Why Ukraine's Soviet-style command is costing lives and jeopardising its war effort

Why Ukraine's Soviet-style command is costing lives and jeopardising its war effort

During the first year of Russia's war, Ukrainian forces won international acclaim for their improvisation, initiative on the battlefield, and ability to outmanoeuvre a larger Russian force. But three years into the conflict, officers and soldiers say the military has reverted to Soviet-era top-down command. Decision-making issues too often from headquarters alone, punishing initiative and slowing battlefield response. Repeated frontal assaults with little strategic aim, and refusal to authorize tactical withdrawals, have contributed to unnecessary casualties and eroded morale, the Wall Street Journal reported.

Front-line frustrations spill into public view

Capt. Oleksandr Shyrshyn of the 47th Mechanized Brigade stepped forward in May with a withering Facebook rant at senior commanders for issuing "foolish" orders and wasting the lives of willing recruits. He denounced an attack in Russia's Kursk region—anticipated in direction and met by ferocious Russian defenses—that cost the lives of numerous well-trained troops. The message landed him reprimanded, but also implied support by fellow officers who share his frustrations. Others, including Lt. Col. Serhiy Kostyshyn, have defied orders to execute combat withdrawals, evacuating most of their men but facing an inquiry for abandoning positions behind.

Leadership in the crossfire

Top Commander Gen. Oleksandr Syrskiy, formerly denounced "the butcher" for his costly defense of Bakhmut, remains unpopular among soldiers who perceive him as emblematic of a Soviet mindset—Moscow-trained, micromanaging, and willing to accept heavy casualties for constricted objectives. The General Staff insists that it is modernizing training, delegating more, and learning from combat experience, but officers say that institutional culture is not open to change. The resignation of Maj. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatiy, who lamented a "gap between headquarters and units," underscored the internal struggle over reform.

Deadly effects of delay

Excessive control has created deadly battlefield delays. In Zaporizhzhia, 14 Ukrainian defenders of houses against hundreds of Russian soldiers were killed after their leaders instructed them to stand their ground without realizing the flank had already given way. In Kursk, troops usually waited for high-level approval before mortar shelling or minor withdrawals, only to move after chances were missed or after the suffering of casualties. Dread of being accused of lost initiative or failed attacks discourages timely decision-making, creating a vicious circle of unnecessary losses.

Manpower and morale strain

The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates Ukrainian losses at around 400,000, of which up to 100,000 are thought to have been killed—losses Russia can afford more readily than Ukraine. The combination of attrition warfare, under-trained mobilized reservists, and poor operational decisions is draining recruitment. Many veterans now discourage friends from signing up, and there have been desertions, with some troops defecting to volunteer units such as the Da Vinci Wolves, which operate more autonomously with greater emphasis placed on soldier welfare.

A struggle for cultural reform

Efforts to introduce NATO-style mission command—where battlefield officers set tactics to achieve strategic goals—have been slow. Some brigades, including those in Ukraine's new Third Army Corps, are embracing more flexible, soldier-conserving tactics. But veterans warn that unless there is a more widespread shift away from Soviet ways, Ukraine will be fighting Russia's war on Russia's terms. "They are bigger—we need to be better," as Maj. Oleksiy Pasternak put it.