Jamaat-e-Islami's controversial legacy and its role in Bangladesh’s political landscape

Jamaat’s ideological inflexibility poses a significant threat to the values of Bangladesh’s hard-won freedom. (Source: AP/File)

Dr Shafiqur Rahman, the Ameer (chief) of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), recently stated that his party would offer an apology if its actions during the 1971 Liberation War are proven wrong. JeI, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist political party, has been deeply controversial due to its involvement in the 1971 conflict and its extremist ideological stance. As Bangladesh looks towards rebuilding its future in the post-Hasina era, with the potential inclusion of Jamaat-e-Islami, it is crucial to reassess the party’s historical role in shaping the nation's identity and its ongoing influence on political discourse.

Jamaat-e-Islami was founded in 1941 by Abdul A'ala Maududi in Hyderabad (now part of India). Initially, it emerged as a social organisation with the vision of establishing a unified India governed by Islamic principles, positioning itself against the partition. Over time, Jamaat evolved into a political entity, focusing on both West and East Pakistan after the 1947 partition. During the 1971 Liberation War, Jamaat opposed the growing Bengali nationalist movement. Instead of supporting Bangladesh’s independence, it sided with West Pakistan, advocating for a unified Muslim state. Jamaat became a key collaborator with the Pakistan Army in their military crackdown against East Pakistan. Its leaders and members played a significant role in supporting the Pakistani military’s efforts to suppress the Bengali liberation struggle, thus deepening their involvement in the war and the violence that accompanied it.

The Pakistan Army established the East Pakistan Central Peace Committee (Shanti Committee) during the war, with Jamaat-e-Islami’s Ameer, Ghulam Azam, as a founding member. This committee helped orchestrate attacks against Bengali liberation fighters and played a central role in the creation of the Razakar, a paramilitary force made up of approximately 10,789 volunteers. Razakar, along with other collaborators, committed atrocities, including war crimes and human rights violations, targeting Bengali fighters, intellectuals, women, and Hindu communities. This brutality of these forces led to the massacre of three million people, a dark chapter in Bangladesh’s history. Through its involvement with the Razakars, Jamaat-e-Islami was complicit in inciting violence against its fellow Bengali citizens. Among the most horrific acts were the systematic executions of over 200 Bengali intellectuals, the mass rape of an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 women, and the violent persecution of Hindus. The auxiliary factions of Razakar-al-Shams and al-Badr—were formed by Jamaat's student wing, Islamic Chhatra Sangha, further deepening the party's role in the genocidal violence. The legacy of these war crimes continues to haunt Bangladesh to this day.

Following Bangladesh’s independence, Jamaat-e-Islami was banned in 1972 under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s leadership. The party was accused of "misusing religion for political purposes," with its anti-secular, anti-democratic stance seen as incompatible with Bangladesh’s constitutional values. The ban, compounded by the prohibition of religious-affiliated political parties and the establishment of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) Act in 1973, marked a period of political isolation for Jamaat. Top leaders fled, and members kept a low profile. However, after Mujibur Rahman’s assassination in 1975, Jamaat-e-Islami found new opportunities. The military regime of Ziaur Rahman lifted the ban on communal organisations in 1977, allowing Jamaat’s political resurgence.

Under Ziaur Rahman and General Ershad, Jamaat re-entered the political arena. In the 1986 elections, it secured 10 seats. By 2001, Jamaat became the third-largest political force through a coalition with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), even holding key ministerial positions. The party’s student wing, Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS), founded in 1977, gained significant influence, radicalising madrassas and universities and engaging in violent activities against the Awami League government. ICS was also reported to have ties with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Despite this political rise, Jamaat faced strong opposition from civil society, especially after the formation of the Ekattorer Ghatak-Dalal Nirmul Committee in 1992, which targeted and protested against Jamaat’s wartime actions.

Under the Awami League’s governance from 2008 to 2024, Jamaat-e-Islami faced significant repercussions for its actions during the 1971 Liberation War. The 2009 amendment and enforcement of the 1973 ICT Act led to the trial of Jamaat’s top leaders for war crimes, severely tarnishing the party’s political future. In 2013, the Bangladesh High Court declared Jamaat's political registration with the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) illegal, citing its incompatibility with the Constitution. That same year, Dhaka witnessed the Shahbagh Movement, where civil society demanded the death penalty for war criminals and a complete ban on Jamaat. Jamaat activists responded with violence against the peaceful protesters, further isolating the party. In 2020, a breakaway faction of former Jamaat members formed a new political party, Amar Bangladesh, driven by disillusionment with Jamaat’s refusal to apologise for its role in the 1971 war.

Since the fall of the Hasina government, Jamaat-e-Islami has re-emerged in Bangladesh’s political landscape. Although not officially represented, party members have found a place in the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, following the lifting of the party ban after its role in inciting violence during the July protests. As the nation prepares for a potential democratic transition, Islamic parties, including Jamaat, are attempting to reclaim political ground. Jamaat and its student wing have sought to rebrand themselves as ‘moderate’ and ‘democratic,’ positioning themselves as proponents of a ‘peaceful transition to an Islamic welfare state’. Despite these claims, Jamaat-e-Islami’s political resurgence must be approached with caution. Its long-standing ties with international radical Islamist organisations raise concerns, suggesting that Jamaat 2.0 is an old entity in a new guise.

Jamaat’s refusal to confront its past and its continued denial of its role in war crimes during the 1971 Liberation War is a stark insult to the millions of martyrs who sacrificed their lives for Bangladesh’s independence. Jamaat’s ideological inflexibility poses a significant threat to the values of Bangladesh’s hard-won freedom.