India frets over Sheikh Hasina’s China visit, a litmus test for New Delhi-Dhaka ties

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, China in July 2019. (Source: File Image/Reuters)

All binoculars in New Delhi’s South Block, which houses the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), will be trained on Beijing from July 8 to 11 during Sheikh Hasina’s state visit — her first trip to China after becoming the Prime Minister of Bangladesh for a record fourth straight term.

Narendra Modi government’s foreign policy-cum-security establishment is naturally all eyes and ears for Hasina’s talks with her powerful host, President Xi Jinping and other top Chinese leaders next week, because India has a very big stake in Bangladesh. Any rise or fall in Dhaka’s relations with Beijing has huge implications for New Delhi, especially as India’s own relations with China are presently in tatters, and the superpower’s presence in India’s neighbourhood is growing by leaps and bounds.

Teesta River Treaty On Agenda

On the wily 76-year-old Hasina’s agenda in Beijing, first and foremost, is the trans-border Teesta River which needs no introduction in Bangladesh or India.

After failing to finalise the Teesta River water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh for 13 long years, New Delhi perfunctorily offered to “conserve and manage” the Teesta waters on the Bangladeshi side during Hasina’s June 21-22 state visit to India, barely a fortnight before Hasina’s scheduled China trip.

China, in contrast, is confident and dying to bankroll and execute the billion-dollar Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) designed by Dhaka to overcome the crisis caused by India’s failure to operationalise the treaty since 2011 and somehow rejuvenate the river basin. The Bangladesh Water Board and China’s Power Construction Company have been quietly negotiating TRCMRP’s execution for years but Dhaka judiciously refrained from giving the go-ahead to build infrastructure for TRCMRP fearing an adverse reaction from India.

India and China’s Offer

I have written before that New Delhi wields more influence in Bangladesh than all the five permanent members of the United Nations’ Security Council put together. Given India’s unimaginable clout, Hasina obviously wanted to get re-elected first and then take a call lest a spurned New Delhi upset her electoral apple cart and cut short her rule. Back in the saddle with unqualified Indian backing, Hasina -- who visited New Delhi twice in June – will now have to finally choose between India’s and China’s Teesta offers, her decision can’t be deferred any more.

On her return from India after the June 21-22 state visit - and before starting to pack her bags for the July 8-11 trip to China - Hasina announced that “China and India have given separate proposals to implement the Teesta project. We will accept the proposal which is more suitable and beneficial for us”. But a few days later, her Foreign Minister, Hasan Mahmud, who accompanied her to New Delhi and will be her companion in Beijing too, declared that “as Teesta is a trans-boundary river of India and Bangladesh, it will be good for us if India executes the project as per our requirements”.

The suspense will finally be over during Hasina’s Beijing visit when the veil of secrecy around Dhaka’s choice will be lifted. If Bangladesh ultimately decides to rope in China to rejuvenate the Teesta basin in India’s backyard, it will be a huge blow to the Modi government in the whole of south Asia. But I have my doubts that Dhaka will summon up the courage to antagonize New Delhi even if it is convinced – and perhaps rightly so -- that China will do a better job than India.

Tough Choice For Dhaka

My hunch is that instead of an outright choice Hasina will configure a middle path in keeping with Bangladeshi expertise in balancing its relations with China, India, the United States and European Union, driven by Mujibur Rahman’s principle of “friendship with all and malice towards none”, which governs the country’s foreign relations.

Also high on Hasina’s agenda is enlisting Jinping’s help in repatriating over a million Muslim Rohingya refugees to Myanmar as hosting them is straining Bangladesh’s limited resources. For ideological reasons, the Modi government has so far refused to exert any pressure on the Myanmar junta on Hasina’s behalf to take back Rohingyas. Our stance has displeased Hasina but she has taken it in her stride. Consolidation of the Belt and Road Initiative in Bangladesh is inevitable post Hasina’s visit, despite New Delhi’s boycott and opposition to China’s infrastructure outreach. And whether we like it or not, Hasina is bound to sign agreements to boost arms imports from China and cement military-to-military relations.