26/11 Mumbai attack anniversary: The 'unpunished' conspiracy of ISI, Lashkar, Al Qaeda and Dawood gang's local support

A detailed Indian security dossier, coupled with international investigative work, points to a direct collaboration between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Al Qaeda in the planning and execution of November 26, 2008 Mumbai terror attack, which killed 175 people and injured 300 others.

According to a report by the FPJ, the 69-page dossier provides substantial proof of the ISI’s active role through its proxy, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The investigation reveals that the operation was masterminded by the ISI’s ‘S’ branch, seeking to expand its theatre of conflict beyond Kashmir.

The connection to international terror networks is starkly detailed in the book The Exile by British journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy. The publication cites two former aides to LeT leader Hafiz Saeed, claiming that Osama Bin Laden himself travelled to Manshera to attend a key meeting for the 26/11 operation.

The journalists aver that the meeting was “facilitated by Lashkar, overseen by the ISI's S-wing and sponsored by Al Qaeda.” Documents recovered after the US operation that killed Bin Laden reportedly confirmed that Saeed had been in close contact with the Al Qaeda leader until his death.

Adding significant weight to these claims, former chief of Pakistan’s own Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Tariq Khosa, admitted in a 2015 op-ed in Dawn newspaper that the ten terrorists were members of the LeT. He confirmed forensic evidence showed they received training at a camp in Sindh province and revealed that the LeT control room in Karachi, which directed the attacks and the ship used to transport the gunmen, had been seized by authorities.

Despite these admissions, Pakistan has yet to take substantial action against the LeT or its identified handlers, such as Major Iqbal and Sajid Majeed and continues to describe them as “non-state actors.”

The investigation also turns a spotlight on a crucial and perhaps underexplored, aspect of the atrocity: extensive local support within Mumbai. Sources indicate the operation could not have been executed with such precision by the gunmen alone. The Dawood Ibrahim gang, infamous for its role in the 1993 Mumbai serial bombings, is alleged to have worked in close tandem with the LeT.

Dawood’s operatives, active in the docks, reportedly guided Ajmal Kasab and his associates, helping them evade Indian Coast Guard patrols and land at a precise location near Badhwar Park in Colaba. From that point, local operatives are said to have led the terrorists to their multiple targets, including Cafe Leopold, Chabad House, the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and CST railway station.

While American accomplice David Headley had conducted extensive reconnaissance of the sites, the ease of the attackers’ movement through the city suggests a support network on the ground was instrumental in facilitating the bloodshed.

Seventeen years on, the quest for accountability for one of India’s most traumatic terror attacks remains unresolved, with official Pakistani complicity and local collusion forming central, yet largely unaddressed, questions.