Pakistan’s ugly geopolitical playbook exploits Afghan refugees for aid and other concessions

Pakistan has long leveraged the displacement of Afghans to its advantage by reinforcing colonial-era borders.

By Aishwaria Sonavane

Pakistan’s migration policy, reflected in the mass expulsion of Afghans, many born and raised in the country, is explained as a political tool and a gesture of Islamabad and Rawalpindi’s growing frustration with the Afghan Taliban. The ongoing deportations, including those of Afghan Citizenship Card (ACC) holders, a state-issued document meant to legitimise their stay, have been widely characterised as a pressure tactic, a means to control immigrant populations and, by extension, the administration in Kabul.

This approach is not new. Pakistan has long leveraged the displacement of Afghans to its advantage by reinforcing colonial-era borders, extracting foreign humanitarian aid, and asserting regional dominance. This piece examines the ongoing mass deportation through the lenses of securitisation theory, neo-colonial control, and the refugee bargaining model, demonstrating how forced displacement has always been a tool in Pakistan’s geopolitical playbook.

This move follows a protracted impasse between Pakistan and the Taliban administration, despite efforts involving military interventions, diplomatic engagements, tribal jirgas, and international appeals. This is not to take away from the fact that Pakistan has witnessed a sharp spike in militancy, with attacks doubling from 517 in 2023 to 1,099 in 2024. The country was ranked the second-most affected in the Global Terrorism Index 2025.

Genesis of the move to repatriate refugees

In 2023, Pakistan launched a drive to repatriate approximately four million Afghans who had entered the country over the past four decades. While the authorities granted some leeway in 2024, Pakistan imposed a strict March 31 deadline to expel foreign nationals, with Afghans as the primary target. This decree was accompanied by search operations, often marked by violence, conducted in January and February, as reported by multiple sources citing eyewitness testimonies.

Pakistan has fundamentally justified this decision on security grounds, particularly the Taliban’s alleged facilitation of anti-Pakistan groups, such as Baloch insurgents and Islamist factions like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), operating in the volatile border provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Additionally, waning international assistance has likely further propelled this move.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, another wave of refugees, including former Afghan officials and human rights activists, fled to Pakistan. This latest development can broadly be attributed to the steady but sure deterioration of bilateral ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021.

Caught between a rock and a hard place, Afghan refugees, especially those who associated with the former fallen government and Western forces, face an increasingly dire predicament. Their situation has been exacerbated by US President Donald Trump’s decision to freeze nearly all foreign aid and suspend refugee resettlement in the US through an executive order signed on January 20. Despite the Pashtun-dominated Islamist administration in Kabul issuing a general amnesty, a 2023 UN report documented the alleged killing of hundreds of government officials and security personnel from the former Western-backed government.

Pakistan’s neo-colonial move and securitisation of Afghans

Pakistan has invoked securitisation theory to frame the mass deportation of Afghans as a national security imperative, linking their presence to militancy and organised crime, despite limited evidence. The Pakistani security establishment claims that groups like the TTP and Baloch insurgents exploit Afghan refugee communities as safe havens, justifying militarised border policies and coercive deportation efforts. In that light, securitising Afghan refugees also serves as a domestic political tool, deflecting attention from the multifaceted internal challenges faced by the country.

Despite Pakistan’s attempts to portray itself as a victim of Afghanistan’s instability, its migration policies reflect neo-colonial tactics. The Durand Line, a conflicted border dividing Pashtun communities across Afghanistan and Pakistan, remains a major point of contention. While Afghanistan refuses to officially recognise the border, Pakistan’s deportation policy reinforces its territorial claims by asserting control over Afghan populations. Additionally, the crackdown on Afghans, including thousands awaiting resettlement in Western countries, can be seen as a leveraging tactic to engage the US and Europe on migration policies.

At large, Pakistan’s move exemplifies the strategic use of Afghan refugees as a geopolitical tool, aimed at extracting economic, strategic, and political concessions from both the Taliban administration and the international community.

Geopolitical impact 

Given the precedent of the Taliban’s unyielding position, the group is unlikely to relent, despite the humanitarian and economic burden of this mass migration. This means, it will neither recognise the Durand Line nor sever ties with the TTP, with whom it shares ideological, familial, and ethnic linkages. Meanwhile, Pakistan will continue to leverage international forums to frame Afghanistan as a renewed epicenter for terrorism. This serves two purposes - first, to sustain the Taliban’s isolation in the international community, and secondly to position itself as a victim of militancy, thus potentially reviving security ties with the US.

For India this presents a diplomatic opening. India has long enjoyed goodwill among the Afghan people through decades of humanitarian support, cricket diplomacy, and people-to-people exchanges. Capitalising on the growing anti-Pakistan sentiment in Afghanistan, India could expand its diplomatic activities in the Taliban. While engaging with the Taliban is a pragmatic approach aligned with geopolitical realities for New Delhi, it should not hold back from expanding its engagements with other stakeholders, including anti-Taliban fronts. This remains especially crucial amid increasing divisions within the Taliban factions - the Haqqani Network and the Kandhahar bloc, as demonstrated by reports of Sher Abbas Stanekzai and Sirajuddin Haqqani fleeing Afghanistan over differences and purportedly fearing threat to their lives.

This could mean extending support or establishing structured dialogue with Afghan diaspora groups, ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the anti-Taliban political factions, including former officials, now living in exile. India’s response will determine New Delhi’s strategic positioning in Afghanistan. Failure to act decisively could erode India’s historical role in the country.

(Aishwaria Sonavane is Research Analyst for Pakistan Studies, Indo-Pacific Programme, Takshashila Institution.)

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.