West Bengal Elections 2021 | 5 reasons why the Left has its back to the wall

As many as 43 constituencies will be voted for in the sixth phase of polling in Bengal on April 22. (Representative Image)

More than month-long West Bengal assembly elections are beginning to wind down, with the sixth phase of voting scheduled for April 22 and two more to follow. Even by Bengal standards, this election is being fought bitterly. Mamata Banerjee-led Trinamool Congress is looking to make it three in a row but the BJP, a rank outsider until a few years ago, is not willing to give an inch without a fight.

This poll season has all been about the Trinamool and the BJP. The Left Front, with the Communist Party of India (Marxist) as its dominant force,  that ruled the state for 34 years before the Trinamool won a famous victory in 2011 is not even in the picture, a telling tale of the precipitous fall in its fortunes.

The Left Front’s voter share has shrunk from 40 percent in 2011 assembly polls to around 7 percent in the 2019 Lok Sabha election. Why is the Left in such a mess and why are the voters disenchanted with the party they supported for almost 35 years.

Bloody politics

The rise and the fall of the Left Front in Bengal is soaked in blood.

In 1979, a few months after it was voted to power, hundreds of Hindu migrants from Bangladesh who had taken refuge in Marichjhapi, a tiny island in Sunderbans, were massacred. The Jyoti Basu government didn’t want the refugees to settle in the Sunderbans.

In 1982, 16 monks and a sadhvi of Ananda Marg, a controversial spiritual order, were killed when taxis ferrying them to a conference were intercepted and set on fire. The government blamed the sect, which accused the government of orchestrating the violence for opposing the Left.

Eight years later, three health workers were raped and murdered in Bantala in 24 South Pargana after they unearthed a corruption case involving party workers. Political killings continued well into 2000. No one was spared, opposing the ruling party came at a huge cost.

The former chief minister and senior party leader Buddhadeb Bhattacharya is on record as saying that since the beginning of the Left’s rule in 1977 to 1998, around 24,000 had lost their lives in political violence.

The killing of 14 protesters, most of the farmers, in Nandigram in March 2007 that eventually led to the Left’s ouster was yet another example of the party resorting to violence when faced with opposition.

But the worst perhaps was Harmad Bahini, a private militia, whose existence the Left denied but was everywhere. Leaders like Tapan Ghosh, Sukur Ali and ministers like Sushanta Ghosh were often accused of terrorising villagers through these hired thugs who were armed.

In the Sashan area of North 24 Parganas, Majid Ali, known as Majid Master, ruled with violence. Master “controlled” the fishing ponds and it is alleged that the auction and allotment would only take place after he had been paid off. Master, Ghosh and  Sukur have several cases of rioting and murders pending against them.

Sushanta and Tapan are in the fray for the 2021 assembly polls as well.

Few months before it was voted out in 2011, indiscriminate firing from the house of a CPM activist left nine people dead. Of the 20 persons against who charges were brought, 12 were directly linked to the party.

Deindustrialisation, unemployment

Along with political violence, deindustrialisation, joblessness is the Left’s legacy in the state. Ideologically, the Left is opposed to capitalism. The industrial downturn was already on in West Bengal when the Left was voted in but it hastened industry’s demise. Militant trade unionism, frequent bandhs and harassment of industrialists trigged a flight of capital.

Unlike 1948-65 when new industries and townships were set up by the Congress government, the Left Front relied on agriculture and cottage industries.

From number two in the country in 1977-78, the state dropped to fourth place in employment generation by 1987-88. The share of employment in the industry sector fell from 13.2 percent to 9.4 percent during the period.

Between 1978 and 1987, Bengal’s yearly average of issuing industrial licences was 39.8 against Maharashtra and Gujarat’s 114.9 and 72.8, respectively. Between 1970 and 1977, the state was giving around 62 licences a year, next only to Maharashtra.

Industrial output saw a dramatic fall. While India’s average rate of industrial growth was 12.2 percent from 1980-81 to 1995-96, the state grew only by 3.9 percent. From a 14 percent share in the net value added in the manufacturing sector in 1971, the state slipped to four percent in 2002.

The services sector, one of the biggest employment generators, also got choked as CPM dropped English from the primary school curriculum, dealing a blow to the job prospects of millions of young people.

The JyotiBasu government and the party relied on agriculture. Agriculture grew at an annual rate of 5.81 percent between1980 and 1990. It benefitted the party’s rural bases, which had already gained from land reforms.

When India opened up its economy in 1991, the Left opposed it vehemently. It was against the introduction of computers and staged protests and bandhs against foreign direct investments. It was only when agriculture growth dropped to 2.13 percent between 1990 and 1995 that Basu, who was the co-founder of CPM, was forced to reconsider his stance on industrialisation.

The migrant generation

But the damage had been done. Thousands of big factories like those of Jessops, Hind Motors and Usha Martin had closed down or were facing uncertainty. As coffers dried up, there wasn’t much left for investing in the industry.

India was in the middle of an IT boom, with Bangalore, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Pune and Chennai emerging as tech hubs. The government did sign a string of agreements with foreign companies to bring in investment but only a few materialised.

The Left’s closed-door policy hurt the education sector greatly. The industry had fled, with it capital as well. Every year, hundreds of thousands of students would leave for Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra to study in private engineering and medical colleges.

Short of funds, the Left government had come up with a two-year degree course as it had limited resources to support a three-year honours degree. The two-year course was not recognised by the country’s higher education regulator or employers. Those who could moved out of the state for a college education did.

The 'party society'

Those left behind had nothing but the party or menial jobs to fall back on. The party has spawned a new social and economic order, in which fierce loyalty a prerequisite.

A subclass of agents for “facilitating” land deals and arranging space for street vendors to set up temporary shops came up.  The most lucrative trade was developing old houses into new apartment complexes and supplying construction material.

Under the watchful eyes of the party, force was used to “facilitate” the deals. Locally it came to be known as promotari, which gave rise to “syndicate raj”.  Promotari is a distortion of the word promote, which meant developing old properties into stand-alone apartments

In rural areas, local party leaders oversaw the procurement of grains. Those who fell foul of the party struggled to farm. Sharecroppers and landless labourers, too, were at the mercy of local panchayats controlled by the party.

The Centre Indian Trade Union(CITU), the party’s trade union wing, had a huge presence in organised as well as unorganised sector. CITU strongmen controlled the demand and supply of daily workers to factories.

In return, workers had to give a small part of their earnings towards the party fund. Factory owners had to listen to CITU leaders or face closure or labour trouble.

The party was everywhere—factories, farms, and even homes. Noted scholar Partha Chatterjee refers to it as the “Party Society”, highlighting CPM’s control of all aspects of a person’s life—from settling marital discords, a disagreement over a fence to the vexed question of livelihood.

CPM was everywhere.

Bhattacharya’s failed attempt at a reset

Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, who took over as chief minister in 2000, tried to undo some of Basu’s follies by bringing back English, allowing private players to enter the education sector and wooing industry.

His efforts saw the index of industrial production show an average compound rate growth of 6.8 percent between 1999-2000 and 2005-06, up from 3.65 percent in the previous six years.

But strife within the party and mishandling of the land acquisition stir in Singur and Nandigram brought industrialisation to an abrupt stop. High-handedness and coercion in acquiring farmlands alienated and angered its rural support base, leading to the party’s downfall.

Small farmers who benefitted from land reforms were struggling as agriculture was no longer remunerative. Jobs were limited, forcing people to move to other states to earn a living.

So, when JNU Student Union President Aishi Ghosh, the CPM’s Jamuria candidate, or Meenakshi Mukherjee, president of the Bengal chapter of the Democratic Youth Federation of India and the Nandigram candidate, accuse Banerjee and Narendra Modi of failing to generate jobs and attracting investments, their words ring hollow to voters.

PrithaTah, who is in the running from Bardhman South, often speaks about political violence that left her father dead in 2012. Her opponents remind her of her party’s bloody history and dismal record against political violence.

The new crop of leaders may give CPM some hope but there is a huge trust deficit and that is not about to be bridged in a hurry.