China’s ‘two sessions’ and Xi Jinping’s blueprint for China’s future

Xi Jinping

China’s lianghui (two sessions) is the concurrent annual meetings of the 13th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) which are starting from March 4 and 5 respectively. The NPC and the CPPCC are held regularly since the ‘reforms and opening up’ (gaige kaifang) which began in the early 1980s.

These meetings witness the gathering of the 2,980 NPC deputies and 2,158 CPPCC National Committee members at the Great Hall of the People at Beijing, for formal discussion and approval of the economic, social and political, and other development policies of the Chinese government for its future. Although sometimes called ‘rubber stamp’ institutions, the two bodies are chaired by two of the powerful seven-member politburo standing committee and have statutory prestige vis-à-vis other institutions in the party-state.

This year, the two sessions are being held in the midst of some important developments both within and outside China. In fact, during the NPC sessions, the premier of the state council delivers the annual work report of the government, and other top state institutions such as the courts, and procuratorates.

However, the most important will be the ratification of the 14th Five Year Plan after formal discussions, debates and advise from the NPC deputies and CPPCC members. This plan was earlier passed at the fifth plenum of 19th CCP Central Committee in 2020.

The recent speech by Xi Jinping, on China’s ‘victory over absolute poverty’ is an acknowledgement of its ‘miracle’ in the eve of the first centenary goal. Similarly, as Zhang Liqun, one of the scholars of Development Research Centre under the State Council, said, the two sessions will deliberate on issues of science and technology innovation, dual circulation and green development that focus on well-being of the people, than GDP. So the stress for Xi is more on qualitative growth and development for next 15 years.

Besides economy, the other issues will be legislation of some basic laws governing the procedures and efficient functioning of the NPC and its constituent bodies. Moreover, Hong Kong’s existing election laws could go for a toss as the lianghui is likely to approve the passage of laws allowing party-vetted ‘patriots’ to stand for elections, thereby stringently reining the city administration following the passage of the National Security Law in 2020. This is a serious drawback to the autonomy of Hong Kong.

At the personnel level, many of the provincial and central state organisation senior cadre have been replaced by new ones. Li Guoying (58) who was previously the governor of Anhui province has been appointed as the minister for water resources.

But the most important development is the appointment of General Zhao Zongqi — former Western Theatre Commander under whom the Galwan incident occurred — as the Deputy Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of the 13th NPC. Like him, other two generals, Zheng Weiping and Wang Ning, who have left behind the uniforms after reaching 65 years, are appointed to important positions in the NPC. Similarly, a reshuffle has been witnessed in the judiciary, especially in the Supreme People’s Court on February 28, five days before the scheduled sessions.

The CPPCC National Committee, once led by Mao and Deng but now just called as an advisory body, represents a form of multiparty co-operation and political consultation. It is also called as a patriotic united front of the Chinese people, which has representatives from the eight democratic parties (non-communists), sports and media personalities, scientists and other mass organisations. Leaders of the eight parties are vice-chairs of the NPC standing committee. These are friendly constituents of the CCP that participate in state administration. Therefore, one can also see them as ‘interest groups’ within the Chinese political system who aggregate and articulate interests of the groups, professions and feed into the central task of the CCP policymaking process.

This year’s two sessions will be held in midst of international political ramifications. Under United States President Joe Biden, Xi would like to see a change from Donald Trump’s policies. Similarly, one year after the onset of COVID-19, China’s image internationally has mixed responses. Besides, the sudden disengagement with India after more than a nine-month standoff seems to be a strategy to ensure a smooth conduct of the much-needed two sessions than concrete proposals to solve the issue between the two powers.

Unlike the pre-pandemic lianghui, this year seems to be quite short for six-and-a-half days, the outcomes, however have to be keenly watched.