Politics | How long will Northeast’s separatist outfits survive?

PLA cadre at a camp in Myanmar (File Photo/Rajeev Bhattacharyya)

Rajeev Bhattacharyya

On January 12, close to 50 cadre from the anti-talks faction of the outlawed National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) crossed the border from Myanmar to engage in a peace process with the government for a negotiated settlement in an indication that militancy among a section of the Bodos in Assam has drawn to a close. On January 23, another group based in Bhutan laid down weapons along with other militants at a ceremony in Guwahati.

Known as the NDFB (Saoraigwra), this faction had opposed the ceasefire agreement inked by another clique of the outfit in 2005 and had continued to campaign for sovereignty from the camps in Myanmar. It was also part of the an alliance called the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia, which has the anti-talks faction of the ULFA, the Khaplang faction of the NSCN and Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) as its members.

The NDFB(S) was one of the smaller separatist outfits from the Northeast in Myanmar which currently has a total of eight organisations. It was in dire financial straits since the split in 2005, which was quite apparent when this author visited the rebel camps in Myanmar during 2011-12. Plans had been firmed up by a large number of NDFB(S) cadre to cross the border in 2014 under then commander-in-chief IK Songbijit — this was foiled by the hardliners. Songbijit was subsequently expelled from Myanmar and the executive council of the group reconstituted with new members.

Most senior functionaries and cadre of the separatist outfits were residing at the camps in Myanmar’s Taga region, near the Chindwin River, which were dismantled in January 2019 following a series of raids by Tatmadaw (the Myanmar military). The groups that suffered the most were the NDFB(S), the KLO and the ULFA. While the KLO is almost non-existent, the NDFB(S) cadre headed in a southward direction while the ULFA moved further north to the region inhabited by the Konyak and Pangmi Nagas across Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh. The ULFA has an estimated 250-300 cadre in the neighbouring country, many of whom are new recruits yet to undergo training.

The biggest outfits are from Manipur who shifted to their camps in the southern zone of Sagaing Division during the operation. The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) has the largest cadre at around 3,000 followed by the People’s Liberation Army at around 2,000. The third in terms of numbers is the Kanna Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) with less than a thousand cadre followed by the two factions of the People’s Republican Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK). The smallest is a breakaway group of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), which has reportedly set up a new camp in the southern zone contiguous to Manipur. All these outfits had earlier joined hands to form an alliance called the Coordination Committee with the goal to campaign for Manipur’s sovereignty.

While it is difficult to anticipate the future trajectory of the smaller outfits from Manipur, there are bright chances that the UNLF and the PLA would survive longer for two reasons. First, the twin groups have multiple sources of income from investments in different countries including Myanmar and they are not dependent entirely on extortion. The PLA, for instance, has a support base among the Meiteis in Bangladesh’s Sylhet and it still has a wide network in the country. Also, efforts are on by them to invest in business ventures in Myanmar, including in Chin and Rakhine states.

Second, the cadre of both these outfits are scattered in Myanmar, which include some commercial hubs as well. Last year, Tatmadaw had issued a release after raiding a camp of the UNLF in Chin state close to the border town of Champhai in Mizoram. So there are enough places for the cadre to take refuge even if the camps in the southern zone are eliminated by an operation. However, in such circumstances, the campaign for sovereignty would certainly take a hit which is already evidenced by the declining instances of insurgency-related incidents in the Northeast in the last decade or so.

It is learnt that New Delhi is pressurising the Tatmadaw to launch a fresh offensive against the existing camps and hideouts and has offered a proposal as well to invest more in the backward regions of Sagaing Division. The outcome remains to be seen given that the Tatmadaw is already overstretched in fighting insurgents in some border regions. The conflict continues to intensify in Rakhine and Shan states of Myanmar adding a great deal of uncertainty to the peace process in the country.

Rajeev Bhattacharyya is a Guwahati-based senior journalist. Views are personal.