'Islamic NATO', Bagram, Gaza: What Trump might press Pakistan to do as he meets Shehbaz and Asim Munir this week

The stage is set for one of the year’s most consequential, and controversial, diplomatic encounters. Later this week, US President Donald Trump will sit down with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly. Officially, it is being billed as a routine engagement. In reality, the timing and guest list speak volumes.

Today, Trump is also convening a closed-door huddle of Arab and Muslim leaders, including those from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan, to discuss regional security and the Gaza war. The meeting takes place barely a week before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets Trump in Washington on September 29, and against the backdrop of Trump’s increasingly vocal plans to “retake” Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase.

For Islamabad, this is less a moment of prestige than a high-stakes test: it finds itself drawn into Washington’s designs on Gaza, Qatar and Afghanistan while battling devastating floods, economic freefall and growing dependence on China. For New Delhi, the optics are equally fraught. The prospect of a reinvigorated US–Pakistan alignment raises uncomfortable questions about how far Washington is prepared to go in outsourcing regional leverage to a partner with a long record of duplicity.

What Trump, Shehbaz and Munir are likely to discuss

Last week, Geo News reported that Trump and Sharif were expected to focus on Pakistan’s recent floods, trade ties and what Islamabad calls Israel’s “unprovoked” airstrikes on Qatar. Yet the inclusion of Pakistan’s powerful Army Chief at a meeting ostensibly between two heads of government points to a far broader and more sensitive agenda.

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Geo News and other Pakistani outlets have also suggested that the post-May skirmish tensions between India and Pakistan are likely to feature in discussions with President Trump. Islamabad has publicly lauded Washington’s role in “resolving” military tensions and even floated nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. New Delhi, however, has flatly denied any third-party involvement, maintaining that ceasefire talks were strictly bilateral.

Trump is almost certain to raise the Gaza war, pressing Pakistan to take a more public and aligned stance with US diplomatic positions. He may seek Pakistani cooperation in ceasefire initiatives, or even logistical and diplomatic support.

Given how quickly regional opinion has shifted after Israeli actions, including the strike on Qatar, Trump may want Pakistan to help steady Muslim-majority governments’ reactions, both to reassure Gulf partners and to project US leadership.

This dovetails with Pakistan’s own bid to rally the Muslim world under its banner, positioning itself as the self-styled leader of the global Islamic community. In speeches and summits, Islamabad highlights its status as the “only Islamic nuclear power” while casting itself as the defender of Muslim causes.

Munir, the country’s de facto ruler, has styled himself as a champion of the Ummah, floating ideas such as an “Islamic NATO” to project power abroad and shore up support at home. But behind the grandstanding lies a bankrupt economy, eroding credibility and a military desperate for relevance.

It is believed that the “Islamic NATO” — a Muslim or Arab defence pact — following Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s recent pitch will also be part of Trump’s private conversations with Shehbaz Sharif and General Munir. The concept, which envisions an attack on one Arab or Islamic nation being treated as an attack on all, has circulated for years but has gained urgency after Israel’s strike on Doha. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have already announced an agreement committing both countries to treat an attack on one as an attack on the other.

Another major topic of discussion is likely to be the Bagram airbase. Trump has expressed desire to regain US control of Bagram, warning that if his demands are not met, “bad things are going to happen.” Pakistan may be asked to facilitate US access or influence negotiations with the Taliban concerning handing over Bagram, logistically or diplomatically. Munir may be seen as a crucial interlocutor by the US given Pakistan’s geographical proximity, historical role as a gatekeeper for US operations in Afghanistan, and intelligence ties. This could lead to Pakistan being pressured to give up leverage over the Taliban or support US demands that contradict Taliban insistence on non-interference, risking Pakistan being caught between US ambitions and Taliban resistance.

Finally, an underlying agenda will be countering China’s influence. The US see Pakistan as increasingly aligned with China via the Belt and Road Initiative, investment, infrastructure deals, and diplomatic alignment. Trump may push Pakistan to reduce its dependency on China, perhaps by seeking US investment instead or cooperating on US strategic goals in the region that run counter to Chinese ambitions. Pakistan will have to weigh whether embracing US overtures means provoking Beijing, risking economic and diplomatic consequences.

Why this meeting should raise eyebrows in Delhi

India will be watching this meeting closely because many of the items on the table implicate India directly. Any US push that encourages Pakistan to play mediator or broker access to Taliban-held Afghanistan, especially regarding Bagram, could undermine India’s strategic interest in having a stable Afghanistan not dominated by Pakistani influence. If Pakistan becomes the primary conduit for US military or diplomatic activity in Afghanistan, India could fear marginalisation of its own voice.

Secondly, if Pakistan commits to stronger joint security arrangements with Gulf or US partners (such as the Saudi-Pakistan pact), this could shift regional power balances. India, which has built its own relations in the Gulf, might find itself competing for influence, especially if Pakistani overtures are rewarded with US or Gulf investment.

Also, India has consistently condemned violations of sovereignty, such as Israel’s strike on Qatar. If Pakistan aligns publicly with US positions that are softer on Israeli actions, Delhi might see this as inconsistent or opportunistic. Or Pakistan may be coerced into statements that complicate India’s diplomatic posture.

Moreover, any US pressure on cross-border terrorism (where India frequently raises Pakistan’s role in supporting certain militant groups) could force Sharif and Munir to make commitments that domestically may be politically unpopular. India may benefit if Pakistan is constrained or weakened by such demands, but also risk instability at the border if Pakistan responds with nationalist pushback.

Trump’s cosying up to Munir: Risks and potential backfire for Pakistan

Trump’s outreach to Asim Munir seems designed to acknowledge Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, especially regarding the Taliban, and to make Islamabad feel it has leverage in the current US strategic calculus. But this courting has many pitfalls for Pakistan.

First, aligning closely with US military demands or diplomatic pressure exposes Pakistan to accusations of being a junior partner or fixer for US policy, rather than a sovereign actor setting its own agenda. Over decades, Pakistan has been alternately courted and chastised by the US, depending on American strategic needs. If Munir commits to enabling US access to Bagram or facilitating pressure on the Taliban, and the Taliban resist or retaliate, Pakistan could be blamed both by inside Afghan forces and by internal Pakistani opposition groups for collaborating with foreign powers.

Second, co-operation in contentious matters like Bagram could trigger backlash with the Taliban itself. The Taliban have already stated that any US effort to retake Bagram would lead them to “fully prepare for war” and that any Pakistani assistance would convert Islamabad into an “enemy state.” If Pakistan is seen as moving forward with US demands, it may find itself in direct confrontation with Afghan entities, which could destabilize the border regions and open up new fronts of hostility.

Third, public opinion in Pakistan may turn sharply against Munir or Sharif if cooperation with US initiatives is perceived as selling out. This is especially sensitive given Pakistan’s strong nationalistic culture, its history of resisting foreign military presence, and the long narrative of self-respect in foreign policy. Any perceived acquiescence to US pressure may undermine the legitimacy of both civil and military leadership.

Fourth, reliance on US ambition and promises is historically unreliable. US administrations change, and US support often comes with strings that may erode Pakistan’s autonomy. For example, US demands for counterterrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing, and territorial access have previously required Pakistan to accept constraints that later became politically controversial or economically costly.

Lastly, Pakistan’s gambit to increase its strategic importance vis-a-vis the US might antagonise China. If Pakistan shifts too noticeably toward the US, Beijing may cut back investment, reallocate projects, or lean more heavily on India to counterbalance. That risk is real in the current geopolitical environment, where China is watching US efforts to reclaim influence in the region.