What a formalised Quad means for India and the Indo-Pacific

It is a plan that is clearly aimed at riling China. The United States, Japan, Australia, and India propose to hold the first meeting of their leaders this week under the Quad framework.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or simply Quad, will hold its first summit in a virtual format on Friday or during the upcoming weekend.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be joined by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, US President Joe Biden and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, ostensibly to discuss the fair distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and efforts to tackle climate change.

In geopolitical terms, important as these issues are, the looming presence of China is on everyone’s radars. The fact that President Biden has chosen this to be his first important multilateral meeting after taking office, suggests that the US policy on the Indo-Pacific – and more specifically its China plan – enjoys broad bi-partisan consensus in Washington.

``You would have noticed that the summit has been upgraded to the level of head of government. Expect a formal charter this time and a joint statement, which may not necessarily name China, but is headed that way,” former Indian diplomat, Deepak Vohra, told Moneycontrol.

He added that while Quad is no NATO or the UN Security Council, the number of those wanting to join the security formation - countries that have been at the receiving end of Beijing’s belligerence – are increasing.

Foreign ministers of the four countries held an online meeting last month, in which they agreed to work toward a `free and open Indo-Pacific’ region while strongly opposing any attempts by Beijing to alter the status quo in the East and South China seas by force.

The meeting would take place days before US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary, Lloyd Austin, plan to visit Japan and South Korea later this month.
Moneycontrol examines the frequently asked questions (FAQs) on this subject, which is likely to dominate the geopolitical strategies of many countries in Europe, Asia and the USA, in a tense region fraught with standoffs.

Is it right to say that Quad is more aspirational than real?

Thirteen years after it met for the first time and three years after it has revived itself in the face of consistent Chinese belligerence, the Quad - an informal strategic forum between the US, Japan, Australia and India – has uptill now remained a somewhat hazy idea without any formal institutional structure or an agenda. But things are changing.

Can highly developed countries, whose economic wellbeing is directly connected to China’s supply lines, afford to go against Beijing, which puts national interest over everything else?

The two ministerial meetings held by the Quad on October 6, 2020, in Tokyo underlined what is obvious: countries affected by Chinese economic and military muscle flexing were unwilling to even issue a joint statement against Beijing’s trepidations. To be sure, Chinese clout is such that for each nation, self-interest becomes paramount. If for India, the concerns are both military and economic, for Australia and Japan the economic and supply-line linkages with China are too vital for it to take an openly adventurous position, beyond a point.

Predictably, it is only the US that has baited China, accusing the governing Communist Party of `exploitation, corruption and coercion’. But even while doing so, Washington has been careful of the economic inter-dependence of Quad members on Beijing. Security, in US’s perception, includes “economic capacity and the rule of law, the ability to protect intellectual property, trade agreements, diplomatic relationships, all of the elements that form a security framework. It’s not just military. It’s much deeper,” Washington said in a statement last year.

Post-Covid, has the situation changed and what is India’s stand, since the Ladakh disengagement?

In recent years there has been much speculation about the Quad becoming a formalised body, but has been constrained largely by India, a traditional stalwart of the Non-Aligned Movement. But China’s belligerence in Ladakh last year, has forced New Delhi’s hands into adopting a tougher position. The fact that India was able to hold its own against a powerful Chinese adversary on icy Himalayan heights, has led to greater confidence in New Delhi. Indian diplomats, fluent in Mandarin, have tracked down some interesting articles that appeared in Huanqiu Shibao, the Chinese version of the Global Times this week. Presumably reacting to the chain of events in Ladakh, where the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) was negotiated into withdrawing from positions it had held, the paper lamented, ``.....in recent years, the phenomenon of `feminization’ of males has had a negative impact on the aesthetics, health and values of young people. The social harm caused by the epidemic like spread of such a trend should not be underestimated... it aggravates the degradation of social spirit.... young people are less willing and enthusiastic to protect their country ... they lack the `grit’ to turn pressure into motivation to struggle (against difficulties) in life and work in the face of social pressures.’’

Then again, it wrote, ``...there are many ways to promote masculinity among youth. First, strengthen national defense education. It is recommended that national defense education be stipulated as the first course in the field of education ...and that ....... cultivating the spirit of martial arts be made a value orientation for youth.”

It added for good effect: `` Second, .....children between 8 and 12 should be recruited into junior military schools, to facilitate nurturing of correct values, developing good habits of doing and living physically fit as well as building strong physique, in order to train a trained reserve army for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.....”

How has the Quad evolved over the years?  

In November last year, the Modi government invited Australia for the annual Malabar Naval Exercises, along with the US and Japan. The move was expected to further lay the foundations for the eventual formalisation of the Quad grouping, something that could take place this week. In 2020, it took place in the Bay of Bengal and a year before, off the coast of Japan. The shared objective of all four countries is free and open navigation in Indo-Pacific.

Despite upgrading the Quad this year, India’s dilemma is perhaps understandable, given the past record of two member countries, Australia, and Japan. Since its inception, the US projected and China perceived Quad as an ‘Asian NATO’. Angered by the first-ever meeting of the four countries in 2007 at the initiative of the then Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, the Chinese leadership had come down heavily on Quad calling it an anti-China security formation. The Chinese reaction was enough to rattle the partner countries and Quad lost its momentum, no sooner than it began. Abe lost the elections in Japan a few months after the Quad meeting. Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Asō, who succeeded him, appeared keen to have China on their side. In Australia too, the new Labour government led by Kevin Rudd had completely reversed the Liberal government’s policy towards China. Rudd’s Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, categorically stated in February 2008, after a China-Australia strategic dialogue, that Australia would not attend any of these future four-country security dialogues. India, naturally, does not want to the odd man out. Former Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, however, believes that the Quad in on course. ``The Quad’s progress will be steady, not spectacular,” he says. ``This is no military alliance. It is a group that will enjoy closer military understanding and intelligence sharing. China’s navy is expanding at an unprecedented rate and it is in everyone’s interest to keep their guard up,” he said.

Potentially, what can Quad and specifically India, hope to achieve?  

Despite the pull back from Ladakh, New Delhi realises that if push comes to shove, Quad can effectively help interdict Chinese shipping across the Malacca Straits, particularly since Beijing depends on the sea for 80 percent of its oil imports. There is evidence that New Delhi is quietly forging strong naval ties with the alliance members on a bilateral basis. There are several initiatives underway. There is the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, which was launched at the East Asia Summit 2019, and includes maritime security as one of its key points in the charter. To broaden the alliance, New Delhi has invited Vietnam to be a part of it, even as Hanoi considers filing an international arbitration case against Beijing in the South China Sea. Both are non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. Vietnam, together with New Zealand and South Korea, was also part of an online `Quad plus’s meeting earlier. All are countries sitting on important sea lanes, whose interests clash directly with China.