Wagner Mutiny: Did Prigozhin walk into a trap set up by Putin?

Wagner Boss Yevgeny Prigozhin (left) Russian President Vladimir Putin. (File images)

It will be a long time before the unvarnished truth about last weekend’s rebellion by the Wagner military group is available to the public, if at all. But when the true sequence of events and their background comes out – like the flood of information when the Soviet Archives were opened after the end of Communist rule in Russia – its very many truths will typify how Vladimir Putin has ruled from the Kremlin for almost 23 years.

Access to the Soviet Archives led to projects like the Washington-based Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project, which contributed to global scholarship on 74 years of closed Bolshevik rule in the world’s largest and one of two most powerful countries in the history of mankind. Till such an eventuality in today’s Russia, many events in the 16-monthUkraine war and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s antics can only be understood on the basis of circumstantial evidence, but most of all, by eschewing gleeful Western disinformation.

Tactical moves

Enough circumstantial evidence is already available for those who want to objectively dissect the Wagner rebellion. The most important question to be asked is: how did Prigozhin’s phalanx of soldiers, ammunition and heavy equipment like tanks and rockets end up in an orderly manner in Lugansk – a city in Ukraine which pro-Russian separatists took control of in 2014 – and later in Rostov-on-Don inside Russia? Were they not supposed to have been stationed in Bakhmut, the Ukrainian city on the frontline of the war, which Wagner forces captured – almost entirely – at a great cost in men and material? The answer holds a key to the momentous recent events in Russia. Although Bakhmut was a war trophy for Prigozhin, by May 25, a month before his mutiny, Russian troops had replaced Wagner fighters in the city and along the combat frontline. This was the earliest hint that Putin was taking steps to gradually neutralise Wagner. Its fighters were relocated to Lugansk.

Simultaneously, sections of the Russian media reported sighting in Lugansk special forces from Chechnya, where separatism was subdued by Putin. They were brought in as rear guard to the Wagner troops. Chechen special forces have a history as ferocious fighters. It was clear that Chechen forces would be an insurance against any trouble by Wagner forces in Lugansk. All this was largely ignored by the Western media. Major intelligence agencies in Washington and European capitals would have, doubtless, been aware of Putin’s tactical moves.

The next step by Russia’s Defence Ministry was to move Prigozhin and all his men to Rostov-on-Don on the pretext that they deserved rest and recreation for their contribution for many months in the fight to capture Bakhmut. Wagner complied with those orders although Prigozhin may have had suspicions about the intentions of Russia’s army top brass. That was why Prigozhin’s rantings against Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Army Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov intensified.

Service contracts decree

There has been speculation since January that the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 foreign spy outfit had made contact with Prigozhin through their Russian-speaking Ukrainian counterparts. Such stories can never be confirmed in the shadowy world of intelligence until some concrete outcomes in action validate those contacts. Putin, in all probability, did not want to take chances and have his entire war effort in Ukraine crippled, if these stories were true. Hence, on June 10, Shoigu signed a decree that Wagner – and other private military companies – must sign service contracts with the Defence Ministry in three weeks. That was the trigger for Prigozhin’s rebellion. Those in the West who insist that Putin was caught off guard by the uprising ignore the entire sequence of events on the Bakhmut front since May. When the rebellion broke out, Putin was fully prepared for it: that is why it ended peacefully without any significant bloodshed. That is why Wagner is now out of the Kremlin’s way.

Prigozhin’s rise and fall has many parallels in Russia’s recent history since Putin came to power. Putin has dealt with the Wagner chief exactly as he has dealt with numerous oligarchs who usurped the wealth of the Russian people during the misrule of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, and then moved on to acquire political power in Yeltsin’s second term. A month into his first elected term in mid-2000, Putin called a meeting of about two dozen top oligarchs and gave them an offer they could refuse only at their peril. Keep your ill-gotten fortune, but stay out of Russia’s politics. Many of them accepted the President’s offer and are still flourishing. Those who dared to refuse paid a heavy price. It is early to tell whether Prigozhin’s fate is with those who kept their wealth and stayed below the political radar or if he will be destroyed like the other oligarchs who did not heed Putin’s advice 23 summers ago. The story is still developing.

Meanwhile, it is safe to assume that the Wagner forces will remain, even if they undergo an institutional transformation. The difference between the Russian Army and the Wagner company is that the former are patriots, the latter are super patriots. This explains the respect they got in Rostov-on-Don throughout their stay in the city. Those who describe the Wagner as mercenaries make a mistake. They are like a combination of the French Foreign Legion and US military contractors abroad, such as Blackwater. Putin admitted in the last of his three nationally televised speeches this week that Wagner was entirely funded by the Russian state. Wagner was a product of combined Russian intelligence services by cloning the French and US outfits. Much thought went into its creation. So, Putin will use it one way or another.

KP Nayar has extensively covered West Asia and reported from Washington as a foreign correspondent for 15 years. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.