Iran’s humiliation nukes the foundation of non-proliferation treaty

The conjecture is that Iran's enrichment operations might still be functional and past history shows that Tehran often ramps up its nuclear efforts under pressure rather than abandoning them. (Image Source: Pixabay)

The US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities on Saturday (June 21) has been described by President Donald Trump as a ‘spectacular military success’ and in his triumphant address to the nation he added "Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated."

The trigger for the Israeli attack on Iran on June 13 was an IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) resolution (June 12) that censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the agency's safeguards agreement and for not providing timely information about undeclared nuclear material and activities.

This non-compliance observation by the IAEA was used as the casus belli by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netenyahu to launch the first attack on Iran. However, since the munitions used by Israel were not able to damage the underground storage facilities of Iran’s nuclear assets, the US entered the fray with its far superior military capability to bomb the underground facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.

The question that arises is whether the attack on Saturday night by the US is likely to shut down Iran's nuclear weapon program for good, or will it strengthen Tehran’s resolve to obtain the nuclear capabilities it has long sought in a covert manner?

Iran claims that the damage caused by the US attack is not significant and an Iranian parliament member representing the city of Qom near the Fordo nuclear site was  quoted in Iranian state media as claiming that damage to the facility was “only above ground and can be restored.” He also added that any radioactive material that could have posed a danger to the public had been removed from the site beforehand.

Local sources in Iran and analysts have suggested on social media that the US strikes may not have fully crippled Iran's nuclear program. The conjecture is that Iran's enrichment operations might still be functional and past history shows that Tehran often ramps up its nuclear efforts under pressure rather than abandoning them.

Less than forthcoming cooperation with international inspectors could further obscure Iran's activities, potentially strengthening Tehran’s resolve to pursue nuclear capabilities covertly.

The US strikes may delay Iran's program by a decade or more, but without sustained IAEA monitoring and diplomatic pressure, they could galvanize Iran to rebuild covertly, especially if regional escalation continues.

The final outcome will depend on Iran's response to the American attack and the support Tehran may receive from major powers such as Russia and China. Even if there is a change of leadership in Iran from the Supreme Leader downwards – the Islamic regime will continue to stay in power and in my view, the Iranian nuclear program will be pursued in a covert manner.

A related issue is whether recent technological advances make covert nuclear weaponisation easier and the answer is: Yes, relatively.

Among different technological advances, the most critical is uranium enrichment. Modern centrifuge designs and laser enrichment techniques are more compact, efficient, and easier to hide than older gaseous diffusion methods. These allow smaller-scale operations to produce weapons-grade uranium with less detectable infrastructure.

Other factors aiding this trend are 3 D printing; AI that enables optimized nuclear weapon design and simulation of tests without physical detonations; miniaturization and precision technologies; metallurgical advances and the abundance of open-source information/knowledge makes acquiring nuclear weapons relatively easier.

But there are constraints. Obtaining adequate quantities of natural uranium and enriching it adequately to attain bomb-grade uranium, assembling the cores and mating the nuclear warhead with a long range missile are very complex tasks and demand the highest levels of technological and manufacturing competence across different verticals. The fact that Iran has yet to reach these levels is indicative of the many challenges that need to be surmounted, while traversing the covert path to acquiring a credible and deliverable nuclear weapon.

A contextual observation is that in recent wars - from Ukraine to Iran- nuclear weapon capable states have been the aggressors against non-nuclear weapon states. What is the likely impact of such actions on nuclear non-proliferation?

The perception of nuclear weapon states as aggressors, such as Russia in Ukraine or the current Israel-US attack on Iran undermines global non-proliferation efforts that are already weakened.  The fundamental  question that is swept away under considerations of realism and realpolitik is:  if nuclear weapon capable nations deem that acquiring and refining such apocalyptic  capability is an essential requirement for their core national security and in some cases regime survival; and inequitable protocols  such as the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation treaty)  are imposed, wherein all other states have to forego their nuclear weapon options and accept safety guarantees – can the guardian (the nuclear haves)  turn predator and expect that this norm will be accepted by the have-nots meekly?

Iran is the current test case but it merits recall that India had long refused to accept such an iniquitous global nuclear norm and remained outside the NPT as a non-signatory. Pakistan and Israel are also in the same category. All three nations are now nuclear weapon states.

After the end of the Cold War and the imploding of the former Soviet Union in December 1991, Ukraine along with Belarus and Kazakhstan gave up their nuclear weapons in return for what they thought were cast-iron security guarantees - that their sovereignty and territorial integrity would be safeguarded by the nuclear weapon states.

The Ukraine experience is a bitter lesson for Kyiv and this question has been raised often: would Russia have dared to attack a Ukraine that still had nuclear weapons? Libya in North Africa suffered a similar fate. North Korea has demonstrated how nuclear weapon capability can be used as a shield to deter major power intimidation and this is a lesson many others may internalize after the US attack on Iran.

Among the nations that could go down this path of seeking self-reliance in matters nuclear, some unlikely names surface. Japan, Germany, South Korea and Australia are US allies and may well conclude that they are better off with their own deterrent and much the same conclusion may be arrived at by nations such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  Perhaps even Taiwan.

Managing the global nuclear domain in an equitable and sustainable manner is imperative, for the world cannot afford to have a repeat of Nagasaki or Fukushima.

Mercifully for the world, the IAEA confirmed on Sunday (June 22) that there has been “no increase in off-site radiation levels” after the US strikes on Iran. This should not be a short sigh of relief and hopefully there will not be another 'spectacular military success’.