‘Dragon and elephant must walk together’: Can India really trust China? Key concerns explained

Decoding China’s interests in renewing ties with New Delhi

Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping on Sunday on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and said he is “committed” to taking India-China relations “forward based on mutual trust, respect, and sensitivity.”

Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his opening remarks during the bilateral meeting, said it is the “right choice” for India and China to be “friends,” emphasizing the importance of being good neighbours and noting that “the Dragon and the Elephant must walk together.”

The SCO Summit is being held in Tianjin, China, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi is also scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin. This comes amid ongoing criticism from the Trump administration, which has imposed 50% tariffs on India and accused New Delhi of 'fueling' the war in Ukraine that began in February 2022.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a regional bloc that India joined in 2017. It now comprises 10 member states, including China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian nations.

Together, the SCO represents around 40% of the world’s population, with a combined GDP of $26.8 trillion. The group holds substantial energy reserves and strategic resources, positioning it as a key platform for regional cooperation and a counterbalance to Western-led initiatives.

The bilateral meeting between the Indian and Chinese leaders is seen as a high-stakes opportunity to improve ties, and given that both countries maintain close relations with Russia, it could potentially pave the way for a revival of the RIC (Russia-India-China) trilateral framework.

What is the RIC troika, and why does it matter to India?

The RIC (Russia-India-China) trilateral was first conceptualized in the 1990s, a period when India was liberalizing its economy and seeking closer ties with the West, especially the United States.

During this time, New Delhi maintained a cautious distance from the grouping. India’s 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests further strained relations, particularly with China, which strongly condemned the move, reducing momentum for the troika.

Tensions deepened following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which severely damaged India-China relations and increased mutual distrust, effectively sidelining the RIC framework.

Now, as China, Russia, and India each face varying degrees of economic pressure from the United States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is being positioned as a platform to promote a “multipolar world order” that counters Western hegemony.

Collectively, Russia, India, and China represent a GDP (PPP) of USD 53.9 trillion, accounting for approximately 33% of global economic output. Their combined exports exceed USD 5 trillion, and they hold around USD 4.7 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, according to a report by The Economic Times.

As the world grapples with rising instability and unpredictability in global politics, particularly due to the disruptive policies of Donald Trump, the renewed convergence of these three Asian powers could have far-reaching implications for the evolving world order.

However, the situation is more complex than it appears on the surface. India cannot simply overlook the past or fully trust China, which has repeatedly acted against its interests.

Why India should not blindly trust China? 

For over a year, India and China have engaged in sustained diplomatic efforts to stabilise their bilateral relationship and reduce the risk of conflict. However, despite these ongoing talks, fundamental differences persist, particularly over the unresolved border dispute.

In October 2024, both countries reached a partial understanding to ease the military standoff in Ladakh, which began with Chinese incursions in 2020.

Nearly five years after the Galwan clashes, India and China continue to maintain between 50,000 and 60,000 troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The standoff has not ended; it has merely frozen into a tense watchfulness.

The gradual resumption of direct flights, visa issuance, and limited border trade was the result of these long-standing diplomatic negotiations, not merely a reaction to mounting international pressure or actions by the Trump administration.

Yet, the border issue remains a major obstacle to deeper ties. India cannot ignore the reality that China has occupied more than 43,000 square kilometres of Indian territory in Aksai Chin for decades, disputes India’s sovereignty over Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, and continues to support Pakistan diplomatically, militarily, and strategically.

The 24th round of talks on the India-China boundary dispute was held on August 19, 2025, in New Delhi, led by India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Notably, following his visit to India, Wang Yi traveled to Pakistan, highlighting that even as Beijing extends an olive branch to New Delhi, it is not sidelining its traditional ally.

Tensions escalated further after the deadly April 22, 2025, terrorist attack in Pahalgam, which claimed 26 innocent lives. In response, India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

During this military escalation, Pakistan reportedly used Chinese-made weapons against Indian targets. Meanwhile, Turkey openly supported Pakistan during the crisis.

In a parallel development, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, during a meeting in Beijing, that China is ready to strengthen strategic coordination with Turkey to resist "power politics" on the global stage.

These developments underscore the complexity of India’s regional security environment and highlight the deep geopolitical entanglements that continue to shape its ties with China, Pakistan, and beyond.

Beijing’s olive branch comes with thorns? 

New Delhi must carefully weigh how best to safeguard its own interests amid an increasingly volatile mix of geopolitics and trade wars.

History provides important warnings: the 1962 border conflict, the 1963 Shaksgam territory cession, the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, and the 2022 refusal to allow Wang Yi to meet with Modi all highlight the risks of placing trust without thorough verification.

India has observed Beijing’s unilateral actions with suspicion: the mega-dam on the Yarlung Zangpo threatens water flows into the Brahmaputra; Chinese survey ships dock in Sri Lanka and the Maldives under the guise of research; and Beijing engages Indian media and intellectual circles to soften perceptions even as mistrust deepens.

India has not forgotten 1963, when Pakistan handed over the Shaksgam Valley, part of Indian territory under illegal occupation, to China. The valley remains under Chinese control today. Such historical precedents make separating dialogue from deception exceptionally difficult.

The Brahmaputra dam, approved in late 2024 and touted as the “project of the century,” is the largest hydropower dam in the world, at an estimated cost of US $167 billion. While celebrated in China, downstream India and Bangladesh see it as a strategic weapon, with potential ecological, food security, and geopolitical consequences.

Can India become a dumping ground for Chinese products? 

Concerns for India extend beyond border issues to encompass trade relations as well. Although bilateral trade between India and China has been on the rise, the trade imbalance remains heavily skewed in China's favor.

From April to July 2025-26, India's exports to China increased by 19.97 percent, reaching $5.75 billion, while imports grew by 13.06 percent to $40.65 billion, as reported by Business Line. In the fiscal year 2024-25, India's exports were valued at $14.25 billion, whereas imports stood at $113.5 billion.

The trade deficit, calculated as the difference between imports and exports, has expanded significantly, rising from $1.1 billion in 2003-04 to $99.2 billion in 2024-25. According to the report, China's share of India's total trade deficit, which amounted to $283 billion in the last fiscal year, was about 35 percent. This gap was $85.1 billion in 2023-24.

What exacerbates the situation is China's dominance across nearly every key industrial category within India's import basket. This includes sectors such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, construction materials, renewable energy, and consumer goods, as noted by the think tank GTRI.

India has voiced its long-standing concerns over limited market access in China. It responded by selectively reopening its economy to targeted Chinese investments, especially in the electronics and infrastructure sectors.

What are the options India is left with? 

Amid evolving geopolitical dynamics, US President Donald Trump advanced his “Make America Great Again” agenda by imposing tariffs on several countries, including India.

On August 7, Trump announced a 25 percent duty on Indian goods, accompanied by reciprocal tariffs of the same rate imposed by the US. Additionally, a further 25 percent tariff was applied to India’s imports of Russian oil.

The United States is India’s largest export market. In 2024, bilateral trade in goods reached $129 billion, with India exporting $87 billion worth of merchandise and maintaining a trade surplus of $45.8 billion with the US.

The doubling of tariffs now poses a significant threat to this trade balance.

Industry estimates indicate that approximately 55 percent of India’s exports to the US will be adversely affected by the increased duties.

Currently, India has limited alternatives beyond relying on China; however, it must adopt precautionary measures given its dependence on China for manufacturing. The strategic alignment of India, China, and Russia could create a formidable bloc capable of challenging the United States, often referred to as "Uncle Sam," and questioning the assumption that global power revolves solely around US dominance.