Stealth eagle gliding in the Indian sky

IAF's Rafale fleet.

By Laxman Kumar Behera 

Taking India a step closer to building its own 5th-generation fighter aircraft, Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh, on May 27 approved the ‘Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) Programme Execution Model.’ Coming in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, China showcasing its 6th-gen fighters and fast-tracking delivery of J-35A stealth fighters to Pakistan, Singh’s approval shows the urgency for India to maintain its fighter combat edge. The approval is also indicative of India’s growing technological and industrial base, with the capability to build a stealth fighter that a few countries in the world can do independently.

Setting the stage 

The Defence Minister’s May 27th approval follows the March 2024 official sanction by the Cabinet Committee on Security to indigenously build protypes of 25-ton single seat twin-engine AMCA at an approximate cost of Rs 15,000 crore. The Defence Minister’s approval now clears the roadmap for the programme’s execution.

Herein, the Defence Minister and his Ministry of Defence have taken a bold and ambitious decision that is in tune with India’s evolving arms acquisition strategy wherein the Indian private sector is slowly yet steadily being plugged in for production of major defence items.

As the Defence Minister’s approval suggests, the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), a society under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), is the lead agency for the programme execution. However, in a break from the past, ADA is now given freedom to choose partner(s) from a wider Indian industrial base, from both public and private sectors to execute the AMCA programme. This is a marked departure from the execution model of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in which the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), the public sector behemoth under the MoD, was the sole nominated production agency.

HAL’s overflowing order book is a catalyst for policy change

HAL’s loss of monopoly in the AMCA execution programme can be attributed to two factors.

One, HAL is already overburdened with too many orders. By the end of the 2024-25, its order book has increased to Rs 1.89 lakh crore due to fresh inflow of contract for AL-31FP engines, LCH Prachand and Sukhoi-30MKI among others.

Furthermore, in the next one to two years its order book is likely to boosted by another Rs 1 lakh crore with fresh orders for LCA Mk-1A, Advanced Light Helicopter and Dornier aircraft. With an annual turnover of about Rs 30,000 crore (in 2024-25), HAL will take about 10 years to execute its orders, existing and imminent. This may not suit AMCA’s ambitious timeline which requires prototype development by 2029 and induction from 2035 onwards.

Two, with the entry of private sector into the defence production, HAL and other Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUS) have lost their traditional monopolies in defence production. With a supportive policy environment under the Make in India initiative and a domestic industry-friendly defence acquisition manual, private companies are now manufacturing defence items which were earlier the preserve of the government-owned companies.

Indian private sector’s aerospace manufacturing footprint

In the aerospace sector, Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) is already manufacturing the Airbus C-295 military transport aircraft. It has also tied up with Airbus for the final assembly of H125 helicopters in India.

Besides TASL, private companies, namely L&T, Alpha Tocol, VEM Technologies and Lakshmi Machine Works are the suppliers of key aerospace structures to the HAL’s LCA programme.  With so many private companies in the fray, it would have been difficult for the government to keep them out from the AMCA programme, especially when it’s committed to providing a level-playing field between private and public sectors.

It’s, however, noteworthy that unlike the C-295 programme which was exclusively reserved for Indian private sector, HAL is not barred from participation in AMCA. HAL, like any other public or private company, has the freedom to participate in the programme, either independently or through a joint venture or consortia.

Having cleared the AMCA execution model, all eyes will be on ADA’s selection of industry partners and, the subsequent execution stage. The government hopes that the competitive selection process will bring in the best of India’s aerospace players for a faster execution.

Engine selection presents a potential challenge

Going forward, a potential hurdle in the execution stage will be the engine selection. The initial two squadron AMCA are planned to be powered by GE-414 engine followed by a higher capacity engine to power the subsequent squadrons. The government is reportedly talking to several global engine houses for a possible collaboration to manufacture an engine in India.

It is needless to mention that earlier the selection of an engine, better for the programme considering that fighters are built around an engine not the other way round. The lessons of the HF-24 Marut, India’s first indigenously designed jet aircraft, should not be lost among the Indian policy makers. Marut, which first flew in 1961, could not win the confidence of the Indian Air Force due to an under-powered engine and government’s failure to find a suitable alternative. AMCA should not be allowed to face the Marut’s fate.

Perhaps it is high time for India to revive its own Kaveri engine. Foreign collaboration and technology transfer, however attractive, can never lead to complete self-reliance in engine technology. No foreign country will transfer 100 per cent technology of a jet engine. HAL, which is manufacturing the Russian AL-31FP engine under license for years, has been able to indigenize it by only 60 per cent. For a truly indigenous AMCA, the goal should be to power it by a powerful indigenous engine, for which the government needs a have a clear vision and a national mission.

(The author is Associate Professor at Special Centre for National Security Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.