China’s playbook in India’s backyard: How Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan are being roped into Beijing’s designs

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi were received by Taliban officials on arrival in the Afghan capital for a trilateral summit on Wednesday.

South Asia is once again in the throes of geopolitical churn. Over the past week, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh have stepped up high-level diplomatic and military engagements. Afghanistan has also entered the picture with Beijing attempting to extend its influence through trilateral dialogues and economic projects. What might look like routine diplomatic exchanges at first glance is in fact part of a deeper recalibration. China and Pakistan are seeking to pull Dhaka closer, while also tying Kabul into their economic and security frameworks. For India, this evolving alignment is not only concerning but also a clear red flag.

The developments come at a time when Pakistan is pushing for the launch of what it calls CPEC 2.0 during Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s upcoming visit to Beijing. China is eager to project this as an upgrade of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, with Afghanistan possibly being pulled in as well. In parallel, Bangladesh has quietly signed a visa exemption agreement with Pakistan and sent its army chief on an official visit to Beijing. Afghanistan has hosted Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi for a trilateral summit, while Wang has also met Pakistani generals and politicians to reinforce Beijing’s backing for Islamabad.

This flurry of activity points to one direction: an emerging bloc in South Asia that is tilting around China, with Pakistan acting as the bridge and Bangladesh and Afghanistan being drawn closer. For India, the timing is particularly sensitive. Nepal too has revived its rhetoric on the Lipulekh issue, indicating that New Delhi’s northern and eastern peripheries are being tested simultaneously.

We take a detailed look at the growing diplomatic and security engagements among Pakistan, China, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, and why they matter for India.

Pakistan’s desperate outreach

Pakistan is at the centre of this renewed activism. Facing a collapsing economy, chronic political instability and isolation in many global forums, Islamabad has little choice but to lean even more heavily on Beijing. For decades Pakistan’s foreign policy has been anchored on two pillars: hostility towards India and dependency on China. Both of these strands are visible today.

Pakistan’s Commerce Minister Jam Kamal visited Dhaka this week to push commercial ties. This is significant given that relations between the two countries have long been strained by the memory of 1971, when Pakistan’s brutal military crackdown led to Bangladesh’s liberation war. Dhaka has often reminded Islamabad of its refusal to apologise for those atrocities. Yet, with an interim administration under Muhammad Yunus in place and with China’s quiet encouragement, Pakistan is trying to reset the tone.

At home, Pakistan’s military leadership is coordinating closely with China. Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir has met Chinese leaders repeatedly in recent months. The Chinese foreign minister’s recent visit to Islamabad only underlines how critical Beijing sees the Pakistan army in driving its South Asia agenda. From the Pakistani point of view, strengthening the “all-weather strategic partnership” with China is a survival strategy.

China’s expanding footprint

China is playing an orchestrating role in this renewed wave of diplomacy. Beijing has interests in each of the three countries:

• Pakistan is the lynchpin of the Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia through CPEC.
• Bangladesh is an important recipient of Chinese defence exports and infrastructure investments.
• Afghanistan offers a land bridge to Central Asia and mineral-rich zones, while also being a key piece in regional security.

Bangladesh’s tilt towards China

The most striking development of the week was the visit of Bangladesh’s army chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman to China. Military diplomacy is one of Beijing’s most potent tools. For years Bangladesh has been a significant buyer of Chinese defence hardware, from submarines to fighter jets. Beijing also provides military training and technology to Dhaka.

By hosting the Bangladeshi army chief, China is signalling that it wants to deepen this relationship further. This is not a standalone gesture. Only days earlier, Dhaka approved a visa exemption agreement with Pakistan for diplomatic and official passport holders. On the face of it, this is a small technical move. But symbolically it marks a thaw between Dhaka and Islamabad after decades of friction.

Together, the visit to Beijing and the deal with Pakistan reflect Dhaka’s openness to greater coordination with both China and Pakistan. For India, this is a worrying sign. Bangladesh has historically depended on India for connectivity and support, but under the current interim government, its willingness to align with Chinese and Pakistani initiatives is visibly growing.

Afghanistan’s place in the puzzle

Afghanistan remains a fragile state under Taliban control. For China, however, it offers both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, Beijing fears that instability in Afghanistan can spill over into Xinjiang. On the other, it sees Afghanistan’s resources and location as too important to ignore.

At the trilateral summit with Pakistan and Afghanistan this week, Wang Yi emphasised extending CPEC into Kabul. For Pakistan, this is also crucial because it offers potential economic integration and political leverage. The Taliban regime, facing isolation and sanctions, has few alternatives and is likely to welcome Chinese investments.

If Afghanistan does get tied into CPEC 2.0, India will face a serious strategic setback. Not only would Chinese projects run along India’s northwestern flank, but Islamabad and Beijing would also gain another card to play in regional politics.

CPEC-II

Perhaps the most critical element in this evolving equation is CPEC 2.0. The original China Pakistan Economic Corridor was launched a decade ago and promised tens of billions of dollars in infrastructure and energy projects. While many projects were delayed or scaled back, the initiative gave China access to Pakistan’s Gwadar port and deepened its strategic hold.

Now, Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is poised to visit China later this month to officially launch the long-delayed second phase of CPEC.

CPEC-II is touted by Pakistan’s leadership as a potential remedy for the nation’s economic ailments, flagging Special Economic Zones (SEZs), modern agricultural initiatives, technology investments, and enhanced connectivity spearheaded by Gwadar port. Yet, critics argue this is far more than a development project; it is a strategic lever designed to tighten Chinese control over Pakistan’s economy and to indirectly project Chinese power into South Asia.

For India, whose sovereignty over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir has already been compromised under CPEC-I, this expansion only intensifies security, territorial, and geopolitical threats. In short, what looks like industrial progress for Pakistan could well be a masterstroke in China’s regional manoeuvring, making India’s vigilance not just prudent, but imperative.

Why India should be concerned

China and Pakistan are steadily expanding their influence in South Asia, and India risks being surrounded. From Gwadar port in Pakistan to Chittagong in Bangladesh, Beijing is building a chain of strategic footholds that could leave New Delhi encircled.

This growing network has direct security implications. If China, Pakistan and Bangladesh step up military cooperation, through intelligence sharing, joint training or arms supplies, India’s defence posture could face new vulnerabilities.

India has also spent years investing in regional development and connectivity. But if neighbours like Bangladesh or Afghanistan tilt towards China, New Delhi’s influence and goodwill could shrink, eroding its role as a partner of choice.

Terrorism remains another risk. Pakistan continues to use extremist groups as tools of policy. Any closer coordination between Islamabad and Dhaka could revive covert networks that may be used against India.

Last but not the least, there is the economic dimension. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and new Chinese projects in Bangladesh may divert trade and investment away from India, leaving Indian companies at a competitive disadvantage in the region.