What is India’s Quad game plan, according to experts

Thirteen years after it met for the first time and three years after it has revived itself in the face of consistent Chinese belligerence, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or simply the Quad - an informal strategic forum between the US, Japan, Australia and India - still remains a hazy idea without any formal institutional structure or an agenda.

The two ministerial meetings held by the Quad on October 6 in Tokyo underlined what is obvious: one, the countries affected by Chinese economic and military muscle-flexing are unwilling to even issue a joint statement against Beijing’s trepidations and two, India’s marked reluctance in giving a military shape, even if symbolically, to the alliance, given the current tensions in Ladakh, is difficult to comprehend.

To be sure though, Chinese clout is such that for each nation, self-interest becomes paramount. If for India, it is military concerns that act as a check on unfettered action, for Australia and Japan the economic and supply-line linkages with China are too vital for it to take an open anti-Beijing position, beyond a point.

Predictably, it was only the American Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, who accused China's governing Communist Party of "exploitation, corruption and coercion". An acknowledgement of the economic inter-dependence of Quad members on China was apparent in Pompeo’s next statement when he noted that ‘security’ includes “economic capacity and the rule of law, the ability to protect intellectual property, trade agreements, diplomatic relationships, all of the elements that form a security framework. It’s not just military. It’s much deeper.”

Alexander Neill, an Asia-Pacific security analyst based in Singapore, believes the `real clincher’ for the renewed momentum of the Quad grouping is down to `India's buy-in’. "In recent years there has been much speculation about the Quad becoming a formalised body. But it had been constrained by India in particular, which is a traditional stalwart of the Non-Aligned Movement," he told the BBC in a recent interview.

Experts say New Delhi has deliberately kept it low key. "The Quad was always a forum for consulting each other rather than a military alliance,” says Jayant Prasad, India’s former Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, and ex-Indian envoy to Afghanistan. "If anything, it is China’s belligerence that is forcing India’s hands in adopting a tougher position,” he told this writer.

But for now, things are changing. The Modi government is all set to invite Australia for the annual Malabar naval exercises next month with the US and Japan already confirming their participation. The move is expected to further lay the foundations for the eventual formalisation of the Quad grouping.

The Malabar exercises will be taking place in two stages in the Bay of Bengal; the 2019 exercise took place from September 26 to October 4 off the coast of Japan. The naval exercise featuring the Quad partners will be held on November 3-6 and November 17-20. The shared objective of all four countries is free and open navigation in Indo-Pacific.

The Indian Dilemma

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was reportedly deliberating the impact of the exercise on the on-going military-diplomatic talks to resolve the Ladakh stand-off with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has told the defence ministry that it has no problems with Australia’s participation.

India’s dilemma is perhaps understandable, given the past record of two member countries of Quad, Australia and Japan. Since its inception, the US projected and China perceived Quad as an ‘Asian NATO’. Angered by the first-ever meeting of the four countries in 2007 at the initiative of the then Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, the Chinese leadership had come down heavily on Quad calling it an anti-China security formation. The Chinese reaction was enough to rattle the partner countries and Quad lost its momentum, no sooner than it was born. Abe lost the elections in Japan a few months after the Quad meeting. Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Asō, who succeeded him, appeared keen to have China on their side. In Australia too, post-John Howard, the new Labour government led by Kevin Rudd had completely reversed the Liberal government’s policy towards China. Rudd’s Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, categorically stated in February 2008, after a China-Australia strategic dialogue, that Australia would not attend any of these future four-country security dialogues. India, naturally, does not want to the odd man out.

In addition, the US election is on everybody’s minds and Quad members are keen to avoid harsh anti-Chinese rhetoric, there being good reasons for doing so. President Trump has been flaying China for `spreading’ the Wuhan virus and for the US trade deficit, all of which is clearly part of his poll strategy. If Trump wins and decides not to offend his good buddy President Xi Jinping – or even better, tie up a deal with his main adversary - he can hardly be held responsible. As for Joe Biden, his record of backing a moderate China policy is well known.

Ambassador Jayant Prasad, however, believes that there is broad bipartisan consensus in the US for the need to stand up to China, which will remain, irrespective of who wins.

While Foreign Minister K Jaishankar’s bland statement at the Quad did not say much, there is evidence that New Delhi is quietly forging strong ties with the alliance members on a bilateral basis. Media reports suggest that New Delhi and Washington are stepping up efforts to conclude the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) ahead of the Indo-US 2+2 ministerial meeting on October 26-27. Defence and Foreign ministers of the two countries will meet at the 2+2. BECA will allow India to use US geospatial intelligence and enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles and armed drones. In February, both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump had called for early conclusion of BECA.

“A Steady Progress”

There are several other gambits on the table as well, including the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative referenced in Jaishankar’s statement, which was launched at the East Asia Summit 2019, and includes maritime security in its charter. New Delhi has invited Vietnam to be a part of it, even as Hanoi considers filing an international arbitration case against Beijing in the South China Sea. Both will be non-permanent members of the UN Security Council next year. Vietnam, together with New Zealand and South Korea, was also part of an online `Quad plus’ meeting earlier. All are countries sitting on important sea lanes.

Former Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, believes the Quad is on course, with the invitation finally handed out to Australia. ``The Quad’s progress will be steady, not spectacular,” he says. ``This is no military alliance. It is a group that will enjoy closer military understanding and intelligence sharing. China’s navy is expanding at an unprecedented rate and it is in everyone’s interest to keep their guard up,” he told this writer an interview.

What about countries like Australia, which has very deep trade and economic linkages with China and whose trade bodies may oppose rupturing of bilateral ties? According to Sibal, the Chinese tactic of differentiating between political and economic relations will not work. ``No democracy will tolerate that,” he points out.

At a time when the Chinese are digging in opposite Ladakh, New Delhi seems to have realised that Quad can effectively help interdict Chinese shipping across the Malacca Straits, particularly since Beijing depends on the sea for 80% of its oil imports.

Pointed out BJP leader Ram Madhav in his blog; ``It is important to recall the history of the Quad because alliances have to be formed on agendas, not emotions.” Presumably, those are the parameters that are guiding India’s naval policy with China now.

(Ranjit Bhushan is a senior journalist based in Delhi)