What we know about the fate of Iran’s nuclear programme after US and Israeli strikes

Iran's Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

The recent US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s key nuclear facilities have inflicted significant damage but left major uncertainties about the status of Iran’s nuclear programme—most notably, the fate of 400 kg of enriched uranium. Despite setbacks, neither US intelligence nor international inspectors can account for Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium.

Last seen in Isfahan before the strikes, the material was likely moved, according to IAEA chief Rafael Grossi, and may now be hidden across multiple locations. The possibility that Iran preserved its fuel and retains covert facilities keeps open the risk of a rapid nuclear breakout, even as its known infrastructure lies in ruins, the New York Times reported.

Fordo: deep damage but unclear outcome

The Fordo Fuel Enrichment Plant, buried deep under a mountain, was struck by six US B-2 bombers dropping a dozen 30,000-pound bunker-busting bombs. Satellite images showed bomb entry points at the site’s ventilation shafts and that tunnels leading into the facility had been filled with dirt. However, the bombs did not appear to collapse the underground enrichment halls.

Grossi said the centrifuges housed there—some of Iran’s most advanced—are no longer functioning, largely because of the vibrations caused by the strikes. Even so, American analysts noted that the facility’s structure appears to have remained mostly intact, which raises the possibility of eventual repair and reactivation.

Natanz: enrichment halls struck

Natanz, Iran’s primary uranium enrichment site, was hit by Israeli and US airstrikes. The aboveground portions of the pilot fuel enrichment plant were destroyed, while two fresh craters appeared over what experts believe are underground enrichment halls. The IAEA confirmed “direct impacts” at those locations.

The damage is considered significant, though less devastating than Fordo given that Natanz is not as deeply buried. Rebuilding would still take time, especially if electrical and technical infrastructure was rendered inoperable.

Isfahan: a strategic chokepoint disrupted

In Isfahan, a combination of Israeli missile strikes and US Navy cruise missile attacks targeted nuclear conversion and processing facilities. The site housed enriched uranium and had infrastructure critical to converting uranium gas into solid metal for potential use in weapons.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized that destruction of the “conversion facility” was key to stalling Iran’s weaponization pathway. Satellite images confirmed significant new damage to the facility. But some analysts warn that Iran could have constructed a duplicate facility in secret, outside the IAEA’s reach.

Intelligence gaps and the mystery of the uranium

The most serious uncertainty centres around the fate of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. UN inspectors had last verified its presence in Isfahan a week before the strikes. Since then, neither US intelligence nor the IAEA has confirmed its location.

Grossi said the fuel was stored in containers small enough to fit into the trunks of about 10 cars—making relocation both feasible and plausible. Satellite imagery and reports from intelligence sources suggest movement of vehicles in and out of the Isfahan complex shortly before the attacks.

European officials have reached similar conclusions: that Iran likely dispersed the material as a precaution. Senior American officials now privately concede they do not know whether Iran still possesses all, some, or none of the enriched stockpile.

A setback—but not an end

While the strikes have temporarily degraded Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and produce weapons-grade material, the unverified status of the 400 kg stockpile looms large. Without clarity on where that fuel is, or whether Iran possesses covert facilities to process it, the risk of a rapid nuclear breakout remains.

Representative Jim Himes, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, summed up the concern: “Obliterating the sites means nothing if the Iranians moved enough 60% uranium, centrifuges and other weaponization tools to build a bomb at some possibly unknown location.”