China courts Taliban, Pakistan plays middleman: Why India should be on guard as CPEC game unfolds | Explained

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi - File Photo

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s surprise trip to Kabul this week is more than routine diplomacy. It is Beijing’s clearest signal yet that it intends to pull Afghanistan into its strategic orbit through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with Pakistan acting as the bridge. Wang’s visit -- the first by a Chinese foreign minister to Afghanistan in over three years -- comes just days before he travels on to Islamabad, underscoring how China and Pakistan are working in tandem to shape Kabul’s economic and security future.

For India, this development raises red flags. Not only does it risk formalising Afghanistan’s entry into CPEC at a time when Pakistan is preparing to launch “CPEC-II” with fresh Chinese investment, but it also cements a China-Pakistan-Taliban axis that could deliberately sideline New Delhi’s role in the region. The timing is equally telling: Wang Yi stopped in New Delhi to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi before heading to Kabul, signalling Beijing’s double game -- projecting a thaw with India while doubling down on its Pakistan strategy.

Beijing’s calculated move

At the heart of Wang’s visit is the plan to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. CPEC, part of Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has been the bedrock of Beijing’s partnership with Islamabad for the past decade. Now, by roping in Kabul, China wants to anchor Afghanistan into its trade and infrastructure network, while ensuring that India remains sidelined.

The Taliban, desperate for economic legitimacy, have been receptive. Earlier this year, China formally invited Afghanistan to join CPEC during a trilateral meeting with Pakistan in Beijing. Pakistan soon appointed its first ambassador to Kabul since the Taliban’s return in 2021, underlining how Islamabad is using the corridor as both a bargaining chip and a lever to keep Kabul dependent.

The shadow of CPEC-II

Wang’s visit also comes just ahead of Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s planned trip to China, where “CPEC-II” will be formally flagged off. Unlike the first phase, which focused on power plants and road connectivity inside Pakistan, this second phase is being pitched as more expansive, covering regional trade links, industrial zones, agriculture, and technology.

For Beijing, expanding into Afghanistan offers a twofold advantage: tapping into Afghanistan’s mineral wealth while also creating leverage over a fragile Taliban regime. For Islamabad, it is a chance to cement its role as China’s junior partner while projecting itself as Afghanistan’s economic gateway.

Pakistan’s dubious role

India should be particularly wary of Pakistan’s opportunism here. While Islamabad has struggled to contain cross-border militancy, especially from the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, it is simultaneously eager to use Chinese backing to shore up its influence in Kabul. Pakistan routinely accuses the Taliban of sheltering the TTP, yet both sides continue trade and security dialogues, underwritten by Beijing’s money.

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Pakistan’s bet on CPEC-II and Afghanistan’s inclusion reflects its old pattern: outsourcing its economic future to China while trying to corner India strategically. But history shows that Islamabad rarely delivers. The first phase of CPEC left Pakistan drowning in debt and dependent on Beijing, with projects plagued by delays, corruption, and security threats. The Taliban’s promise that Afghan soil will not be used by terrorists is equally suspect, especially given how Chinese projects themselves have come under attack from terror groups.

A regional realignment that excludes India

Another reason for India’s concern is the emerging China-Pakistan-Taliban axis. Reports earlier this year suggested that Beijing, Islamabad, and the Taliban had privately agreed to restrict India’s role in Afghanistan to mere diplomacy, blocking any economic or security footprint. If true, this represents a deliberate attempt to push India out of a region it has historically supported through infrastructure projects, aid, and capacity-building.

New Delhi also cannot ignore the optics: Wang Yi visiting Kabul after a stop in New Delhi to meet Prime Minister Modi, and then flying on to Islamabad for three days of talks with Pakistan’s deputy prime minister. The sequencing underscores Beijing’s balancing act, maintaining a superficial thaw with India while doubling down on its strategic embrace of Pakistan and the Taliban.

Why India should keep watch

For India, the risks of CPEC’s extension into Afghanistan are serious. The project would strengthen the China-Pakistan partnership and tighten their grip around India’s northwestern flank, adding to New Delhi’s security concerns.

It could also erode India’s influence in Afghanistan. Over the years, New Delhi has invested heavily in building roads, schools, and infrastructure there. But a stronger Chinese presence may deliberately push India’s role to the margins.

Security is another worry. With Beijing backing Pakistan, Islamabad could gain more cover to maintain its links with terror groups while deflecting international criticism.

Finally, Afghanistan risks falling into China’s debt diplomacy trap, just as Pakistan has under CPEC. If Kabul becomes financially dependent on Beijing, Chinese leverage in South Asia will only deepen, leaving India strategically disadvantaged.