China-Taiwan Tensions: A shift in cross-Strait policy language 

china military drill taiwan

China’s latest military exercises around Taiwan, dubbed the ‘Joint Sword 2024B’, offer two important learnings. The first is that such broad and comprehensive military exercises, featuring naval, airpower, and often missile elements, have become a regular feature in China’s response toolkit vis-à-vis Taiwan. Second, the ability of the Chinese military to encircle Taiwan completely, as depicted by such exercises, sets a dangerous and escalatory precedent for regional peace and stability.

The Context

On October 10, Taiwan marked its 113th national day anniversary, following closely after China, which celebrated its 75th national day on October 1. In what were his first addresses as President during Taiwan’s National Day celebrations, Lai Ching-te addressed large gatherings over the course of a week. Few of his remarks, however, left a bad taste in Beijing’s mouth.

In his pre-national day gala remarks, for example, Lai firmly told his audiences that China must not be referred to as the ‘Motherland’, and it is, in fact, Taiwan that deserves the title due to its older “age” as compared to the mainland. He laid great emphasis on protecting Taiwan’s sovereignty and status as an “independent country.” In his ‘Double Ten’ day remarks, he further implied that China has failed to play the role of major power and peace broker in the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts.

Most importantly, Lai gave an impetus to a major shift in policy language vis-à-vis China, which was already underway in the latter part of President Tsai Ing-wen’s tenure. It is the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s increasing willingness to broach the idea of cooperation with Beijing, given that a lack of regular diplomatic communication has led to grave tensions in cross-Strait relations. To illustrate this, Lai said in his speech, that he hopes that the two sides can fulfill the world’s “expectations” of China’s peace-brokering role in major conflicts, together. This quite clearly means that the DPP, long accused by China of not talking to them, has now, under Lai’s presidency, thrown the metaphorical ball in Beijing’s court.

Aftermath

Even though some may interpret Lai’s ‘Double Ten’ address as implicit and cooperative, it evoked an angry reaction from Beijing. Subsequently, the People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theater Command launched the ‘Joint Sword 2024B’ military drills, aimed at coercing Taiwan and creating a new normal. The exercises demonstrated the integrated capabilities of China’s four services, i.e. army, navy, air force, and rocket force, in a Taiwan encirclement simulation. The PLA deemed the manoeuvre necessary to “thwart separatism” apparently promoted in Lai’s remarks.

This is the fourth time such a comprehensive exercise has been conducted by the PLA around Taiwan. The first such exercise, occurring in the aftermath of the then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022, took the world by surprise. Soon, however, China incorporated such a show of force into its toolkit to respond to any major event in Taiwan. Subsequently, China conducted similar exercises when Tsai transited the US in April 2023, when Lai was inaugurated in May 2024, and more recently, when he addressed the pre- and national day gatherings.

The drills conducted in May this year, dubbed ‘Joint Sword 2024A’, similarly demonstrated the encirclement of Taiwan. Though there are differences in the capabilities that both editions of the exercise showcased, the similar naming convention indicates pre-determination and preparation. The event to which the ‘B’ edition could be used as a counter-response remained unclear – until recently.

Side-by-side representation of encirclement zones in Joint Sword 2024A (May) and 2024B (October) drills. (Sourced from 81.cn)

The 2024A exercise, for example, featured one of the largest displays of Coast Guard (CCG) force by China. However, while the CCG was evidently missing from the 2024B exercise, it did feature a more packed encirclement of Taiwan than its predecessor. In fact, the only region it broadly left out was the area surrounding Penghu country, one of the three outlying islands under the control of the Taiwanese government. The other two islands, Kinmen and Matsu, despite being a part of Taiwan, lie closer to mainland territory, and are regular sites of sorties by the CCG.

The exercises serve larger purposes too – demonstrating the PLA’s capability to defend China’s regional interests, and its commitment to combat preparedness in real-time scenarios. In this regard, the integration elements of the exercises are meant to be a symbol of faith in the PLA’s training and reform process, despite its lack of warfighting experience. Together with other regular drills at a smaller scale, as well as continued drone and naval incursions conducted beyond the Taiwan Strait median line, these large-scale drills by the PLA keep Taiwanese defences under pressure, and on high alert.

Conclusion

Through its various statements and actions, Beijing has effectively declared Lai a ‘separatist’ who must be ‘thwarted’ and controlled. As the PLA gradually demonstrates the success of large-scale drills for both deterrence and as a capability-check, such drills are only likely to become a more common occurrence. From the Taiwanese perspective, too, however, responding to such military manoeuvres will become a part and parcel of defence and foreign policy. With neither the will of the Taiwanese people to celebrate the national day nor the mainland’s intention to coerce Taiwan going away anytime soon, structural tensions in cross-Strait relations are likely to remain a central feature of regional dynamics.