Prachanda's visit alone not enough to reset India-Nepal ties

Nepal PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’. (File Image)

Amid the relentless India-China battle for strategic influence in Nepal, it’s a matter of relief for New Delhi that new Nepalese Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ has chosen India for his first official visit abroad. The Maoist leader, who’s now expected here in June, had snubbed India in no small measure when he chose China as his first port of call after becoming PM for the first time in 2008.

But, regardless of Dahal’s decision to travel to India first in his third stint as PM, New Delhi is unlikely to breathe easy. For, it knows well that in the fickle world of Nepal's politics, where political expediency rather than good governance matters, the pendulum can swiftly swing in China’s favour at any time. Nepal's leadership, across the political spectrum, knows it’s no longer solely dependent on India for its development needs. There is also an ever-willing China, which has huge resources at its command. This was fairly evident when New Delhi-Kathmandu ties experienced major turbulence during the tenure of Dahal’s predecessor K P Sharma Oli as PM.

Dahal, whose party won merely 32 seats in the November 2022 parliamentary polls, leads a fragile coalition of 10 political parties, which includes the pro-India Nepali Congress. With the pulls and pressures of alliance partners making for an unstable government, New Delhi’s task will be even more challenging. India would do well to keep in mind that apart from being seen as a crucial economic and development partner of Nepal, it should also be seen as a benign bigger neighbour. It will need to be more sensitive to Kathmandu’s needs to ensure the Dahal-led coalition government is mindful of its geo-strategic interests. In short, practice ‘Neighbourhood First’ in right earnest instead of merely paying lip service to it.

Domineering Neighbour

Despite repeated assertions of its close and historical ties with Nepal, India has been unable to rid itself of the perception of being a domineering neighbour, one that simply tends to ignore many of Kathmandu’s demands instead of engaging in a dialogue. To be sure, some of these demands are driven by the Nepalese leadership’s need to cater to its domestic constituency. But New Delhi has to ensure that issues of importance are addressed in a more transparent manner instead of choosing to brush them under the carpet. There, the wounds fester and help fan anti-India sentiments in Nepal.

Take, for instance, India’s purported refusal to allow electricity from any hydropower project that has Chinese links, be it in the form of a contractor or equipment access to the Indian market. Nepal believes that is why India has refused to source power from the 456 MW Upper Tamakoshi Hydroelectric Project. While not conveyed explicitly in writing to Kathmandu, it’s indicative of the intense jostling between India and China, whose own bilateral relations nose-dived after the Galwan Valley clash in eastern Ladakh in 2020.

There is yet another power trade issue. Nepal, which began exporting electricity to India last year, is pushing for “unrestricted access” to the Indian market as against the present ceiling of 452 MW of electricity. To Nepal’s dismay, the approval is given on a project-by-project basis by India. Kathmandu also wants long-term guarantees for power imports by India and is hopeful that the two countries will sign a framework agreement allowing this. Nepal’s hopes were raised when Indian PM Narendra Modi, during his first visit to Kathmandu in 2014, said in a speech before the country’s Parliament: “By selling electricity to India alone, Nepal can make a place for itself among prosperous nations… You have this much strength. We are with you. We want to be part of this development journey.”

Victim of Indo-China Rivalry

The India-Chinese geo-strategic rivalry is playing out in the aviation sector too with Nepal’s long-pending request with India for additional air entry routes. At least two of its new international airports, in Bhairahawa and Pokhara, both built with Chinese assistance, need the new entry routes.

The Kalapani-Lipulekh-Limpiyadhura territorial dispute is yet another example wherein New Delhi could have nipped the trouble in the bud by acceding to the Oli government’s initial request for foreign secretary-level discussions on the matter. Instead, it chose to ignore this request, leading to an escalation in the border row with PM Oli whipping up anti-India sentiments and going so far as to have a constitutional amendment passed in Parliament to alter the map showing these territories as part of Nepal. This tendency to simply ignore Kathmandu’s wishes if New Delhi considers it inconvenient extends to the report of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) too. The two nations had agreed to constitute this bilateral group to examine various aspects of the bilateral relationship, including the crucial India-Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950. But its report, ready by 2018, has been given a quiet burial by India, perhaps because it suggested changes to the treaty, a long-standing demand of Kathmandu.

India has also managed to alienate Nepal with its new Agnipath scheme for the short-term recruitment of soldiers. Nepal decided to suspend recruitment of its nationals under this scheme in September last year. If it becomes permanent, India stands to lose the tremendous goodwill it generates in the Himalayan nation through the Gorkhas who serve or have served in the Indian Army.

All in all, New Delhi would do well to remember that it cannot have its cake and eat it too as it struggles to retain strategic space in a country where it was once the dominant force. China, obviously, is lying in wait.

Parul Chandra is a New Delhi-based senior journalist who writes on foreign affairs. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.