Drones are changing warfare. India needs to move fast

We’re still in the early stages of the drone era.

By Aditya Ramanathan

In 1898, the Polish-Russian banker Ivan Bloch published a prophetic six-volume study on the future of war. His work not only predicted the profound political and economic effects of a war involving European powers but also the horrific battlefield stalemate that would ensue because of machine guns and long range artillery.

It would take two years of carnage in the First World War’s Western Front to painfully birth new technologies and tactics that could break the deadlock. By the end of that war, the victorious armies had learnt to employ tanks, artillery, and heavily armed infantry in a carefully orchestrated symphony that would bloodily restore movement to land warfare.

It was a lesson in the transformation of warfare that would echo well into the twenty first century. Today, more than two years into the Russia-Ukraine war, onlookers in India have much to learn. If analysts of the First World War turned their attention to tanks and submarines, we must consider the impact of that broad category of systems we call drones.

The Dawn of the Drones

Drones are hard to define though we usually know one when we see one. The majority are uninhabited platforms with payloads that might be cameras, jammers, missiles or bombs. The rest are remotely operated munitions launched on one-way suicide missions. Drones may take to the seas, or move on land, though most of those used in Ukraine have been airborne. Even aerial drones encompass a bewildering array of systems that range from tiny commercial quadcopters to sophisticated military aircraft that happen to be piloted remotely.

The first lesson we can draw is that small, cheap, low-altitude drones operating in the ‘air-littoral’ - usually defined as an altitude below 10,000 feet - are transforming land warfare. These provide persistent reconnaissance, act as spotters for artillery and other munitions, and can mount attacks themselves (though not as effectively as established weapons). The overall effects of these drones is to make movement perilous and surprise difficult.

To restore movement and surprise, the Indian Army will need air superiority at low altitudes, a task for which air forces are not currently oriented. This probably means the army will need to field its own ‘drone force’ for the air littoral as well as anti-drone defences that deploy both kinetic measures and electronic warfare.

The second lesson is that uninhabited platforms are slowly changing traditional air power as well. In the right circumstances, long-endurance drones can effectively hit enemy bases and infrastructure, suppress air defences, and provide real-time intelligence from deep behind enemy lines. However, most present platforms also have severe limitations. They are vulnerable to missiles, carry small payloads, and are usually dependent on communications links with their operators. Until these challenges are overcome, drones will supplement rather than replace traditional airpower.

The third lesson is that drones will make existing naval platforms more vulnerable. While Ukraine’s naval successes have been limited to coastal combat, in the near future we could see aerial, surface, and underwater drones swarming fleets of warships in the deep seas. We got a glimpse of this future in recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on both merchant ships and naval vessels. To counter such attacks, the Indian Navy, much like the army, will need its own swarms of drones as well as anti-drone systems.

What the Ukraine War Can’t Teach Us

We’re still in the early stages of the drone era, marvelling (or shuddering) at the ability of a cheap quadcopter to destroy an expensive tank. However, drone combat is likely to get a lot more complicated over the next decade. As electronic spoofing and jamming becomes more effective, and high-powered microwave weapons are introduced, they could flip the current exchange ratio, making it cost effective to disable even the simplest of drones. This will, in turn, force military drone makers to jettison commercial-grade equipment and produce more expensive drones that feature hardened electronics and have a better shot at survival.

Drones will also make much more use of artificial intelligence over the coming decade. Autonomous drones will be able to move in swarms, take evasive action, identify threats, and select targets by themselves. This will not only reduce the need for complex communications links, but also free up human operators, allowing them to deploy ever larger numbers of autonomous systems simultaneously.

Finally, it’s important to keep India’s unique circumstances in mind. For example, to understand how non-state actors could use drones, India can look at how the Houthis or Hezbollah are employing them. It will also not be lost on Indian observers that China is a much more capable drone-power than either Russia or Ukraine. Lastly the Russia-Ukraine war will tell us little about how drones might be used in high altitude areas or the Indian Ocean. The lessons that wars provide are simultaneously invaluable and limited.

What India Must Do

The first two, obvious steps India must take are to develop a robust drone industry and aggressively begin incorporating drones into all three services. Here, speed is of essence. Rather than seeking self-reliance, the government must facilitate joint ventures between Indian and foreign companies to develop new drones and produce existing ones under  licence. However, Such ventures will ultimately make commercial sense only if the government creates more flexible procurement rules that help fund research and development by assuring orders.

There will also be some resistance to drones from within the armed forces. It will take leadership to embrace and promote the adoption of drones. Change is not easy, but it is less painful than defeat.

The third action is harder to measure but equally important. Drones are simply types of weapons or platforms that will exist within a complex system of warfare. To understand their transformative potential as well as their limitations requires a culture of informed and largely open debate involving military professionals, civilian analysts, and industry. Such a culture can provide the knowledge base for India’s own Ivan Blochs, as well as the wisdom to heed their advice.

The author is research fellow at The Takshashila Institution. 

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.