and others due to their local support.

Removal of their security and that of various political leaders may seem logical, the question being whom they are being protected against? The reality can be gleaned from remarks of separatist leaders themselves. Abdul Gani Butt, for instance, once remarked that deaths of leaders such as Abdul Ghani Lone were at the hands of their own people rather than the security forces. A view Lone’s son agrees. His father had opposed jihad and foreign mercenaries. So did Mirwaiz’s father, who was gunned down in 1990. And there are leaders inPakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) expressing the same views.

Separatist leaders today have little clout with the public, and little independence to speak their mind. Essentially they’ve been made irrelevant in this new youth-centred militancy. Until they can move from blaming New Delhi to actually providing the heft for development, they’re irrelevant.

Action against the Jamaat-e-Islami is another matter altogether. Launched in 1942 from Shopian, it has been one of the most influential forces in the Valley in the last two decades, when it has spearheaded the shift from a traditional and composite culture based on indigenous religious practises to one based on pan Islamic teachings. A review of its rise will see that the graph matches perfectly with the rise of militancy.

The Jamaat-militancy linkage is sometimes direct, when it cadre is implicated for supporting or participating in militancy. The indirect link is the ideological backing. However, the vitriolic videos and even more violent public denunciations by clergy from different persuasions are fast outpacing the Jamaat. The ban will therefore probably push the Jamaat cadre further to the Right in a bid to regain lost ground. Both the Jamaat and the Centre would do better to cooperate quietly to reduce tensions. It would certainly benefit the former. The Centre, can afford to wait.

While it is true that one suicide bomber doesn’t herald a storm, it is certainly an early warning. An air strike may compel Pakistan to be more careful in its covert assistance in Kashmir, but, it’s not going to stop it. Meanwhile, the poison that has been injected into the state for decades will only fester, unless all sides are persuaded that it’s time to change the rules of the game. That may already have begun.

Tara Kartha is former director, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal.

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