US-China rivalry intensifies in quantum technology race and security

The most significant outcome of this geopolitical rivalry for quantum technology could be the breakneck progress made in a short time.

By Shobhankita Reddy

Quantum technology is still in the early stages of advancement. By harnessing the extraordinary processing power of subatomic particles, it promises computational efficiency and capabilities far superior to even the most advanced supercomputers today. This would have wide-ranging implications in both civilian and military use cases, such as life sciences, space exploration, cybersecurity, defence, and financial services. The first nation to achieve a breakthrough in the field could potentially alter the global security and power order, skewing the balance of power in their favour. This is raising the stakes of the race.

This rivalry is evident in four ways.

Firstly, there is a decoupling of research collaboration and publications between the two nations. From 2011 to 2020, the US produced twice as many highly cited papers as China, but the landscape has shifted since 2022, with China now dominating research publications in quantum technologies.

This shift has also been marked by a rapid decline in joint publications and cross-border research between China and Western nations, a sharp contrast with earlier years. In fact, Pan Jianwei, a central figure in China’s quantum mission, earned his doctorate from the University of Vienna under the mentorship of Nobel laureate Anton Zeilinger before returning to China.

Secondly, the US and China have distinct areas of specialisation in quantum technologies. While the US dominates in quantum computing, China leads in quantum communications.

This is reflective of the different R&D ecosystems in both countries. In China, the quantum initiative is led by a statist, expansionist, long-term view. This enables coordinated and centralised efforts to execute infrastructure megaprojects, such as the communication network spanning 12,000 km, including ground-based fibre optic links and satellite connections. Private capital and industry, however, play a more significant role in the US.

Thirdly, over the past year, the US has placed several restrictions on quantum exports and investments to quantum research labs and other entities in China. Critical items affected by these controls are quantum computers and their essential components, dilution refrigerators necessary for manipulating subatomic particles at low temperatures, and error correction software and algorithms that are key to stabilising quantum operations.

Additionally, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) requires US companies to disclose information on foreign nationals from “sensitive” countries working in quantum technology.

Lastly, technical standards are increasingly becoming a contentious issue between the two nations. For instance, the Biden administration pushed for a new joint technical committee on quantum standards to be formed in response to a Chinese representative chairing the existing working group. While this is unusual for the US, where standards are otherwise delegated to a bottom-up, open, industry-led due process, the fears are not completely unfounded. In 2021, China issued a national plan for technical standards emphasising their role in “building a modern socialist country” and detailing the need for “active participation in international standardisation activities”, with an entire section focused on critical emerging technologies.

The current trajectory of technological competition across a wide range of sectors, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, telecommunications and renewable energy, can be compared to the Cold War-era competition that led to breakthroughs in space technology, nuclear capabilities and advanced missile systems and laid the ground for many civilian use cases including the internet. 

As for quantum technology, the declining research collaboration will likely result in isolated and redundant efforts in the short term. Many technical challenges, such as error correction, qubit incoherence, hardware development, and scalability, still need to be solved, and the larger geopolitical influence on the technology is an irritant. The friction over technical standards reflects a more significant issue: decisions are likely to be driven by vested interests, not the merits or even a complete understanding of the underlying technology.

The effectiveness of US export controls on China, however, is still unclear. Coordinated, multilateral efforts with a coherent plan of action and timelines are needed to restrict critical technology from a select adversary. This has yet to materialise, allowing China to stockpile from various European countries, in turn leading to a tightened US export control regime.

Over the longer term, the most significant outcome of this geopolitical rivalry for quantum technology could be the breakneck progress made in a short time. In October 2024, Chinese scientists detailed an experimental proof-of-concept quantum study where they were able to break military-grade encryption. ‘Q-day’ — the moment when quantum capabilities could render current encryption methods obsolete, and in anticipation of which data globally is being plundered for a ‘harvest now, decrypt later’ strategy — is likely to be closer than was earlier estimated. There is a dire urgency for quantum-resistant cryptography and post-quantum secure communications to tackle this. 

(Shobhankita Reddy is a research analyst with the High-Tech Geopolitics Programme at the Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru.)

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.