In J&K, India combats more than a two-front challenge through the China-Pakistan overlap

The CRPF along with the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the local police was fired upon by terrorists around 3:30 pm in the remote Dudu area of Basantgarh, the officials said

Viewed from the prism of ambushes by hardened terrorist combatants, the security situation ahead of the Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is tense but not overly fraught with a threat that could derail the democratic process.

Numbers and narratives

In terms of the numbers of terrorists, whose majority is dominated by Pakistanis linked to the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army, the situation is far more comfortable as compared to the Assembly elections in the 1990s and at the turn of the century when numbers were assessed as between 2,000-3,000.

The latest assessment furnished by J&K DGP RR Swain puts the number of local recruits at 20 and the Pakistanis as five to six times that number. The Indian State’s benchmark is the Assembly elections of 1996 when the situation was retrieved from the brink by a concerted effort of the security establishment spearheaded by the Indian Army.

An analysis of terrorist attacks in the Jammu division, especially in the Pir Panjals, would reveal that the preference is to engage the Army when it is complacent and in areas where the alert levels are virtually off guard.

The run-up to the Assembly elections augurs an operational environment that is turning adverse to such tactics on the part of the terrorists handled by professionals in Pakistan from the ISI and the SSG. The recent crackdown on terrorist over-ground workers (TOGWs) among the nomadic graziers of the higher reaches, dismissal from service of five policemen involved in the narco-terror syndicates, setting up of 19 special counter-terror detachments of the Police in eight Jammu districts et al has put the clamps on the initiation of terrorist actions.

That said, the challenge to the Indian State lies in the battle of the narratives, amplified by social and mainstream media. Having declared the goal of ‘zero militancy’ in J&K, even a relatively low number of violent incidents can puncture disproportionately big holes in the ‘big picture’ narrative. Terrorist handlers have expertly built narratives on a series of actions, whose overall toll pales in front of the staggering numbers of the 1990s and early 2000s.

Chinese footprints on the LOC

There is a degree of unwillingness to accept and war-game for the emergent synergy between the Pakistan and Chinese militaries in the conventional and guerrilla warfare domains.

Lest India be again surprised (Kargil 1999 and Eastern Ladakh April-May 2020), the Chinese hand in the J&K terror strikes and the strategic situation on the LOC should be taken in all seriousness. It is known the Chinese are assisting the Pakistanis with their formidable Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Chinese encrypted, communication ultra sets meant for the Pakistan Army have been recovered from terrorists in Jammu division. Chinese and Turkish drones have been operating on the LOC for weapons and narcotics carriage. A steady supply of Chinese steel-core armour-piercing assault rifle rounds, defensive hand grenades etc. to terrorists points to a well-planned, coordinated and war-gamed guerrilla warfare in J&K.

The PLA has increased its footprint on the LOC by assisting in hardening the Pakistani defences. The Chinese have laid optic fibres and strengthened the defensive constructions on the LOC and also provided 155 mm howitzers to introduce a parity in artillery firepower. The formidable Chinese armament industry takes care of the Pakistani requirement for attrition in war reserves.

Not only this, the incursions of the PLA in Eastern Ladakh in 2020 have fundamentally altered the regional strategic calculus in Pakistan’s favour. The LOC environment has got intrinsically linked to the LAC.

India has had to divert military resources to the LAC from Jammu and the hinterland as the LAC has been war-gamed as the more formidable of the two strategic challenges. In the process, Pakistan has got a strategic shield to its proxy war in J&K. Hence, the troubling issue of India’s restraint on the LOC and its quiet adherence to the ceasefire of February 2021 in the face of a spate of soldier deaths and two video-recorded cases of beheadings of the soldiers of 48 and 10 Rashtriya Rifles deep in the Jammu hinterland.

In the conventional domain, the two hostile militaries are exercising together and adopting common weapon systems. Officers are embedded in the military commands of each other’s nations.

The 2.5 war-front, which could even visualise a one-front seamless war effort on the part of Pakistan and China, is evolving at a steady pace.

Blind spots in Jammu

The intelligence grid is a cause of concern with respect to Jammu division.

In my analysis of 14 terrorist ambushes, lures, traps in the Pir Panjals and the Jammu hinterland since October 2021, the Army suffered heavy casualties due to pinpoint information available with the terrorists with respect to potential ambush points, movements of convoys and strength of soldiers. The provision of food, cave shelters and route guidance to terrorists from the TOGWs was a conspicuous element.

On the other hand, the Army was invariably caught off-guard and in retaliation nailed a handful of terrorists. Compromised intelligence and inaccurate tip-offs further complicated the operational environment in Jammu for the Army.

Terrorists are using highly-encrypted communication devices or taking recourse to the sophisticated Alpine Quest navigation and route-mapping device which is off-line. Thus, signals interception has also been curtailed as a critical source of intelligence.

In the above scenario, human intelligence assumes import. This is where the terrorists again have an upper hand with the flow of information from locals tilted in their favour. That is the one factor which explains the disproportionate Army to terrorists kills ratio in Jammu division.

The lack of intelligence-sharing synergy between the different arms of the security establishment in Jammu has been a cause of concern. A troubling question is why the terrorists have not attacked police personnel, who are relatively soft targets in the far-flung mountainous reaches of Jammu? What does the series of summary dismissals of policemen -- for supporting terrorists and peddling drugs for narco-terror syndicates -- point to?