OPINION | US Disengagement from East Asia: Rhetoric or reality?

The reality of US engagement in East Asia points towards continuity and, in some respects, deepening involvement

As the Trump administration’s rhetoric fuels speculation about American disengagement from East Asia, the reality on the ground tells a very different story. Data show increased troop deployments, expanded defence funding, and a sustained US presence in the region, embedded in long-standing alliance frameworks and institutional networks.

Over recent months, the Trump administration’s “America First” approach has reignited fears of US disengagement from East Asia. President Trump’s repeated criticisms of US alliances, calls for allies to pay their fair share, and threats to withdraw troops from Japan and South Korea have led many to question Washington’s commitment to regional security. Public remarks about owning American bases in South Korea rather than leasing them have further deepened anxieties among allies who depend on the United States for deterrence against regional adversaries.

This perception of strategic retreat has been reinforced by Trump’s characterisation of alliances as bad deals and his reluctance to commit publicly to defending partners in potential conflicts, such as those involving Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula. These perceptions have also been strengthened by the latest reports of US troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe. This tone appeared to accelerate the pace of the US disengagement under the Trump administration.

Simultaneously, the administration’s economic policies have complemented this perception of disengagement. The imposition of tariffs on Japan, South Korea, and India, while maintaining a comparatively conciliatory stance towards China, has been seen as a pivot away from economic cooperation with allies and towards transactional engagement with Beijing. Washington’s new approaches to trade have prioritised short-term economic bargaining over long-term strategic alignment. By blaming its allies for unfair trade practices and pursuing bilateral negotiations on unequal terms, the administration has appeared to weaken the cohesion of key regional frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and AUKUS.

Despite this perception, the reality of US engagement in East Asia points towards continuity and, in some respects, deepening involvement. On the military front, the United States has sustained and even increased its forward presence across key regional outposts. As of mid-2025, there were 53,912 US military personnel in Japan, 23,766 in South Korea, and 6,929 in Guam, compared with 52,603, 23,291, and 6,725, respectively in December 2024. Even the reports of a supposed withdrawal from South Korea earlier in 2025 revealed a redeployment towards Guam. A move prioritising China over North Korea, underscoring that Washington’s focus remains deterrence oriented rather than isolationist.

This expanding footprint has been accompanied by significant financial commitments. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), a strategic framework designed to strengthen US capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, continues to grow. Under the Trump administration, the administration has proposed $10.004 billion for the 2026 fiscal year, an increase from $9.060 billion in 2025, surpassing the final budgets proposed under the Biden administration. While the earlier iteration of the PDI emphasised modernisation and training, the new framework prioritises strengthening infrastructure, innovation, and joint operations readiness across the region. This clearly indicates that the United States is not merely maintaining its presence but enhancing it in preparation for long-term competition with China.

The legislative dimension further underscores this sustained commitment. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026 was passed by the US Senate on 9 October 2025, amidst an intense government shutdown. The Act allocates additional funding to strengthen US defence cooperation with Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India and the Philippines, as well as through the Quad and AUKUS partnerships.

Its bipartisan passage during these highly polarising times reflects a wider consensus in Washington that countering China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific remains a national priority. This consensus, thus far, cuts across party lines and continues regardless of changes in leadership. Moreover, congressional funding for frameworks such as the Quad demonstrates that, despite fluctuating presidential rhetoric, the institutional commitment to U.S. presence in the region remains firmly in place. Despite a dominant role of the executive, the congressional support can prove to be a significant challenge for any moves the administration might make to disengage. This was seen most prominently during the Congressional resistance for US disengagement from Syria during the first Trump administration.

This inconsistency between rhetoric and activity can be viewed as a potential tactic used by the Trump administration to pressure allies into greater burden-sharing. By questioning alliance commitments, the administration nudges them towards higher defence spending, enabling the US to sustain regional deterrence with reduced financial strain. However, this approach has the potential to negatively impact the relationship between the US and its East Asian allies who might perceive the US, especially under the current administration, as unreliable. This also coincides with a larger pattern observed since the first Trump administration with the setting of unrealistic goals resulting in a rhetoric unmatched by desired outcomes. The first Trump administration failed to arrive at its electoral promise of exiting from foreign wars in Syria, Afghanistan and Africa, and closing down financially unsustainable overseas bases. This failure was attributed to the institutionalised nature of US power that made US foreign-military commitments deeply embedded in alliances, regional security frameworks and military planning cycles. This institutionalised nature of US military presence resulted in significant resistance from the military leadership, bureaucracy, the State department officials, and the US Congress, including prominent Republicans. Today’s commitments and presence have only increased considering the growing threat of conflict over Taiwan and increasing rivalry between the US and China, resulting in an even more sustained institutional resistance against US disengagement.

As China’s military power rises and regional flashpoints such as Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula persist, the institutional architecture of US foreign and defence policy will continue to resist any meaningful withdrawal. For allies, the challenge is not that the US is leaving, but that its commitment now comes with higher political and financial expectations. In this sense, US disengagement is more rhetorical than substantive, and the Indo-Pacific is likely to remain the central theatre of American strategy for the foreseeable future.

(Abhishek Kadiyala is a Research Analyst at Takshashila Institution’s Indo-Pacific program with a focus on United States and US-India relations.)

Views expressed in this article do not represent the views of the institution.