What a US war game reveals about the risks of ousting Venezuela’s Maduro

Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro (Courtesy: Reuters photo)

When Donald Trump first pushed to drive Nicolás Maduro from power, his own government quietly tested what might come next. A US war game run during his first term painted a stark picture: the fall of Maduro could open the door to turmoil, competing armed groups and a long, messy struggle for control of Venezuela, the New York Times reported.

A war game that ends in chaos

As the Trump administration explored ways to unseat Maduro, US officials and outside experts gathered for a series of official “war game” exercises. Their task was to map out likely scenarios if the Venezuelan leader were removed by a coup, popular uprising or foreign intervention.

Douglas Farah, a national security consultant who took part in several of these sessions, later reported that almost every path led to the same outcome: a fractured state, warring power centres and no quick route back to stability. The conclusion, he wrote in an unclassified memo for the Pentagon, was that Maduro’s overthrow would probably shatter the brittle authoritarian system and unleash chaos for an extended period.

Trump’s renewed pressure and unclear endgame

Those findings loom over Trump’s new, second-term confrontational approach to Venezuela. He has branded Maduro an outlaw and enemy of the United States, moved US troops, ships and aircraft closer to the country and authorised a wave of strikes on boats off Venezuela’s coast that Washington says were carrying drugs.

Trump has floated the possibility of talking to Maduro but pointedly refuses to rule out a ground operation. Publicly, the administration frames its mission as stopping drug trafficking. Privately, analysts warn that the US still appears fuzzy about what it actually wants to see on the ground the day after Maduro is gone, and how it would manage the vacuum.

María Corina Machado and the promise of a clean transition

On paper, Venezuela has a clear alternative leader. María Corina Machado, the Nobel Prize-winning opposition figure, is widely seen by her supporters and by Washington as the rightful winner of the 2024 election, which they say Maduro stole. She insists she has a transition blueprint ready and could assume power with a strong popular mandate.

Recently, she released a “Freedom Manifesto” promising to restore rights, rebuild institutions and hold Maduro’s circle accountable for alleged crimes against humanity. But experts caution that any new government would inherit a sprawling state apparatus filled with officials, soldiers and security chiefs who owe their careers and safety to Maduro. Many might fear prosecution or revenge and resist any attempt to sweep them aside.

Armed groups, migrants and the risk of regional spillover

Beyond the formal state, Venezuela is home to armed actors who could try to sabotage or reshape a transition. Fighters from Colombia’s ELN guerrilla movement, thousands of whom shelter in the border jungles, have pledged to defend Maduro and confront foreign troops. With explosives and armed drones at their disposal, they could wage a prolonged, low-intensity conflict against a new government or any outside force.

A messy collapse could also accelerate an exodus that has already driven millions of Venezuelans into neighbouring countries. A fresh wave of people fleeing violence and economic breakdown would put even greater pressure on fragile public services and politics across Latin America.

Why regime change is easier than rebuilding

Analysts point out that the US has seen versions of this story before. In Haiti in 1994, removing a junta and stabilising a much smaller country took about 25,000 American troops. The 1989 invasion of Panama, also involving roughly 27,000 US forces, toppled Manuel Noriega but left Washington’s chosen successor facing protests, unrest and rapid disillusionment once US attention drifted.

Venezuela is vastly larger and more complex than either case, making any stabilisation mission enormously demanding. A recent report by the International Crisis Group warned that a post-Maduro government backed by Washington and regional allies could still face armed resistance from security forces and pro-Maduro elements, dragging the country into a drawn-out conflict.

Maduro’s calculations and the lessons of exile

For Maduro, the warnings serve as another reason to cling to power. He is already under investigation by the International Criminal Court, meaning that exile might not shield him from prosecution abroad. History offers grim examples, such as Nicaragua’s former dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle, who fled into exile in Paraguay in 1979 only to be assassinated a year later.

That background makes it easier to understand why Maduro might gamble on staying put, despite sanctions and international isolation. As one veteran analyst put it, the Trump team appears to believe that enough pressure, including military force, will eventually panic Maduro into leaving. The war games and past interventions suggest something very different: removing a regime is the simple part; living with the aftermath is where the real trouble begins.