Sharm-el-Sheikh back in focus as NDA slams UPA’s 26/11 response: Why is 2009 joint statement controversial

File Photo - Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (R) and his then Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani shake hands during a meeting on the sidelines of the 15th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm El-Sheikh on July 16, 2009.

The controversial Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement of 2009, which has long been seen as a diplomatic misstep in India’s handling of Pakistan post-26/11, is back in the national spotlight. During the ongoing Monsoon Session of Parliament, top ministers from the Narendra Modi government launched a scathing critique of the then Congress-led UPA government’s approach to cross-border terrorism.

As the Lok Sabha discussed Operation Sindoor -- India’s May 2025 retaliatory strike on terror launchpads in Pakistan -- Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar invoked the Sharm-el-Sheikh summit to contrast the Modi government’s assertiveness with what they described as the UPA’s “strategic error.”

Rajnath Singh: "Sharm-el-Sheikh was a mistake"

Defence Minister Singh led the charge, calling the joint statement issued after then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met his Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani in the Egyptian resort town in July 2009 a damaging shift in India’s posture.

“In 2009, the government back then made a mistake in the Sharm-el-Sheikh agreement,” Singh told Parliament, opening the Operation Sindoor discussion.

He said the joint statement weakened India’s long-held position that any dialogue with Pakistan must be conditional on verifiable action against terrorism.

“This diluted the terms set that Pakistan will not be allowed to use its land for terrorism,” Singh said, contrasting it with Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s unequivocal stance that talks were contingent on ending terror from Pakistan’s soil.

Singh further argued that India under UPA had squandered a rare diplomatic opening to isolate Pakistan globally after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks.

Citing former President Pranab Mukherjee’s memoir The Coalition Years, Singh quoted: “Pranab Mukherjee has written in his book ‘The Coalition Years’ that when the Mumbai attacks happened, India had evidence that the terrorists came from Karachi port. No one in the world believed the excuse of Pakistan’s ‘non-state actors’. He has written, and I quote – ‘Amid heated debates within the Cabinet, there was a demand for military intervention which I rejected’.”

Singh also referenced a high-level meeting where Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon suggested a cruise missile strike on the Lashkar-e-Taiba headquarters in Muridke. “Hearing this, Mukherjee took off his glasses, cleaned them, and thanked all the officers before concluding the meeting,” Singh recounted—a moment he said reflected the indecision of the time.

He added that even the BRICS summit held after 26/11 didn’t mention the Mumbai attacks, indicating diplomatic underreach.

“If the government back then had taken decisive and tough steps like the 2016 (surgical strike) and 2019 (air strike), Pakistan’s strategic calculus could have been altered,” Singh argued.

Jaishankar: ‘People who did nothing are questioning those who acted’

Backing Singh’s remarks, External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar took direct aim at Congress criticism of Operation Sindoor.

“We were asked, why did you stop at this time? Why did you not go further? This question is being asked by people who, after 26/11, felt that the best action was inaction,” he said.

Jaishankar called the Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement a diplomatic own goal, especially its unprecedented reference to Balochistan.

“In Sharm-el-Sheikh, the then government and the Pakistani Prime Minister agreed that terrorism is a main threat to both countries... And worst of all, they accepted a reference to Balochistan in that,” Jaishankar noted.

He criticised the equivalence implied in the statement: “Now, here is a country reeling after 26/11, and you are equating Balochistan and 26/11, what happened in Mumbai, and you are saying that the perpetrator and the victim have both got a problem... People who did nothing are asking the Government that did so much, why didn’t you do more?”

He further highlighted the NDA’s success in targeting key terror hubs: “Who thought that terror sites in Bahawalpur and Muridke would be brought down the way they were?”

Jaishankar also cited the 2006 Mumbai train bombings and the UPA’s subsequent engagement with Pakistan in Havana as part of a repeated pattern of appeasement:

“The Mumbai train bombing happened in July 2006. In September, three months later, at Havana, the UPA Government with its Pakistani counterpart condemns all acts of terrorism – as though we were both again equal... I think it’s extraordinary.”

What happened at Sharm-el-Sheikh?

The July 2009 summit occurred just eight months after the 26/11 attacks. Manmohan Singh and Yousuf Raza Gilani issued a joint statement declaring terrorism the “main threat to both countries” and noted Pakistan’s progress on prosecuting those behind the Mumbai attacks.

The document also stated: “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed.”

This delinking of talks from counter-terror action marked a reversal of India’s post-26/11 stance.

Most controversially, it included a reference to Balochistan: “Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.”

Gilani later used this to allege Indian interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs -- an accusation India rejected, but one that added fuel to the political backlash.

Back home, opposition parties called the statement a “sell-out.” The BJP declared in Parliament: “Waters of the seven seas will not be able to wash the shame.”

Manmohan Singh’s defence

At the time, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh defended the engagement as a strategic necessity: “We do not dilute our positions or our resolve to defeat terrorism by talking to any country... Unless we talk directly to Pakistan, we will have to rely on third parties to do so... I say with strength and conviction that dialogue and engagement is the best way forward.”