India, Iran and intelligence in the Cold War years

There is no archival evidence that India and Iran ran coordinated intelligence operations against the United States.

• India and Iran shared intelligence on regional issues before 1979
• No proof of India-Iran joint operations against the US
• Intelligence ties ended after the 1979 Iranian Revolution

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When India’s external intelligence agency took shape in the late 1960s, the world it was designed to operate in was defined by superpower rivalry, shifting alliances and deep mistrust. Relationships between intelligence services in that period rarely followed neat diplomatic lines. Countries that were publicly aligned still watched one another closely, and those without formal alliances often exchanged information out of mutual convenience rather than shared ideology.

India’s interactions with Iran during the Shah’s rule have to be understood in that context.

Why RAW was created

India set up the Research and Analysis Wing in 1968 after two wars exposed serious gaps in its ability to anticipate military and diplomatic shocks. Reporting by The Indian Express on RN Kao’s tenure as the agency’s founding chief shows that RAW’s primary mandate was to give India independent assessments of its neighbourhood, free from reliance on foreign intelligence.

The experience of the 1971 Bangladesh war reinforced that instinct. Declassified US government records published in the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series show how the movement of the US Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal was closely tracked in New Delhi and interpreted as a signal aimed as much at India as at Pakistan.

From that point on, Indian planners treated the Indian Ocean and surrounding regions as strategic spaces where information gaps could carry serious consequences.

Iran’s place in the intelligence landscape

Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran was a key American partner in the Middle East. But it was not a client state in the intelligence sense. Declassified CIA material and studies released by the National Security Archive at George Washington University show that Iran’s security service, SAVAK, operated with considerable autonomy by the late 1960s and 1970s.

While SAVAK had been established with CIA and Israeli assistance in the 1950s, it developed its own regional networks, driven by the Shah’s ambitions to position Iran as a dominant Gulf power. Iran monitored Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, and maintained intelligence contacts across South Asia.

Historians such as Ervand Abrahamian, writing on the Shah’s internal security apparatus, have noted that SAVAK’s role extended well beyond domestic repression. It functioned as a foreign intelligence service engaged in regional power management.

Where Indian and Iranian interests overlapped

India and Iran did not share a formal alliance, but they did share strategic concerns. Both watched Pakistan closely. Both were attentive to developments in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Both had an interest in stability across the Arabian Sea and the broader Indian Ocean.

Indian officials speaking over the years to The Hindu have acknowledged that India maintained intelligence-level contacts with Iran before the 1979 revolution. Such engagement was neither secretive nor unusual by Cold War standards.

Intelligence cooperation in that era often meant exchanging assessments, comparing notes on regional developments, or sharing limited operational insights. It did not necessarily imply joint operations or hostile targeting of third countries.

As intelligence historian Christopher Andrew has documented, even close allies routinely gathered information about one another’s military capabilities and strategic intentions during the Cold War. Monitoring did not stop at alliance boundaries.

The United States as a factor, not a target

There is no archival evidence that India and Iran ran coordinated intelligence operations against the United States. No declassified US damage assessments, congressional inquiries or diplomatic crises point to such activity.

What does exist, in US naval records and FRUS documents, is evidence that India sought to better understand how American power was deployed in the Indian Ocean after 1971. Iran, by virtue of its geography and its ties with Washington, had insight into regional military patterns.

Sharing assessments about force movements or strategic signalling is not the same as espionage directed at an adversary. It reflects a desire for situational awareness — something that middle powers often pursue when operating alongside superpowers.

The Shah himself pursued a careful balancing act. Declassified diplomatic correspondence shows that while he relied on US military support, he frequently asserted independence in regional policy. Limited intelligence engagement with countries like India strengthened that autonomy without directly challenging Washington.

The rupture of 1979

The Iranian Revolution abruptly ended this phase of engagement. SAVAK was dismantled. The Shah fled. The new Islamic Republic redefined Iran’s relationship with both the United States and much of the world.

Indian reporting after 1979, particularly in The Hindu, shows that New Delhi approached post-revolutionary Iran with caution, recalibrating its diplomatic and intelligence posture. Any informal understandings that existed in the Shah’s era ceased to be relevant.

Had there been a sustained intelligence partnership aimed at the United States, the upheaval of 1979 would likely have brought it into the open. It did not.

What the record supports

The historical evidence supports a restrained conclusion.

India built an intelligence capability designed to reduce dependence on foreign powers. Iran under the Shah pursued intelligence autonomy despite its alliance with Washington. The two countries exchanged information where their regional interests overlapped.

This was not an intelligence axis directed against the United States. It was a product of Cold War caution, regional geography and the normal behaviour of states navigating a world dominated by superpowers.

In intelligence history, that distinction matters.