Durand Line on fire: Will Pakistan and Afghanistan go to war? Why India must watch the border closely

Armed Taliban security personnel keep guard beside the closed gate of the zero point border crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan at Spin Boldak district in Kandahar province on October 12, 2025. (Photo by Sanaullah SEIAM / AFP)

A raw, combustible melee has erupted along the Durand Line, and Pakistan has only itself to blame. After years of treating Afghanistan as a pliant backyard and then trying to browbeat Kabul when that control slipped, Islamabad now finds itself trading artillery and words with a defiant Taliban that will no longer be ordered around. The latest wave of tit-for-tat strikes has killed dozens, closed major crossings and produced competing claims of captured tanks and overrun posts.

Pakistan’s generals sound tough on the airwaves, but their inability to prevent militants from launching attacks from Afghan soil has pushed Islamabad into dangerous brinksmanship that could easily spiral beyond border skirmishes. India must prepare for instability on a volatile frontier, but a full interstate war remains unlikely for now.

What has happened lately?

The fighting intensified after explosions in Kabul and Paktika led Afghan authorities to accuse Pakistan of strikes on Afghan soil. Pakistan denied or would not confirm responsibility for those strikes, even as Kabul vowed retaliation. Heavy fighting followed across several sectors of the border over the weekend and again on October 14–15. Kabul’s Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said Pakistani forces attacked Spin Boldak in Kandahar and that Afghan forces were “compelled to retaliate,” claiming they killed “several Pakistani aggressor soldiers,” captured posts and seized weapons including tanks. Mujahid also said “more than 12 civilians were martyred and more than 100 were injured” in the Pakistani action. Pakistan denied those claims and said it had repulsed Taliban attacks, reporting its own casualties and claiming heavy Taliban losses. Border crossings at Chaman and Torkham have been shut and tensions remain high.

Why they are clashing

The immediate trigger is reciprocal violence and mutual accusations over cross-border attacks. Islamabad blames the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other militant groups for staging attacks from Afghan soil. Kabul denies it harbours those groups and points to long-standing displacement and complex tribal dynamics along the frontier. Analysts also point to Pakistan’s attempt to set a “new normal” by signalling that attacks coming from Afghanistan will be met by strikes inside Afghanistan, mirroring how India responded to attacks originating from Pakistan earlier in the year. The broader cause is a collapse of the old patron-client relationship between Rawalpindi and Kabul. Pakistan nurtured and backed the Taliban for decades, but the Taliban now pursue independent diplomacy and outreach to New Delhi and others, eroding Pakistan’s leverage and provoking a hard reaction from Islamabad.

Could this turn into a full-fledged war?

A full-scale interstate war is possible only if political decisions in Islamabad escalate beyond punitive cross-border raids and if regional mediators fail. But a full conventional war remains unlikely in the short term for several reasons.

First, Pakistan is militarily far superior to Afghanistan. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Pakistan’s defence budget exceeds $8.5 billion, compared to Afghanistan’s barely $400 million under Taliban control, which is a more than 20-fold gap. Pakistan also maintains a standing military of over 650,000 active personnel, a modern air force equipped with F-16s and JF-17s, and a significant armour and artillery advantage. The Taliban, by contrast, rely on captured US equipment and lack an organised air or armoured corps, making them militarily asymmetric despite their combat experience.

Second, major regional powers including China, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have a strong interest in preventing a wider war and have already moved to mediate. Third, both Islamabad and Kabul risk crippling economic and diplomatic costs if they open a protracted interstate war.

That said, repeated tit-for-tat strikes, seizure of posts, and the use of heavy weapons on both sides mean the conflict could remain intense, prolonged, and dangerously unpredictable even without a full-scale war. In short, war is possible but not yet the most probable outcome; a bruising, sustained low-intensity conflict with frequent flare-ups is the likelier trajectory.

Should India fear a border spillover?

India should be watchful but not panicked. The most immediate risk for India is political and humanitarian: instability along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier can aggravate militancy in Pakistan’s northwest, create refugee flows, and complicate New Delhi’s own security calculations. India already faces the diplomatic ripple effects of Afghanistan’s outreach to New Delhi and the Taliban’s implicit acceptance of India’s territorial phrasing on Jammu and Kashmir, which has enraged Islamabad. Direct military spillover into Indian territory is not the most immediate risk, but regional shocks could force Pakistan into riskier behaviour elsewhere, including along the India-Pakistan border. New Delhi should therefore watch the situation closely, harden vulnerable border and diplomatic contingencies, and coordinate with international mediators to contain escalation.

What comes next: Likely scenarios

Short term, expect ongoing border exchanges with each side issuing competing casualty and victory claims while international mediators press for calm. Pakistan may continue to posture aggressively to satisfy domestic demand for security and to pressure Kabul, but such posturing can be self-defeating. If Islamabad cannot control militant violence inside its own territory, it risks further military humiliation and diplomatic isolation. Kabul, for its part, will continue to insist it will defend its sovereignty and may exploit Pakistan’s weakness diplomatically.

Regional actors like China, Qatar and Saudi Arabia will likely broker talks to avoid a full-blown war. International humanitarians will have to prepare for more civilian casualties and displacement along the frontier. For India, the key is pragmatic vigilance: prepare for instability spillovers, shield critical border infrastructure, and press for diplomatic channels that reduce the odds of an unintended wider war.