Can IMEC compete with the Belt and Road Initiative?

IMEC’s viability is crucial as it represents the only non-China trade corridor connecting India and Europe. (Representative image)

By Ayushi Saini

Launched on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi in 2023, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was touted as a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite not having taken off yet, the corridor remains a focal point in global connectivity discussions, with India viewing it as a crucial link to Europe and the Middle East. With Washington’s policy stance toward Beijing becoming more hawkish, the political impetus for the creation of an alternative democratised version to BRI is high. However, certain key challenges persist: the strategic stability of West Asia, unclear sources and quantum of financing, and the question of state capacities in the creation of this viable alternative that aims to bulwark China’s heft in Asia.

Launched a decade apart, it is interesting to compare the somewhat contrasting fundamentals of IMEC vis-a-vis the BRI.

How do they differ?

BRI and IMEC are two major connectivity projects aimed at enhancing economic integration among their partner countries. While the BRI, launched unilaterally by China in 2013, has expanded its partnerships over time, IMEC is a minilateral initiative which was introduced in 2023 by a group of eight countries. Although both corridors share similar objectives, their scope, scale, and strategic implications differ significantly.

BRI is a geopolitical and geo-economic initiative that aims to develop infrastructure to enhance trade, transportation, and policy coordination across Asia, Europe, and Africa. It consists of two major components: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, both of which are primarily focused on facilitating trade in goods. Beyond economic development, the BRI is widely regarded as a strategic tool for China’s global influence, particularly in regions such as Central Asia, where landlocked nations have embraced the initiative to overcome geographical constraints. However, the BRI has faced criticism for creating unsustainable debt burdens among participating countries. Many developing nations, heavily reliant on Chinese loans for large-scale infrastructure projects, risk long-term financial dependence on Beijing. For instance, the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka is often cited as a case under BRI where debt distress led to Chinese control over strategic infrastructure.

IMEC, by contrast, represents a more democratized framework, with multiple stakeholders collaborating to improve connectivity between India, the Middle East, and Europe. An "infrastructure for peace," as described by the United States, IMEC is an extension of the Abraham Accords and I2U2 (India, Isreal, UAE, US) minilateral arrangement.

The corridor comprises two segments: the eastern corridor, linking India to the Gulf, and the western corridor, connecting the Gulf to Europe. It primarily aims to facilitate trade in physical goods by integrating digital connectivity through undersea fibre-optic cables. This emphasis on high-speed, secure data transmission positions IMEC as a transformative initiative in the global clean energy transition. A key aspect of this effort is its alignment with India’s "One Sun, One World, One Grid" initiative, which seeks to enhance energy security through real-time monitoring and optimized energy distribution.

The BRI finances diverse projects, covering transportation, agriculture, and domestic economic programs like Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol. However, IMEC focuses on enhancing transportation connectivity through rail and sea routes rather than extensive road infrastructure.

While BRI is primarily funded through centralized Chinese investments, IMEC is expected to rely on a diversified pool of private investors and public-private partnerships.

Another key distinction lies in their approach to employment generation. The BRI has been criticized for prioritizing Chinese firms and workers for skilled jobs, often relegating local labour to low-wage, unskilled roles. This approach has raised concerns about human security in participating countries, as local job creation remains limited. In contrast, IMEC aims to foster economic growth by ensuring that employment opportunities directly benefit local populations, making it a more inclusive model.

Can they compete?

While the BRI primarily serves to strengthen China’s economy, its emphasis on rapid infrastructure expansion has raised concerns about long-term sustainability. The introduction of the “Green BRI" in 2019 signalled a shift towards renewable energy investments. However, these initiatives remain marginal compared to China’s substantial investments in non-renewable energy projects across partner countries.

As Asia’s largest economy and a dominant force in regional organizations, China maintains partnerships under the BRI framework, with 149 countries having signed MoUs. Additionally, nearly 90% of the world’s most active trade corridors pass through China, reinforcing its centrality in global commerce. This has contributed to a prevailing narrative that frames Asia’s economic landscape primarily around China. Against this backdrop, IMEC’s viability is crucial as it represents the only non-China trade corridor connecting India and Europe.

Conclusion

China’s economic slowdown, largely due to rapid industrialization and post-pandemic disruptions, along with the declining financial viability of BRI investments, has prompted many countries to reassess their involvement in the initiative. In this context, IMEC presents a more reliable and viable alternative, offering sustainable connectivity solutions aligned with the global transition to cleaner and more advanced technologies. Unlike the BRI, which faces criticism for high carbon emissions and lack of transparency, IMEC must prioritize sustainability and openness. Learning from the BRI’s shortcomings will be key to its success.

So far, only India and the UAE have taken initial steps by signing MoUs, while European countries and the US have yet to make tangible progress on the ground. IMEC’s future could be uncertain under the new US administration. The extent to which US President Donald Trump prioritizes the corridor will be crucial in determining its long-term relevance and success.

(Ayushi Saini is a PhD candidate in the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, JNU. She is a Research Intern at the Chintan Research Foundation. Her work focuses on Central Asia, BRI and India-Central Asia Relations.)

Views are personal, and do not represent the stance of this publication.