Russia’s Soviet-era arms stockpile is running low — and it's turning to North Korea, Iran and China to stay in the fight

Russia’s Soviet-era arms stockpile is running low — and it's turning to North Korea, Iran and China to stay in the fight (Photo AFP)

Russia’s once-vast stockpiles of Soviet-era military equipment are now severely depleted, with the volume of shipments from storage sites to the front lines dropping sharply to pre-2022 levels, according to a logistics analysis by the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) Institute, as reported by the Financial Times.

Depleted reserves and older tanks on the battlefield

At the height of the invasion in 2022, Russia moved 242,000 tonnes of military materiel from its principal storage hubs. But that figure is expected to fall to just 119,000 tonnes in 2025. Analysts say the drop reflects dwindling resources. “The better quality and easily-restored equipment would have been the first to be moved,” said Pavlo Shkurenko of the KSE Institute. Russia has relied heavily on outdated tanks, including the T-72 and T-80, and even older T-54 models from the 1940s.

Fewer armoured vehicles, but shifting tactics

Some caution that the drop in hardware doesn’t automatically signal a collapse in Russia’s combat capability. “Russia’s tactics have evolved to use fewer armoured vehicles,” said military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady. He added that Russia is simultaneously investing heavily in rebuilding its stocks, suggesting preparation for longer-term conflicts.

Ammunition flows from North Korea and Iran

KSE’s findings point to a stark shift in sourcing: over half of Russia’s explosive materials in 2024 came via the port of Nakhodka, near North Korea. That’s 250,000 tonnes of explosives—compared to zero before the invasion. Ukraine’s intelligence chief estimates 40% of Russia’s ammunition now originates in North Korea, with support including ballistic missiles, howitzers, and even troops. Another 13,000 tonnes of explosive material appears to have entered through the Caspian region, likely from Iran.

China’s role: Indirect, but vital

While Beijing has not officially supplied lethal aid, China’s contribution to Russia’s military manufacturing capacity is significant. Shipments of components and machinery from Russia’s eastern border into domestic defence production sites have nearly doubled since 2021, surpassing 3 million tonnes. KSE analyst Lucas Risinger said: “Even if they claim they’re not sending lethal aid, China is supplying Russia with the machinery and components it needs to keep the war machine running.”

The findings confirm what Western and Ukrainian officials have increasingly warned: that Moscow’s battlefield persistence is being sustained not by its own industrial base, but by a growing dependence on North Korean ammunition, Iranian explosives, and Chinese manufacturing support.