Seemanchal debacle: How the Muslim vote drifted away from Mahagathbandhan in Bihar

The NDA won 14 of 24 seats in Bihar's Seemanchal despite high Muslim population primarily because non-Muslim votes were more cohesively rallied. (File Photo)

The Mahagathbandhan entered the 2025 Bihar Assembly election with the belief that the Muslim-Yadav combination would once again anchor its prospects, especially in the Seemanchal belt where Muslims form between 35 and 70 percent of the population. Instead, the results exposed how sharply the Muslim vote fragmented and why the alliance's long-standing social arithmetic no longer worked in its favour.

In Seemanchal, the alliance expected a repeat of the 2020 cycle, where Muslims rallied behind the RJD-Congress combine to keep the BJP-JD(U) out. This time, a mix of political fatigue, community anxieties and an expanding field of competitors chipped away at the Mahagathbandhan's base. Ground reports from across Kishanganj, Katihar, Araria and Purnia, all constituencies within the region, showed a recurring sentiment that the alliance had taken the community's support for granted while offering little tangible representation or policy assurance in return.

The AIMIM factor

Having gained visibility in 2020 before four of its five MLAs defected to the RJD, AIMIM returned with a focussed campaign built around Muslim issues and a criticism that the Mahagathbandhan expected loyalty without accountability. In the 2025 Assembly election, AIMIM fielded 29 candidates, including 15 in Seemanchal. The results showed a dramatic shift.

While the NDA won 14 seats in the region (including Thakurganj in Kishanganj, which has a 65% Muslim electorate), the Mahagathbandhan and AIMIM won 5 seats each. By securing five seats, the AIMIM matched its 2020 tally and in the process captured a significant share of Muslim votes. This split reduced the consolidated Muslim vote bank that the Mahagathbandhan traditionally relied on.

The perception battle

Several ground reports ahead of polls suggested that Muslim voters had increasingly begun to feel that the Mahagathbandhan had taken their loyalty for granted. The feeling was more acute in Seemanchal where the Muslim population exceeds 40% in many constituencies. The top leadership and ministerial slots remained elusive for community representatives and the Mahagathbandhan's reluctance in naming a Muslim candidate as its Deputy CM face only added to the perception among Muslims.

The Mahagathbandhan named Mukesh Sahani of the VIP as its Deputy CM face. Sahani hails from the Mallah community which accounts for 3% of the state's population. Muslims constitute around 18% of the population of the state.

Internal conflicts and "friendly fights"

Disagreements within the alliance between the RJD, Congress and smaller allies led to confusion among voters over who was their actual candidate. In contrast, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) presented a more coordinated front and exploited the fractured opposition vote. There were 11 seats where more than one Mahagathbandhan party had fielded a candidate. The alliance lost all of them to the NDA.

Mobilisation of non-Muslim blocs by the NDA

The NDA benefited from the churn. While the coalition does not traditionally attract Muslim voters in any significant measure, it consolidated Hindu votes across castes in Seemanchal. Divisions within the Opposition ensured that even in constituencies where the Muslim vote remained numerically strong, the NDA gained enough of the non-Muslim vote to take a decisive lead. The higher turnout among women and young voters in the region only reinforced this tilt.

The NDA eventually capitalised on gains among Hindu voters in Seemanchal and other regions. While the Mahagathbandhan assumed Muslim dominance would secure their win, actual data shows the NDA won 14 of 24 seats in Seemanchal despite high Muslim population primarily because non-Muslim votes were more cohesively rallied.

Strategic alliance architecture of the NDA

The NDA's structured vote-transfer mechanism and disciplined seat-sharing amplified the impact of even modest vote-share advantages. The Mahagathbandhan, however, could not convert its base into seats, especially in Muslim-dominated constituencies where split votes and weak performer turnout hurt them the most.

Together, these factors explain why the Muslim vote did not act as the "safe seat" for the Mahagathbandhan in 2025 despite favourable demographics. The alliance's failure to adapt to changing dynamics in Seemanchal ultimately contributed to its weaker performance in a region it had long counted on.

The result was a dramatic reversal of the Mahagathbandhan’s fortunes in a region once thought to be its strongest ideological bastion. AIMIM matched its 2020 performance with five seats, while the NDA swept more than half of Seemanchal's constituencies. The Mahagathbandhan managed only a handful, and its leadership was forced into an uncomfortable admission that the community it had long relied on was no longer rallying behind it.