Pakistani warship docks in Chittagong after 54 years: Why India must watch Bay of Bengal closely | Explained

A suspicious and significant geopolitical shift is taking shape in the eastern waters of South Asia. Earlier this month, a Pakistani warship – PNS Saif – docked at Bangladesh’s Chittagong Port for the first time in more than five decades. The visit – the first such occurrence since 1971 – marked a symbolic milestone in Pakistan’s outreach to Dhaka. It coincided with the visit of Pakistan’s Navy Chief Admiral Naveed Ashraf to Bangladesh. His meeting with senior Bangladeshi military officials represents the highest level of military contact since the interim government of Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus came to power after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in 2024.

The visit is not just about diplomacy. It signals a deeper shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy under Yunus’s administration and a clear attempt by Pakistan to reinsert itself into a region where India has traditionally held dominant influence. Analysts quoted by Defence Security Asia noted that Pakistan is attempting to “establish a visible presence in the Bay of Bengal” through this naval engagement. For Islamabad, the visit of PNS Saif and the broader outreach form part of a strategy to gain new relevance in South Asia’s maritime sphere.

A revival of old ties and new ambitions

The docking of a Pakistani vessel at Chittagong for the first time since the 1971 Liberation War has been interpreted by experts as a symbolic act of defiance and ambition. For Pakistan, it demonstrates that its navy is capable of forging ties in India’s backyard. For Bangladesh’s interim regime, it projects an image of foreign policy independence from India.

Reports in The CSR Journal and Defence Security Asia indicate that Admiral Ashraf’s visit focused on strengthening “defence collaboration and training linkages” between the two navies. The trip also included a courtesy call with Bangladesh’s naval chief and senior defence officials. Although framed as a “goodwill visit,” the timing and context point to Pakistan’s growing interest in regaining a foothold in Dhaka’s defence structure.

Words that expose intent

Yunus’ remarks during his visit to China earlier this year had already exposed his intentions. In Beijing, he described India’s northeastern states as “landlocked” and declared that Bangladesh is “the only guardian of the ocean for the region.” The choice of words was deliberate and condescending. It implied that India’s Northeast, long a theatre of insurgency and sensitive identity politics, is dependent on Bangladesh for maritime access and regional integration. The statement reduced India’s strategic geography to a subordinate position while elevating Dhaka as the supposed regional gatekeeper.

What makes this rhetoric alarming is that it mirrors the talking points propagated by both Pakistan and China. Islamabad has consistently argued that India’s Northeast is a vulnerable corridor that can be strategically isolated, while Beijing has sought to use its Belt and Road projects to extend influence into the same geography. Yunus’ public remarks, therefore, cannot be dismissed as naive diplomacy. They reflect a deliberate political alignment designed to serve the strategic narratives of India’s rivals.

Why this should concern India

1. Shrinking Indian influence in Dhaka

India has long been Bangladesh’s primary security partner, providing military training, intelligence cooperation, and logistical support. The sudden warmth between Dhaka and Islamabad undermines that long-standing partnership. When Bangladesh allows a Pakistani warship to dock at its main naval port and hosts Pakistan’s naval chief, it signals a deliberate rebalancing away from India. This raises doubts in New Delhi about whether Dhaka will continue to prioritise India’s strategic concerns.

2. Pakistan’s expanding maritime footprint

The presence of PNS Saif in the Bay of Bengal is more than symbolic. It provides Pakistan with visibility and potential access to maritime routes close to India’s eastern seaboard. According to Defence Security Asia, the visit “reshapes Bangladesh’s defence posture and triggers a major geopolitical shift across South Asia’s maritime landscape.” Such a move could allow Pakistan to build logistics networks, intelligence-sharing arrangements, and surveillance capabilities that might one day serve broader military interests.

3. India’s Bay of Bengal strategy under pressure

India has long viewed the Bay of Bengal as a secure maritime zone that ensures its connectivity to Southeast Asia. The emergence of Pakistani military activity in this area threatens that assumption. If Pakistan begins regular naval exchanges with Bangladesh, it could open new avenues for intelligence collection against Indian maritime operations. Combined with China’s growing presence through the Belt and Road Initiative, this development could complicate India’s control over key sea lanes and coastal security.

4. A Pakistan-Bangladesh alignment against Indian interests

Pakistan’s outreach to Bangladesh is also a political signal. By aligning with Dhaka’s interim regime, Islamabad gains a partner that might support it diplomatically in international forums. For Bangladesh, the move provides leverage in its dealings with India. However, for India, this convergence looks like a potential coalition of convenience that could undermine its regional influence.

5. The risk of covert collaboration

Analysts warn that naval diplomacy of this kind often paves the way for deeper cooperation. Joint exercises, logistics access, ship repair agreements, or even information exchange could follow. Given Pakistan’s close defence relationship with China, such collaboration would effectively extend Beijing’s strategic footprint into the Bay of Bengal. For India, this is a security red flag.

The larger geopolitical picture

Bangladesh’s internal political transition has created an opening that Pakistan is now exploiting. Since Muhammad Yunus took charge as Chief Adviser after the fall of Sheikh Hasina, the interim government has sought to reposition Bangladesh as a neutral actor between India, China, and the wider Islamic world. Pakistan is taking advantage of that stance by presenting itself as a partner willing to engage without political conditions.

In Islamabad’s narrative, the engagement with Dhaka is part of a broader diplomatic campaign to project Pakistan as a regional stabiliser. However, in reality, this renewed contact is more about weakening India’s influence in the region. Pakistan’s official media has celebrated the docking of PNS Saif as a “historic friendship gesture,” while privately, its military establishment views it as a small but significant victory in expanding its strategic footprint eastward.

Why India cannot ignore this

For India, the development has both security and symbolic consequences. Strategically, Pakistan’s naval outreach to Bangladesh creates a dual-front maritime challenge when combined with China’s presence in the Indian Ocean through ports such as Gwadar and Hambantota. Diplomatically, it signals that India’s influence over Dhaka is no longer guaranteed.

India must now reassess its maritime security strategy and its broader diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh. It will need to reassert its role as Dhaka’s principal security partner while strengthening its presence in the Bay of Bengal through naval exercises and regional partnerships.