Asim Munir’s Pakistan: Military and ISI get more money, more power. India has reasons to worry | Explained

(FILES) Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir

Pakistan’s proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment marks one of the most sweeping power shifts in the country’s history. It effectively transforms the army’s dominance from an unspoken reality into a legal framework that cements military control over the state. The amendment rewrites Article 243 of the Constitution and creates a new position called the Chief of Defence Forces, giving the serving army chief command over the army, navy, and air force. It also removes the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and grants lifetime privileges to five-star ranks such as Field Marshal, Marshal of the Air Force, and Admiral of the Fleet.

The Print, in its report, describes the move as “rewriting Article 243 into a charter of military supremacy,” warning that it will “jeopardise the independence of the judiciary and permanently tilt Pakistan’s balance of power.” Opposition leaders have condemned the proposal, calling it a “civilian surrender to the khaki establishment.” With this constitutional change, Pakistan’s generals no longer need to stage coups or manipulate politics from behind the scenes. They would instead wield uncontested authority within a framework protected by law.

The 27th Amendment gives the army chief extraordinary protection and autonomy. Once it is passed, the Chief of Defence Forces cannot be removed easily and will have the right to advise on key strategic and defence appointments. Dawn reported that “the CDF will have the right to advise the Prime Minister on appointments to the highest security offices, making civilian oversight a mere formality.”

This includes control over the National Strategic Command, which manages Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets. By giving this authority to a single individual, Pakistan is concentrating the power to oversee nuclear weapons and security forces in one uniformed post. It is a structure designed to ensure the military remains unchallenged, with the Prime Minister reduced to a ceremonial role in defence affairs.

The constitutional power grab is taking place alongside a significant increase in Pakistan’s defence and intelligence budgets. The 2025–26 federal budget raised defence spending by about 20 percent compared to the previous year, despite a severe economic crisis. Reuters described it as “one of the largest increases in Pakistan’s defence budget in over a decade.”

A large share of the military and intelligence budget remains off the books, supported by Chinese loans, Gulf deposits, and funds indirectly freed through International Monetary Fund programmes. According to the Business Recorder, this trend “has squeezed resources for public development but ensured consistent cash flows to the military and intelligence establishment.” While ordinary Pakistanis face inflation and unemployment, the army continues to enjoy financial stability.

This imbalance has entrenched Pakistan’s identity as a security state, where national wealth is channelled to sustain a bloated defence structure rather than improve the lives of its citizens.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) stands to benefit the most from this new structure. The Chief of Defence Forces will have direct control over all intelligence appointments and operations, leaving no room for civilian oversight. The Print noted that “the ISI, long seen as the deep state within Pakistan’s deep state, will emerge as the most financially secure and politically untouchable body.”

With increased funding and constitutional protection, the ISI will have even greater freedom to pursue covert operations abroad. This includes financing and supporting proxy networks in Afghanistan, India, and other regions under the pretext of national security. The amendment will make it almost impossible for any civilian institution to question or audit how intelligence funds are used.

The 27th Amendment is not merely a change in the military’s hierarchy. It institutionalises an entirely militarised model of governance. The law also introduces changes to judicial appointments and transfers, which critics see as an attempt to weaken the courts’ independence. Once enacted, it will effectively remove legal checks on the military’s power.

The Print described the bill as “legalising what Pakistan’s generals have long practiced: governance through khaki supremacy.” Pakistan’s democracy, already fragile, will lose its remaining balance as the military assumes constitutional control over national security, foreign policy, and internal governance. The so-called civilian government will exist only in name.

For India, this development has serious regional implications. Pakistan’s political system will now be entirely directed by its military and intelligence elite. The same establishment responsible for nurturing terrorism, exporting extremism, and destabilising the region will now enjoy legal immunity and greater resources. With General Asim Munir constitutionally empowered, New Delhi can expect a more aggressive and unpredictable Pakistan.

Whenever the military tightens its control internally, it tends to project hostility externally. This pattern was visible after past coups and political transitions, often followed by escalations along the Line of Control or through terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. The new structure also ensures uninterrupted funding for the ISI, enabling it to expand its hybrid warfare campaigns against India.

India must prepare for a Pakistan that will continue to prioritise conflict and control over stability and reform. The 27th Amendment makes dialogue less likely and military adventurism more possible. For New Delhi, this is not merely a political change in Islamabad but a strategic signal that Pakistan’s generals have no intention of sharing power or pursuing peace.