China’s expanding military drone ecosystem is a menace for the likes of Taiwan and India

China’s evolving military policy is paying significant attention to the development and deployment of drones in local wars around the world.

The recently concluded Sixth Chinese Helicopter Exposition, held in the Tianjin municipality of Northeastern China, put up a huge show of airpower with over 350 aircraft and air defence systems manufacturers from around 20 countries participating. At this expo, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army ground forces unveiled the latest addition to their drone arsenal, the KVD-002, manufactured by the Aerospace CH UAV Company.

Drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become all the rage in performing a host of defence-related functions, including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), ground attack, and countering electromagnetic interference from rival forces.

China’s evolving military policy is paying significant attention to the development and deployment of drones in local wars around the world and is utilising its own “Military-Civilian Fusion” (MCF) strategy to create a drone industry capable of meeting the demands of modern warfare.

PLA’s Drone Capabilities

The PLA has now demonstrated its capability to use drones across a range of functions and regions, the most notable being during its incursions beyond the median line of Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). Often, the PLA uses drones to conduct penetrating ISR (which indicates stealthy intelligence collection and reconnaissance in denied areas) and team up with manned aircraft (such as the Chengdu J-10 or the Shenyang J-16 fighter jets).

This “manned-unmanned teaming” (MUM-T) format requires drones to conduct high-risk ISR in visual range without compromising the security of pilots, perform communications relay or decoy operations to assist the manned aircraft, and ultimately enable the latter to undertake Beyond Visual Range (BVR) tasks such as air-to-air missile targeting.

In recent months, many PLA drones, such as TB-001, BZK-005, and KV-001, have already accompanied J-10s and J-16s on their regional combat training missions, including in the aftermath of former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei. This capability can easily be deployed by the PLA in a Taiwan or a South China Sea scenario.

What Should India Watch Out For?

Open-source intelligence on ORBATs (Orders of Battle) of the Western Theatre Command, which is the PLA theatre covering the border with India, indicates that multiple bases in Tibet and Xinjiang host UAV brigades and detachments. For example, the Xigaze (or Shigatse) Peace Airport, a PLA Air Force base just over 150 kilometres from China’s border with Arunachal Pradesh, houses the EA-03 reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs.

Similarly, the Hotan base, located about 250 km northeast of the Karakoram Pass, houses a UAV brigade with detachments of multi-role drones like GJ-1, GJ-2, BZK-005, and BZK-006. As of August 2023, the GJ-2 drone has been put under strike training trials in the deserts of Xinjiang.

When looking from the Indian security interests lens, it is important to note that the PLA-WTC is deploying drones to engage in a range of functions. For example, drone delivery systems have now become a subject of increased testing by the PLA for the purpose of servicing personnel in tough terrains, such as the mountainous regions in Tibet.

In 2020, the PLA’s Joint Logistics Support Force organised multiple drone delivery tests in the plateau areas to unblock the “last mile” of material supplies for plateau troops. The transportation unit, made up of nine drones, was tested to transfer hot food, drinking water, medicine, and other urgently needed materials into incubators at the bases of the Tibet Military Command.

Another key capability to watch out for is drone swarming. The state-owned defense conglomerate China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) has been experimenting with flying swarms of drones at one go to enable them to cover a wider area and perform a battle mission easily and more quickly.

Now, the CETC is also looking to integrate Artificial Intelligence-onboard UAVs to realise the goal of “swarm intelligence”. Such swarms can autonomously perform take-off, flight coordination, and landing. They can be used to overwhelm targets by creating electromagnetic interference, or as swarms of suicide drones exploding on contact.

Facing Geopolitical Headwinds

Despite its feats, China’s evolving military drones industry faces domestic and geopolitical challenges. As tensions between the US and China are simmering, the Biden administration has taken steps to curb the advancement of China’s defence technology.

This is being done through tough export restrictions on the flow of critical technologies like semiconductors and technical know-how on AI from the US to China. Indian defence officials, too, have taken measures to shield India’s own drone industry from Chinese imports.

It was reported in August 2023 that Indian defence officials, too, have taken measures to shield India’s own drone industry from Chinese imports, given that intelligence-gathering by Indian drones could be compromised by Chinese-made parts in the drones’ communication functions, cameras, radio transmission, and operating software.

Moreover, as the Russia-Ukraine war endures, China has announced restrictions and controls on the export of long-range civilian (many of which are dual-use) drones to Russia, with the intent of preventing them from being used in war-fighting. The increasing complexity of the external environment is hence creating a host of challenges for China’s military drones industry.

Nonetheless, drones will continue to constitute an important pillar of PLA’s strategy to create a “world-class fighting force” with the capability to “win localised, high-intensity and short-duration” battles. As China continues to invest in making drones more modular and drone operators more specialised, India must watch out for developments in the field and invest in counter-drone strategies of its own.

Anushka Saxena is a China Studies Research Analyst with the Takshashila Institution. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.