Kabul Gurdwara Attack | Taliban government needs to check Pakistan’s terror plans against India

A Taliban fighter searches a car as he stands guard at a checkpoint during a snowfall in Kabul, Afghanistan, January 3. (Image: Reuters)

It was so expected, that it feels almost like yesterday’s news. Yet, there is tragedy in the attack on the historic Gurdwara Karta-e Parwan in Kabul, not just because of those who died, but because it is yet another blow against the tolerance that has existed in Afghanistan for decades. That’s why there are ‘Afghan’ Sikhs, and many Gurudwaras spread across the country, all relatively safe till the Islamic State began its attacks, and for all the wrong reasons, which makes the whole incident suspect.

Afghan Sikhs

Sikhism in Afghanistan dates back to the fifteenth century, when Guru Nanak journeyed there leading to local tribes taking up the religion. Which is why magnificent hand written copies of the Guru Granth and the Dasham Granth have been found in some old Gurudwaras. Sikhs thrived in Afghanistan for decades, but suffered during the time of the first Taliban government; later they were targets of extortion given their relatively better status. Most of a previously 80,000-strong community fled the country, mostly to India, but had begun to trickle back last year as some stability crept in. The truth was that few were happy in India where they faced myriad difficulties including language. That’s something the controversial Citizenship Amendment Bill needs to factor in. They’re not Indian, they’re Afghan.

The Attack

The recent attack was claimed by Islamic State-Khorasan (ISK) apparently in response to insults against the Prophet Muhammad, by a former spokesperson of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). But that statement was by a Hindu, and an Indian — not by an Afghan Sikh.

An earlier attack was even stranger. In March 2020, a deadly attack killed 25 Sikhs, and involved at least two Indian suicide bombers Mohammed Muhsin and Sajid Kuthirummal from Kasargod, Kerala, who was part of a large group that joined the terror organisation in 2016. But these cadres had no reason to hate the Sikhs.

However, a year earlier, the ISK casually announced a new Wilayat in Pakistan and India, following that up with rather dubious claims of attacks in Kashmir. Then came the dramatic arrest of ISK head Aslam Farooqi and 19 others in an intelligence coup of the decade. Farooqi turned out to be Pakistani, and possibly a former Lashkar-e-Toiba man. Islamabad demanded extradition, which the then Ghani government refused. When the Taliban came to power, Farooqi slid out from jail, and disappeared together with his buddies.

The Group

The ISK is a curious group. It emerged in 2015, made up of former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan members, with deep networks in Pakistan. It first entrenched itself in Nangarhar, and then hit out at Pakistan and the Taliban, leading to bloody battles. The ISK then emerged quite separately in the north, as an Uzbek-dominated entity, threatening Central Asia and Russia. Its Kabul cell had no particular affiliation, and carried out the most deadly attacks. In simple words, the ISK is a creature of many parts. Only the Kabul wing didn’t seem to like Indians. If it hadn’t been for the seizure of an explosive-laden truck, the attack could have been far worse.

But the Taliban administration delivered, in the process quite literally spiking the guns of this rival group. In fact, by late last year, the Haqqani network itself was fighting hard against sections of the ISK. So the Taliban will not be pleased at all with whoever has sponsored the attack — and there’s little doubt as to who did it.

It has been barely two weeks since an Indian delegation visited Kabul, where the Taliban welcomed restarting of Indian projects across the country. The Taliban have never been antagonistic to India, and are now focussed on stoking up the economy. However, the Taliban had one condition, which is not unreasonable — it does not want to be involved in the ‘regional competition’ between India and Pakistan.

With this attack, Islamabad has showed its hand. It’s a cleft stick for Kabul. On the one hand the Taliban does not have the ability to throw out the well-entrenched Pakistanis from Kabul, and on the other hand throwing out India would mean the loss of one of Afghanistan’s largest donors.

There is, however, one way. As it comes out of the ‘grey list’ of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international community needs to persuade Pakistan that joining India in re-building Afghanistan will not only be financially profitable — for instance, Pakistan was once the biggest exporter of cement to Kabul — but will serve to increase its own security. That will mean considerable arm-twisting, and, honestly, there aren’t many other options.

Kabul would agree. It knows its demanding patron too well.

Tara Kartha is Distinguished Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. 

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.