India-US 2+2 Dialogue | Strategic convergence is a work in progress

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The third India-US 2+2 Dialogue will be remembered for its signing of, what the United States calls, their third and final foundational agreement, namely, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). This finally puts India at par with other US allies in terms of accessing intelligence, information and military equipment from US in strengthening its national defence.

These should facilitate India having access to US high-end technology transfers, investments, geospatial maps, even classified satellite data, and boost India's overall military modernisation. As for the US, it sees this agreement as laying the foundation for interoperability between two militaries by creating common standards and systems, and this is how it is viewed in China.

While US secretaries Mike Pompeo and Mark Esper travelling to India in the midst of a pandemic was seen as a powerful symbolism showcasing US support to India, its timing — exactly a week before the US presidential elections — lent credence to mischievous interpretations. From trailing Trump seeking external legitimacy for his re-election to Pompeo promoting his visibility for contesting the 2024 presidential polls, more sober commentaries alluded to this being a routine and institutionalised dialogue. Since engaging India has had bipartisan support, it seemed irrelevant as to who wins the November 3 polls.

The meeting nevertheless did seem bit hurriedly put together alluding to the centrality of the perennial China factor, especially the India-China border tensions. New Delhi appeared keen to host this dialogue lest a Democratic victory in the elections pushed it by several months even after President-designate Joe Biden is sworn into office in January.

What made this interpretation appear convincing is that unlike their first and second 2+2 Dialogue, this one ended without a joint statement. Second, the last dialogue was held in the third week of December, so hosting it post-presidential elections would not have pushed it too far.

Instead of providing any roadmap to the future of India-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, this one became a mere stocktaking exercise concluding their ongoing multiple efforts in sectoral cooperation. It clearly missed to present any shared long-term vision on the big picture which is what ties these two nations together in their endeavour to recast the larger regional security architecture.

Especially coming soon after the Tokyo Ministerial Meeting of Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which had also failed to produce a joint statement, this repeat performance must bring relief to Beijing that sees these meetings as aimed at containing China's regional resurgence. After all, other than the business interests of the US military industrial complex that has already procured contracts worth $20 billion, it is their converging Indo-Pacific geopolitics that has made successive US administrations cultivate India as a counter to China.

Thus, in spite of pious sentiments, the two as yet do not share one vision on what constitutes the Indo-Pacific region or its regional security architecture. Till recently, India had been persistent with ensuring that Indo-Pacific will be neither militarised nor allowed to become an exclusive club of few nations. The US, on the other hand, clearly sees China as a clear and present danger.

Even now, in face of its daunting China challenge, New Delhi has shown great finesse to calibrate its diplomacy so as to avoid shutting all doors on reviving dialogue and developmental partnership with China. This is simply because on several important issues such as terrorism (read Afghanistan) and energy (read Iran) and climate change (read Paris Agreement) US strategies do not gel with India's civilisational ethos or long-term strategic interests.

India remains far too self-conscious and norms-driven to fall in line with US’ power-driven extortions. Both also understand their mutual relevance and limitations which is what explains their continued working together. It was interesting to see how this 'bilateral' dialogue ended with all four principals presenting four separate statements to the media. These showed slight, yet clear, variance in their semantics and sentiments.

Barring well-known China-baiter Pompeo, who mentioned of threats from Chinese Communist Party three times, the C-word was not mentioned by the other three leaders. It remained so even when two of the four 'permitted' questions so pointedly tried to prove them on China.

Were they falling shy to profess their real intentions or were they exploring their meeting points pregnant with deep system sharing potential. Given their persistent divergences on multiple issues, this remains as yet only a work in progress to be continued by the next US administration.

Swaran Singh is Professor and Chairman, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views are personal.