Politics | Why impact of the coup in Myanmar on the North-East remains uncertain

(Image: AP)

It is now more than four months since the military toppled the civilian government in neighbouring Myanmar with the predictable corollary of a brutal crackdown across that country against the anti-coup protestors. So speculation is rife about the nature and extent of the episode’s impact on India’s North-East, which shares a 1,643-km-long border with Myanmar.

Two aspects that seem to have attracted the utmost attention of the government are the influx of refugees, and the fate of the ongoing projects in Myanmar — the projects being a part of India’s Act East Policy. More than 9,000 refugees have crossed the border into Mizoram and Manipur, with more than 80 percent of them holed up in Mizoram.

The Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) has intensified the offensive against the local resistance groups in the Chin State and the Sagaing Division, both contiguous to the Northeast. In Mindat, the military has even shelled the camps that housed internally displaced people who were scurrying to reach safety. Then, on June 9, spokesperson of the National Unity Government (NUG) Dr Sasa warned that 6.4 million people could be without food in Myanmar by October at an online session organised by the SOAS South Asia Institute, University of London. In the past one week or so, close to 3,000 refugees including Chief Minister of Chin State Salai Lian Luai have landed in Mizoram.  In the backdrop of these developments, more refugees cannot be ruled out in the future.

The Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport project and the trilateral highway — two of the biggest Indian schemes in Myanmar — do not show any indication of an early completion if information from government sources is to be believed. This means that the economic benefits which were envisaged for the landlocked Northeast from Myanmar will not materialise very soon. Thus, the informal trade, which is several times more than the formal, can be expected to continue. In fact, violence has erupted at some spots contiguous to Manipur and Mizoram, whereas the region further north opposite Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh has been silent, except that a greater presence of the Tatmadaw has been spotted at some places by rebel groups.

Continuous seizures of contraband items in the Northeast over the past few years indicate that the import of narcotics, gold and timber has not diminished. The ongoing crackdown in Assam reveals that Brown Sugar is being trafficked in huge quantities like the synthetic drugs which are mostly exported to Bangladesh. Profits from this illicit trade are allegedly being garnered by a large group of people including a section of the Tatmadaw posted along the border. If at all there is a declining trend of the imports, it could be due to the operation launched by the Assam Police and not due to the disturbances across the border. The networks in the Northeast which originate from the border in Mizoram and Manipur are still intact.

Finally, what will be the fate of the rebel camps in Myanmar after the coup?

The separatist outfits have been on the back foot in the region for several years. The ULFA (I) and the NSCN(K) are reeling under a severe financial distress and struggling for survival after some of their major establishments were dismantled by the Tatmadaw in early 2019. There are rumours among a section of government officials that a chunk of the ULFA(I) functionaries would soon descend from the hills in Myanmar to lay down their arms. Even if that does not happen, it is unlikely that they would be evicted by the Tatmadaw very soon, given its overwhelming engagement with conflict zones in other parts of Myanmar.

Nor can the outfits from Manipur, who have hideouts, camps and investments at different places in Myanmar, be said to be in danger after the coup. Rather, there are rumours claiming new equations being established between some of these groups and the Tatmadaw, and allegations that a section of the rebel functionaries are being utilised by the military to target the fleeing refugees and protestors against the coup.

There are also rumours about the presence of some functionaries from the Myanmarese resistance groups and their linkages with over ground militant outfits in the Northeast belonging to the Kuki groups. The reason is the ethnic affinity among the communities on both sides of the border. If this trend is consolidated, Tatmadaw would not be happy with New Delhi, and the ties between the two countries could be tested.