Europe’s arsenal of democracy needs an upgrade

Stocks of key Western weapons systems are running low — particularly in Europe, where efforts to replenish them are hampered by a creaking defense-industrial base.

As the war in Ukraine drags on, the challenge of meeting the country’s battlefield needs has become more pressing. Stocks of key Western weapons systems are running low — particularly in Europe, where efforts to replenish them are hampered by a creaking defense-industrial base. Failing to address those vulnerabilities will not only jeopardise Ukraine’s prospects but undermine the security of Europe as a whole.

With the US initially providing the bulk of military assistance to Ukraine, the EU has had to scramble to keep up. It allocated €1 billion from the European Peace Facility to reimburse member states that donated to Ukraine from their stockpiles and spent another €1 billion to support joint weapons procurement. It also came up with €500 million in financing to ramp up manufacturing capacity.

Such aid is critical for Ukraine, whose counteroffensive continues to rely on the traditional tools of war — including guns and mortars but especially large, bullet-shaped 155mm artillery rounds. Russia reportedly plans to produce two million rounds of ammunition a year, and President Vladimir Putin has looked to North Korea and other rogue nations to contribute even more. On Ukraine’s side, the US has doubled its monthly production of shells to 28,000 rounds and is on track to reach 100,000 a month by 2025. Meanwhile, Europe has promised to deliver 1 million shells to Ukraine by March 2024.

The EU’s commitment to arming Kyiv is welcome. Europe has taken other small steps to encourage joint procurement. But more needs to be done to address its anemic defense base, which extends beyond artillery to air defense, transport and other areas. European defense production is plagued by duplication of effort and poor interoperability between militaries. Chronic underinvestment since the end of the Cold War is partly to blame, as are high levels of fragmentation among EU states. (A 2020 European Parliament report found the EU fielded 178 separate weapons systems, compared to 30 in the US, despite a collective defense budget that’s half the size of America’s.) The EU estimates that such inefficiency costs European governments up to €100 billion a year.

Some commonsense measures would help to improve the system. The EU should increase coordination with NATO, with the aim of standardising ammunition and other weapons so that they’re interchangeable across the alliance. Better mapping of supply chains and detailed reporting of how resources are spent would help officials respond more quickly to production problems and worker shortages.

European leaders should build on existing collaborative efforts; initiatives such as the 10-nation Joint Expeditionary Force or the Nordic countries’ cooperation in air power demonstrate the benefits of having small groups of countries work together. Governments should pool resources to source spare parts and conduct regular maintenance work. The EU should also reduce legal and regulatory barriers in cross-border procurement and expand access to the defense market for small- and medium-sized enterprises.

If these were “nice to have” luxuries before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they’re necessities now. Putin is determined to wait out Western support for Ukraine, which faces an uncertain future in the US. Building a stronger and more resilient European defense base will be costly and time-consuming, but it’s essential to saving Ukraine, deterring aggression and preventing future wars.

The Editors are members of the Bloomberg Opinion editorial board. Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.