From Syria to Myanmar: Why national armies struggle against rebel forces in civil wars

There are plausible factors that prevent national armies from effectively dominating the rebel forces. (Representational image)

When the US launched off-and-on airstrikes on Syria during 2017-18, the Syrian army under President Assad resisted the offensive operations and managed to survive. Subsequently, the Syrian army managed to have an upper hand, cornering the rebel forces to desolate places. Yet, when the rebels marched through different cities towards Damascus this time, the Syrian army did not put up any fight. History, in fact, is replete with numerous such instances when national armies, hitherto highly organised, disciplined and trained in offensive or defensive operations in inter-state wars, have often lost the plot against internal warlords and rebel forces.

Perhaps the most embarrassing example of a well-trained national army losing to a rag-tag rebel group is of the erstwhile US-trained, financed and weaponised Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The US, despite spending $2.3 trillion during 2001-2021 in Afghanistan, could not tame the Taliban and had to negotiate its troops’ withdrawal in April 2021. As the withdrawal completed in August 2021, the so-called well-organised and highly disciplined ANSF simply vanished against the marching Taliban forces. In June 2023, the Wagner Group, the Russian-funded and promoted private militia, turned against the patron and charged towards Moscow. The march seemed a cakewalk against a military superpower that has advanced technological weaponry in all categories, spends the third largest defence budget in the world and maintains a military that has big-time fighting experience. Only deft political handling could save Kremlin from big military embarrassment. In Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is waging an inconclusive civil war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since 2023. The latter effectively controls Sudan’s one-third territory. In Myanmar, the Arakan Army and other rebel forces have captured border provinces one after another and there is a remote possibility of the military junta even falling down!

Fragility of National Armies Against Rebel Forces

It appears that the vast manpower, killer weaponries and budgetary resources do not assure national armies in chalking out effective domination or elimination strategies against rebel forces. Very few national armies have managed outright victory against rebel forces. We do have one contemporary example of the Sri Lankan army decimating the LTTE in 2009, after protracted conflict for decades. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), despite an intensive campaign against Hamas for last fifteen months, is ‘less than victorious’. The latter is down but not out! It appears that most national armies have to suffer ‘pangs of parallel co-existence’ with the rebel forces for protracted periods. The rebel forces have sizeable cadres and enjoy local support. Wherever they are weak and not able to out rightly challenge the national armies, they resort to teasing games like sporadic attacks, targeted killings, and terrorise the state, its infrastructure and armed machinery. The trend has only increased over the years!

Challenges of Different Warfare

There are plausible factors that prevent national armies from effectively dominating the rebel forces.

First, national armies are trained for conventional warfare against hostile state counterparts. The enemy is known. The territory to be captured or defended is known. War strategies are designed in keeping with expectational cannons of inter-state warfare. Such things do not happen in case of intra-state, non-state, or civil war.  The rebels are dispersed or hidden amongst wider population. Physical face-off or confrontations are usually avoided. Very few state responses are through specialised counter-insurgency warfare strategies where well-trained police and paramilitary forces do better and are able to distinguish between citizens and enemies.

Second, numerical preponderance and asymmetrical warfare have only relative meaning in civil wars. Intra-state or civil wars are mostly fought with small weapons. While these small weapons have become increasingly lethal and precise, they are also available in the grey market for an asking. For example, drones are easily available with the rebel forces in almost all states suffering from civil wars. Additionally, most rebel forces do get some financial and logistical sponsorship from a neighbouring state. These factors induce a semblance of symmetry in the so-called asymmetrical warfare.

Third, large national armies often find it difficult to make immediate adjustments to high-tech revolution in military affairs (RMA). Some of these armies become victims of pomp and show, ceremonies, archival command and control and resist organisational changes to synchronise with military innovations and new weapons. For example, most west Asian armies suffer from poor combat competencies and do not undertake military exercises. Some armies get obsessed with commercial activities and interfere in civic administration. These engagements, whether in isolation or in totality, affect their combat capability vis-à-vis rebel forces. Only small national armies like the IDF in Israel have constantly innovated and remained steps ahead of the rebels.

Resolving Civil Wars and Strengthening Armies

On a holistic basis, democratic approach offers a ray of hope. Democratic states and societies allow rebel forces the ‘safety valve’ space to convey their aspirations. It also allows the national armed forces to display ‘united spirit’ unlike the ‘divided spirit’ in autocracies and dictatorships. Countries like Nepal that adopted the democratic path managed to end civil wars. So was the case with Columbia that provided democratic space to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) although some of its dissidents are still fighting on. Unfortunately, countries like Syria, Afghanistan, Russia, Sudan, Myanmar etc. did not seriously explore the democratic route to handle civil wars. National armies in these countries remain ‘divided armies’, representing only the majoritarian section of the country. The rebel forces concurrently capture the alternate space consisting of loyal sectarian people and territory.

Neutralising rebel forces in contemporary civil wars is a difficult job. There is neither any single theoretical pill based on hard-core academic research nor any standard operating procedure (SOP) to guide the national armies in dealing with the rebel forces. Nevertheless, encouraging the paramilitary and police forces to train and undertake counter-insurgency operations and an inclusive democratic space are some elements of the evolving food-for-thought basket for avoiding national armies’ collapse to rebel plots.