Karnataka Crisis | It’s time we strengthened anti-defection laws

Somewhere during the tumultuous debate in the Karnataka Assembly on the occasion of the trust vote on July 18 the Speaker, KR Ramesh Kumar (a Congress leader), while admonishing the conduct of the opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is said to have said, “In your one-upmanship and power struggle, you’re all not thinking about what is happening to democracy. I’m tired of all this. How long should I be witness to all this? The people are watching us”.

Somehow, the irony in that statement has been lost on the state’s political leadership across the spectrum over the last year. Democracy is essentially a contract between the electorate and the elected representative, to whom the electorate as a homogenous whole has entrusted her well-being for the period of office. If it isn’t for the “little man, walking into a little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper”, as Winston Churchill once put it, elected representatives have no weight, no power, and no value whatsoever.

However, if the Supreme Court proceedings over the last week have shown us anything, it is that once that little man, or woman, has pressed the button (on the EVM, of course), he becomes a non-entity, a mute spectator to a circus that, curiously it turns out, has the full backing of the Constitution. Courts, rightly, keep their distance, refusing to evade into the political thicket, and honouring the separation of powers.

The toothless tiger that is Schedule X

Anti-defection provisions in India were first introduced in 1985 through the 52nd amendment to the Constitution. The objects and reasons for the amendment cautioned that if the evil of political defections was not combated, it is “likely to undermine our democracy and the very principles that sustain it”. It provided that in case a member of a legislature voluntarily gives up the membership of her party (overtly, or even by merely abstaining from voting), she was disqualified from becoming a member of that house until she is re-elected afresh.

When even that did not stop large scale defections, another amendment provided that a member so disqualified could not become a minister unless first re-elected, thus dissuading defections for the sole purpose of immediate ministerial berth in a rival government (Normally, any person can be appointed minister, pending getting elected within the next six months.)

In Karnataka, even this protection was circumvented. Enough MLAs supporting the ruling coalition ‘resigned’, giving the Opposition a majority in the Assembly, which now has a reduced strength. The Speaker might yet spring a surprise and disqualify the members, but that would only mean that they would have to stand for and win an election immediately before becoming a minister.

In other states, more efficacious methods have been employed. In Goa, 10 out of 14 Congress MLAs split from the mother party and formed a separate block: only to join the BJP the next day. In Andhra Pradesh, four of the six Telugu Desam Party MPs in the Rajya Sabha ‘merged’ their party with the BJP. Both manoeuvres are covered by exceptions contained in Schedule X.

What of the voter?

Where does that leave the voter —the ordinary citizen who chooses one candidate over another? Or the party workers and supporters who toiled to get the candidate elected?

If the events of the last month tell us anything, it is that there is absolutely no recourse for the little man with his little finger against such orchestrated defections. Naturally people are angry. An intervener in the present Supreme Court proceedings collected hundreds of signatures from agitated constituents of one of the defecting MLAs in just a couple of hours [Disclaimer: This author appeared on behalf of these constituents in the Supreme Court].

This is not to say that a person can or should be forced to work against her will. However, abdicating electoral mandate should come with some consequences that disincentivises, and if not, penalises unprincipled defections.

A moratorium on standing for election or occupying any electoral post for a period of five years (or at least the remaining term of that legislative house) is a great place to start. Mandatory investigations into whether any sort of ‘bribe’ or inducement was promised, paid, or received can also strongly work as a strong deterrent to unscrupulous lawmakers.

Abraham C Mathews is an advocate in the Supreme Court, and a chartered accountant. Twitter: @ebbruz. Views are personal.