Trump 2.0 may pressurise India on its positioning in the Quad

India will also have to make an objective assessment of its long term strategic objectives and consolidate its partnerships accordingly.

In January 2017, a freshly minted US President, Donald Trump, decided to fulfil a campaign promise and pulled his country out of TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and this was only the beginning. In the years that followed, President Trump decided to walk out of the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 with no plan B from what his advisers later revealed; and in November 2020 – the US formally walked out of the Paris Climate Accord.

In the wake of the emphatic Trump victory on November 6, the question that arises is whether the agreements related to the Indo-Pacific on the Biden watch (Quad and AUKUS) will meet a similar fate – or will they be pursued on their own merits in an objective manner and policy continuity maintained.

India is an affected party, both in a direct manner (Quad) and in a non-linear way (AUKUS) and a review of this domain in Trump 2.0 and the policies that may unfold merit review.

It may be recalled that the term Indo-Pacific was first introduced into the political discourse of the region by former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe in 2007 and later given traction by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the first Obama term (2009-13).  This inclusive term was welcomed by India, for the earlier formulation, Asia-Pacific was more exclusionary.

The Quad came into de-facto existence in December 2004 in the aftermath of the tsunami that ravaged parts of the (south eastern) Indian Ocean littoral. This natural calamity brought India, USA, Japan and Australia together in an HADR (humanitarian assistance disaster relief) effort and the grouping remained a relatively low profile collective forum.

Interestingly, the Indo-Pacific acquired traction and wheels in Trump 1.0 and the first foreign ministers level meeting was held in 2017 and to his credit – President Joe Biden elevated it to summit level in early 2021 in a virtual format and later in September 2021   he invited the leaders to Washington DC for the inaugural in-person summit.

This was also the time when the US in a radical departure from earlier policy, formed the three-nation AUKUS – comprising Australia, UK and US. This grouping would allow Australia to acquire SSN-s (nuclear powered attack submarines) with assistance from the US and UK, and is currently a work in progress.

The Indo-Pacific received sustained attention by the Biden team as part of the larger issue of dealing with China – which was described as a ‘pacing challenge’ – and the Quad met at summit level every year. The last summit was held in Delaware, hometown of President Biden in September this year and India is to host the next summit in 2025.

In Trump 2.0 it is likely that as part of the larger US policy towards China, the Indo-Pacific, Quad and AUKUS will be reviewed in a more transactional manner – as in what is the hard security dividend that the US is getting out of this investment?

India is the odd member in the Quad, in the sense that while the other three nations are military allies with the US in the lead – Delhi prefers to be in a strategic partnership and has avoided getting into formal military alliances. The suggestion of an Asian NATO is a non-starter from the Indian perspective and the more recent improvement in India-China relations – however nascent and slender – is an indicator of the Indian preference and orientation.

In relation to nuclear submarines, India has recently joined the five countries who have this capability (they are also the permanent five of the UNSC) and has one operational SSBN (nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles) with two others in the pipeline. SSN-s are also envisioned in the Indian acquisition plans and this capability has been enabled by the long standing cooperation with USSR and now Russia.

How Trump 2.0 accommodates this anomaly, wherein India remains a partner and not a military ally of the US and yet remains multi-aligned by way of its relations with Moscow and Beijing will be a test for the strategic and diplomatic acumen of the new White House team.

Will India remain relevant in relation to the US management of the pacing challenge that China poses - a formulation that had its genesis in the second term of President Reagan (1985-89) and nurtured by his successors down to Joe Biden? India will also have to make an objective assessment of its long term strategic objectives and consolidate its partnerships accordingly.

The Indo-Pacific as a region is central to the management of the US-China relationship and is primarily a maritime domain, extending into the cyber-space continuum with advances in technology. Nuclear propulsion and the management of underwater patrolling areas will be a critical capability determinant and how AUKUS will feed into this strategic picture and the locus accorded to India are complex issues.

In his first term, addressing the APEC forum (November 2017)  in Da Nang, Vietnam, Trump advocated  a free and open Indo-Pacific as “a place where sovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in peace.”

Hopefully Trump 2.0 will not jettison this normative and inclusive blueprint but use his many skills, often cloaked in blunt coarseness, to realize this vision and this could be the agenda at the Quad summit that PM Modi will host later in 2025.