'Borrowed knife': How China and Turkey powered Pakistan's war against India

Indian army soldiers' rifles are pictured near the Line of Control (LoC) between Pakistan and India in Kashmir on May 20, 2025. (Photo by TAUSEEF MUSTAFA / AFP)

India’s national security calculus is undergoing a seismic shift. What once was a two-border challenge – Pakistan in the West and China in the North – is now revolving into a three-pronged military threat, with Turkey joining forces and Bangladesh increasingly siding with Beijing. A new regional axis is taking shape, and it is one that India cannot afford to ignore.

This transformation was laid bare during the May 2025 conflict following the Pahalgam terror attack. As India launched retaliatory strikes under Operation Sindoor, it encountered not just Pakistan’s armed forces, but also advanced Chinese and Turkish weaponry — a preview of the future battles India may be forced to fight on multiple technological and geopolitical fronts.

China: The puppet master behind Pakistan’s provocations

China’s strategy has long relied on using proxies and surrogates to destabilise rivals. In Pakistan, Beijing has found the perfect partner to serve its interests without direct military confrontation.

“China is acting as a ‘backdoor adversary’ and is using Pakistan as a live laboratory to test its weapons,” said Lt Gen Rahul R Singh, the Indian Army’s deputy chief.

China provided real-time satellite imagery, cyber support, and electronic warfare aid to Pakistan during the May skirmishes, even while ceasefire talks were ongoing. The timing underscores Beijing’s duplicity and long-term design to bleed India through sustained hybrid warfare without openly crossing into conflict itself.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), over 81% of Pakistan’s arms imports in the past five years have come from China. These include JF-17 and J-10 fighter jets, PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, HQ-9P and HQ-16 air defence systems, and Chinese-origin drones and radar systems.

India’s successful neutralisation of these platforms during Operation Sindoor, particularly its precision strikes on Chinese HQ-series air defence systems, showed tactical superiority. But China gained something arguably more valuable: combat data on how its systems perform against a peer adversary. In essence, Pakistan is Beijing’s free testing ground, with India as the unwilling target.

Turkey: A rising Islamist military partner for Pakistan

Turkey’s military support for Pakistan is no longer symbolic. In the May conflict, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones were reportedly deployed by Pakistani forces. Ankara has emerged as Pakistan’s second-most important defence partner after China, delivering drones and UAVs, smart ammunition, battlefield surveillance systems, and naval cooperation for joint production of warships.

The ideological closeness between Ankara and Islamabad, particularly on Kashmir and anti-India rhetoric, has now matured into a full-fledged defence partnership. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has regularly raised the Kashmir issue at international forums, aligning with Pakistan’s narrative.

India now faces an expanding challenge: not just China’s hard power, but Turkey’s fusion of ideological warfare and drone-led military aid to Pakistan.

Bangladesh’s drift into the China-Pakistan orbit

While not militarily hostile yet, Bangladesh’s growing alignment with China raises serious concerns for Indian strategic planners. Dhaka has signed defence procurement agreements with China, allowed Chinese port and infrastructure investments (like in Payra and Matarbari), and publicly remained silent or neutral during India-Pakistan tensions.

In some cases, Bangladesh has even shown subtle diplomatic sympathy toward Pakistan’s position, especially post-Pahalgam. While India remains a major trade partner, China is Bangladesh’s largest creditor and arms supplier. This economic dependency has translated into quiet but noticeable political shifts.

For India, this means its eastern flank can no longer be considered politically or diplomatically stable, especially during a two-front war scenario.

Furthermore, recent reports suggest that China may be playing a behind-the-scenes role in developing military-linked infrastructure in Bangladesh’s northern Lalmonirhat region – a location that has set off alarm bells in Indian strategic circles due to its proximity to the highly sensitive Siliguri Corridor, also known as the “Chicken’s Neck.”

The project reportedly involves either the construction or dual-use upgrade of an airfield near the India-Bangladesh border, just a few hundred kilometres from India’s northeastern states. While details remain scarce and Dhaka has not publicly confirmed any Chinese involvement, the pattern fits Beijing’s growing footprint in South Asia under its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

For India, the concern is two-fold: first, the strategic vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip of land that connects mainland India to its northeastern region; and second, the precedent of Chinese infrastructure projects with potential military applications — as seen in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Nepal.

India’s isolation: No friends in the neighbourhood

Unlike China, which has forged tight alliances in its neighbourhood (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and increasingly the Maldives), India lacks dependable regional allies. Bhutan remains friendly but is too small and dependent. Nepal has veered pro-China in recent years. Sri Lanka is indebted to Beijing and unwilling to take sides. Myanmar is in chaos.

This growing isolation matters. It limits India’s ability to create regional buffers and diplomatic pressure when border flare-ups occur. It also constrains India’s access to ports, airfields, and regional intelligence networks in times of conflict.

Why Israel’s Iron Dome isn’t India’s solution

India cannot adopt Israel’s Iron Dome model for defending its cities, and Lt Gen Singh made that clear: “We do not have the luxury like Israel… our country is vast, and such systems cost a lot of money,” he said. While the Iron Dome works well for a small country like Israel — roughly the size of Kerala — India’s defence needs are on an entirely different scale. With over 50 major cities, 6,000 km of land borders, and 7,500 km of coastline to protect, replicating a city-specific shield like Iron Dome is simply not feasible with current resources. India's defence strategy is built around large-scale land warfare, not focused urban protection. This means a future coordinated missile or drone attack by Pakistan or its allies could overwhelm existing defences unless India undertakes a major overhaul and modernisation of its air defence systems.

The road ahead: What India must prepare for

India must brace for a prolonged, multi-front hybrid conflict, where threats come not just from one direction, but from multiple adversaries at once. These include cyberattacks from China, drone strikes possibly backed by Turkey, and terror operations carried out by Pakistan-based proxies. The battlefield is no longer limited to borders; it now extends into Indian cities, cyberspace, and the skies.

As Pakistan continues to test new drones and missiles, many supported by Chinese funding or technology, India can expect an increase in grey zone warfare. These are unconventional attacks targeting both military and civilian infrastructure. In addition, China’s growing capabilities in cyber warfare and satellite surveillance could put India’s communication systems and GPS networks at risk. Future conflicts may be short, tech-driven, and intense, giving India little time to respond or seek international intervention.