MIA: Gaps in China’s PLA as Xi Jinping unleashes a purge

The historical reality in China is that the leader has to protect himself from perceived threats.

Chinese President Xi Jinping continued his purge of the top military brass of the PLA (People's Liberation Army) with two senior officials being sacked in an unceremonious and abrupt manner from the high national security positions they were holding.

On Friday (June 27), China’s apex legislature decided to remove Admiral Miao Hua from the powerful CMC (Central Military Commission) – a small body of seven members that is chaired by Xi Jinping. This chairmanship is one of three hats Xi wears – the other two being General Secretary of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and the President of the country. It may be recalled that in an unprecedented move, Xi announced in March 2018 that he would remain   the top leader in China for   life.

Admiral Miao was already on Xi’s radar in November last, when he was placed under investigation for "serious violations of discipline" – a euphemism for corruption. But the timing of his removal from the CMC has led to speculation about why this churn is taking place now and whether it represents a challenge to the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Miao, considered to be a close protege of Xi Jinping was the director of the Political Work Department of the CMC, the body that oversees China’s military-party synergy and is tasked to ensure ideological loyalty within the PLA. Domestic commentary has noted that Miao is one of the highest-ranking CMC members to be purged since the 1960s.

The second senior military official, Vice Admiral Li Hanjun, chief of staff of the PLA Navy, was also stripped of his parliamentary delegate status on the same day (June 27) and it is estimated that since Xi assumed power in 2012, he has overseen the removal or punishment of dozens of at least 78 senior PLA generals for corruption and indiscipline.

Eight of them were CMC members and viewed in its totality - this is a grave setback for Xi Jinping.  The fact that the senior-most echelons of power in the Chinese pyramid are deemed to be guilty of either turpitude (corruption) and/or ineptitude (professional incompetence) and have to be regularly purged in this manner is a less than persuasive rationale. The Chinese leadership ladder is steep and those for the top posts are chosen from a high-octane pool of rigorously distilled meritocracy.

Hence the conjecture that may be advanced is that the purges by Xi reflect a leadership tussle and could well be a strategic move by the Chinese supremo to consolidate his power. Under normal circumstances, Xi Jinping would have completed his ten-year tenure (of two five year terms, co-terminus with the National People's Congress) in 2022. This has been set aside and Xi is in the top position across party, military and state for life.

The historical reality in China is that the leader has to protect himself from perceived threats to his unitary rule and those who endear themselves by exemplary demonstration of loyalty to the 'boss' are promoted to the highest levels of power but evidently for a short period.  Admiral Miao Hua and a former CMC Vice Chairman - General He Weidong, who were both considered to be close Xi acolytes rose up the ranks rapidly to be admitted into the CMC and their downfall has been rapid and dramatic.

Is there a deep dissonance within the CCP, the party, and the PLA, the military which has led to these Xi purges? The case of Admiral Miao is intriguing – for he was entrusted with managing the CCP ideology within the PLA and his removal is particularly striking. Can one infer that even the highest level officials, tasked to instil and enforce loyalty to the party over the gun, are now deemed to be less than loyal to the ‘emperor’?

It is instructive to note that China’s imperial history which spans over 2,000 years, from the Qin Dynasty (221 BCE) to the Qing Dynasty (1912 CE), had over 400 emperors across major and minor dynasties.  Of this long lineage – it is estimated that only 50 of them died of old age or natural causes and under 35 among them met a violent end – death by assassination, suicide, or execution, often during periods of instability.

Historians are divided over the precise number of deaths and the manner in which the Emperor died, due to opaque records.  Very often, death by poisoning, triggered by intrigue within the Forbidden City, would be obscured to maintain the sanctity and legitimacy of the succession.

It is irrefutable that President Xi Jinping, who follows in this imperial lineage, would very much prefer not to be in the latter category (exit through violence) and that his periodic purges are a kind of insurance against any surprises. Thus loyalty and competence have a short shelf life in the current dispensation and this could be institutionally detrimental in the long run for China’s political stability and economic development - more so in the post Xi period.

Chinese strategic culture has been characterised as one that is astute with many positive attributes including deeply ingrained discipline and loyalty to the party; the ability to strategize for the long term; and implement national policies that will augment comprehensive national power with steadfast resolve. But in recent decades, opacity in the Xi leadership has introduced a pattern of the public spectacle of censuring mendacity (untruthfulness and lying). Senior members   of the party and the military have been scorched and the Miao Hua – Li Hanjun purge is symptomatic of this trend.

Is ‘emperor’ Xi lonelier and more insecure in Zhongnanhai than meets the eye?