New Delhi consolidates influence in the Maldives amid rivalry with China in the Indian Ocean Region

India seeks to balance its strategic imperatives in the IOR without being seen as an overbearing neighbour.

The intense geo-strategic rivalry between India and China to hold sway over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) archipelago of the Maldives has just seen New Delhi further consolidate its influence and bolster military ties during the recent three-day visit by defence minister Rajnath Singh there. Indeed, Maldives is not the only IOR nation where China has made steady and deep inroads. This has caused considerable concern in New Delhi, forcing it to redouble its efforts to counter the expanding Chinese footprints in the region.

The significance of India dispatching Singh to hand over a fast patrol vessel and a landing craft assault ship to the Maldives National Defence Forces (MNDF) – announced during President Ibu Solih’s visit to India in August 2022  – and lay the foundation stone for the ‘Ekatha harbour’ along with his Maldivian counterpart Mariya Didi cannot be overemphasised. For one, the first visit by an Indian defence minister in eleven years signals the remarkable upswing in New Delhi-Malé defence ties, particularly in the maritime domain. External affairs minister S Jaishankar travelled to the Maldives in January this year, while defence secretary Giridhar Aramane followed for the bilateral defence cooperation dialogue last month. Naval chief Admiral Hari Kumar too visited the archipelago in April last year.

Strengthening Defence Ties

The growing salience of defence ties is evident in that Singh’s visit took place despite both sides being well aware that it could be used by the Maldivian Opposition to fan anti-India sentiments, more so as the archipelago heads for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary polls later this year. Former Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen has been spearheading the anti-India campaign with its ‘India Out’ slogan. While this campaign was banned by a decree by the Solih-led government last year, the Opposition is sure to raise the bogey of an Indian military base in the archipelago yet again. Under the China-leaning Yameen’s regime, New Delhi-Malé ties had plumbed the depths as his government embraced Beijing with open arms. So much so that the Yameen government wanted India to take back the two choppers it had gifted to the Maldives. If Yameen returns to power, it will only spell trouble for India even as President Solih is set to seek a second term.

Second, Singh’s visit indicates New Delhi is no longer diffident about its growing strategic convergence with Malé ever since the India-leaning Solih-led government took charge in 2018. The Solih government’s avowed ‘India First’ policy, coupled with New Delhi’s own infrastructure development efforts, have allowed it to gain the upper hand in the high-stakes game for influence in the archipelago. With its strategic location straddling vital sea lanes, New Delhi knows well the necessity of thwarting Beijing’s moves to encircle the Indian subcontinent by building inroads into IOR countries. Indeed, Singh’s visit has also been used to convey the message to China in no uncertain terms that its hegemonic ambitions in the IOR are under close watch and there will be push-back.

The joint communiqué issued upon the conclusion of Singh’s visit emphasised “the importance of maintaining peace, stability and security in the region” as well as “underscored the importance of respecting international law and rules-based international order and expressed their commitment to upholding these principles.” What is noteworthy is that New Delhi managed to get Malé on board for this swipe at China, even though the Solih government continues to maintain warm relations with Beijing.

Message to Maritime Neighbours

Thirdly, there is clear messaging for India’s other maritime neighbours too as New Delhi has once again emphasised its mantra of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) which it uses in its outreach to them, be it the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius or Seychelles. Except for Mauritius, all have also joined China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative about which India has grave suspicions and has refused to join it. India has kept close tabs on China’s outreach in the IOR, where its warships are now deployed on a permanent basis. In the case of Sri Lanka, India has even strongly conveyed its unhappiness with Colombo’s decision to allow Chinese naval vessels to dock in its port. And yet, even as India works assiduously to engage closely with these key maritime neighbours in the security domain, the going has not always been easy.

India’s attempts to help the Seychelles develop facilities for its Coast Guard on Assumption Island have been hampered amid domestic opposition stoked by fears that New Delhi was seeking to establish a military base there. Likewise, Indian attempts to have a presence on the remote Agalega island of Mauritius too have not fructified. In 2015, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit, the two sides had signed a pact under which India was to assist Mauritius upgrade Agalega’s air and sea connectivity for the benefit of its inhabitants. But the matter has remained mired in controversy amidst fears that India is seeking to set up a military base on Agalega.

Clearly, a challenging road remains ahead for India as it seeks to balance its strategic imperatives in the IOR and yet not be seen as an overbearing neighbour. India has done well to revive the Colombo Security Conclave, a trilateral maritime security grouping that initially had India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives as members but expanded to include Mauritius last year and has Seychelles and Bangladesh as observer nations. India has to play the Great Game in the IOR with finesse.

Parul Chandra is a New Delhi-based senior journalist who writes on foreign affairs. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.