BJP’s master message was the defining feature of 2024’s political mobilisation

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Suhas Palshikar

As the year of Lok Sabha election, much public focus this year was on who wins, how and what that means. This was natural. But now, elections are almost six months behind us and we can take a re-look at what message this year gave, what continuity that message contains and what larger implications for political culture of the country stem from that message.

Partisans of the BJP may proffer development as the message; supporters of INDIA bloc would point to cronyism as the message; gullible media and economists will lap up to ‘India story’ as the proud message. The first and the third predictably overlap because they originate in a common delusional approach that chooses to ignore many distortions and skews in the economy. The message of cronyism is attractive for opponents of the ruling party but has so far failed to resonate with the general public.

During the campaign, the INDIA bloc in fact identified a more pertinent message of the year: unemployment and economic misery of the large sections. In terms of popular perceptions, these issues certainly had much relevance: in Lokniti’s pre-election survey (with which this author is associated), more than half the respondents mentioned price rise or unemployment as issues that would be upper most in their minds at the time of voting. Similarly, in the post-election survey, a whopping 58 percent listed either of these economic issues or poverty as the most disliked things about the Modi government.

This message had a reasonable objective basis and yet, it affected voting choices to a limited extent. The public is less agitated over the economy than one would have expected. Neither is the political rhetoric attending to questions of material well-being of citizens nor are there any sustained mass movements on the issue.

Efficacy of a master message

This is mainly because, over time, most issues are drowned by a master message that the year witnessed prominently. This message has been rather popular among the people across social sections and states, a message that is likely to remain strong and bound to be the prism through which most other social phenomena will be seen and understood by many—politicians, lay citizens, opinion makers, financial bosses and intellectuals.

The year began with the grand ceremony for consecration of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya. In a sense, this was a continuation of Hindu mobilization that gathered momentum in the late eighties and early nineties. But what surpassed everything in January 2024 was the complete ownership of the event of consecration by the Indian state.

Already, the boundaries between the private faith of rulers and the public imagery of a secular state were confused for last few years. Now the distinction between the state and the self-proclaimed representative organization of Hindus, too seamlessly merged in the spectacle that unfolded on the occasion. The inauguration marked the formalization of the process of converting India into a Hindutva state.

In July, the government had withdrawn an old circular prohibiting government servants to formally associate with the RSS. These developments flag the transformation of the state and its institutions.

In between, election season produced more candid articulations that strengthened the Hindutva ethos of public discourse. Following the handsome victory of the BJP in Maharashtra, many pro-Hindutva commentators and social media handles openly credited the victory to Hindu unity.

So, on the one hand, the state machinery is turning more and more openly pro-Hindutva and on the other hand, language of politics is becoming more suffused with Hindutva appeal. Thus, the key message this year offers is that India is a nation of Hindus, that its state is pro-Hindu, that the Muslim minority is permanently under suspicion and that the might of the nation-state is equivalent to ascendance of Hindus over other communities in the country.

What the Lokniti’s surveys showed

The message is received in its spirit by the Indian public too. As Lokniti’s pre-election survey in March shows, a large number of people (48 percent) viewed the Ram Temple consecration as something that would consolidate Hindu identity. Similarly, during the post-election survey, when respondents were asked to name one thing about the Modi government that they liked the most, the only thing that was mentioned by majority of respondents was the Ram Mandir—while 23 percent mentioned this, no other work of the government received mention in two-digit percentage points.

The conflation of religion and nationalism, the aspiration that state machinery should be pro-Hindu and the imagined and constructed schism between majority and minority are not exactly new. This ideological project goes back one full century and next year actually marks the centenary of the formulation of this project. Admittedly, it has travelled a long way and undergone many internal modifications too. But the core beliefs and assertions have not changed at all since 1925.

Overcoming initial fault lines

The Hindutva project initially existed in wilderness because its advocates were not clear about tackling the caste question as also the question of intra-Hindu diversity.

A systematic ‘social engineering’ from mid-seventies meant that young politicians from what is today known as the OBC bloc were groomed for bigger role in mass politics.

In short, there is a century-long history to the politics of Hindutva and it is a history of gradual expansion of Hindutva and its legitimacy. Post-1990, Hindutva became politically ascendant and ideologically acceptable to many sections. Since 2014, it has received a mascot facilitating its spread and legitimacy. This development cannot be confined to any one moment or year; nevertheless, 2024 will still pass on a critical message: that both the state and the public culture have shifted.

Conclusion

Four factors will consolidate this message of Hindutva in the time to come. In the first place, as indicated by the Temple consecration ceremony, the state and all its arms will openly transform and become pro-Hindutva.

Two, the political arena will be dominated by this majoritarian thinking. Three, as already witnessed during past one decade, dead silence will be the response of the corporate world.

Finally, and right around us as common citizens, the social sphere—our housing societies, schools and universities, public libraries and local festival managing committees--all will be occupied by ideas and actors subscribing to Hindutva.

Suhas Palshikar (suhaspalshikar@gmail.com), based in Pune, taught political science. Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.