How India nearly took out Pakistan’s nuclear site in the 1980s, but didn’t

“A historic window to safeguard India’s long-term security was squandered, for short-term diplomatic comfort,” Sarma wrote. (Picture: Indira Gandhi at the nuclear test site in Pokhran after India tested its first nuclear device | AP)

On June 15, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma triggered fresh political debate by accusing the Congress of making a 'historic blunder' in the 1980s by allowing Pakistan to become a nuclear power.

In a long post on X, Sarma said India had the capability and intelligence support to carry out a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear site in Kahuta but backed off due to political hesitation.

Congresss Historic Blunder: How India Let Pakistan Become a Nuclear StateAt a time when nations today act decisively to neutralize nuclear threats, Indias tragic inaction during the 1980s remains a cautionary tale of what could have beenand what wasnt. The Missed
Himanta Biswa Sarma (@himantabiswa) June 14, 2025

He claimed that:

• Intelligence from R&AW had confirmed uranium enrichment activity at Pakistan’s Kahuta facility.
• Israel had offered operational support, including intel and joint strike planning.
• India’s military and security agencies were reportedly on board.
• Jamnagar Air Base was chosen as a potential launch point.
• Indira Gandhi initially approved the strike but then backed out fearing global repercussions.
• Rajiv Gandhi later shelved the plan permanently, opting for diplomacy under foreign pressure.

What was happening at Kahuta?

By the late 1970s, Pakistan was rapidly advancing its uranium enrichment programme at Kahuta, near Rawalpindi. The facility was central to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions under then-military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq.

The roots of this programme trace back to Pakistan’s political response after losing the 1971 war to India. Then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously vowed to build a nuclear bomb, even if we have to eat grass.'

Kahuta became home to Pakistan’s uranium enrichment centrifuges, developed with help from A.Q. Khan, a metallurgist who had stolen blueprints from a Dutch nuclear facility. By the early 1980s, India’s intelligence agencies, particularly R&AW, had confirmed Kahuta’s role in producing weapons-grade uranium.

What was the proposed Israel-India operation?

According to multiple accounts, also cited by a report by Times of India, including Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Weapons Conspiracy by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Israel had proposed a joint airstrike operation with India to destroy the Kahuta nuclear facility.

The plan was simple but high-risk:

• Israeli F-15 and F-16 fighter jets would fly into Indian airspace.
• They would use Indian bases in Jamnagar (Gujarat) and Udhampur (J&K) for refuelling or staging.
• India’s Jaguar deep-strike aircraft would also support the mission.
• The operation was to resemble Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, but with Indian cooperation.
• Israel’s offer was motivated by its own fears of an “Islamic bomb” falling into the hands of countries like Libya or Iran, both of whom
• had ties with Pakistan. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin even wrote to UK PM Margaret Thatcher in 1979 warning of the threat.

• While initial reports suggest Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was inclined to accept the Israeli proposal, the mission was ultimately called off for a mix of domestic and geopolitical reasons:
• Political instability in India: Punjab was in ferment due to the Bhindranwale insurgency. Kashmir was showing early signs of unrest.
• The nation had barely recovered from the Emergency (1975–77).
• Pakistan's proximity and threat of retaliation: A strike on Kahuta could lead to direct war. Unlike Israel’s Osirak raid in distant Iraq, this time India would bear the full brunt of Pakistani counterstrikes.

• The CIA reportedly tipped off Pakistan about a potential Israeli-Indian strike.
• The US had started supplying F-16s to Pakistan in 1982 as part of Cold War strategy in Afghanistan.
• Any attack on Kahuta could damage India’s relations with Washington, which was using Islamabad to funnel support to Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets.
• Change in leadership: After Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi took over as PM. His government shelved the strike plan entirely, choosing diplomacy instead.

In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto signed a landmark agreement prohibiting attacks on each other’s nuclear installations.

Under this agreement, the two countries have since exchanged annual lists of their nuclear sites every January 1 to ensure transparency. It has remained one of the few stable, enduring bilateral agreements despite multiple military confrontations.

What happened after: Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998

A decade later, in May 1998, Pakistan officially became a nuclear state by conducting five nuclear tests, just weeks after India’s Pokhran-II.

Since then, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent has served as a strategic shield. During the 1999 Kargil War, Pakistan was able to prevent India from escalating full-scale retaliation.

It has also emboldened Pakistan’s use of proxy terror, with India responding in recent years through cross-border strikes, including the 2016 Uri surgical strikes and 2019 Balakot air raid.

This is the 'nuclear blackmail' that Himanta Biswa Sarma referred to, suggesting that Pakistan’s arsenal has limited India’s conventional military responses.