Company and platoon leaders in the Pattan-Baramulla-Uri advance: How small-unit actions stopped the 1947 drive on Srinagar

Budgam set the tone for what would follow westward. The Indian Army was not yet strong enough for a deep push. It needed time, and time was bought by small units standing fast on tactically awkward ground.

In the autumn of 1947, as irregular forces pushed down Kashmir’s road spine toward Srinagar, the defence of the Valley turned not on grand manoeuvre but on the decisions of company and platoon leaders fighting village to village along the Pattan-Baramulla-Uri axis.

A road that led straight to the capital

The road from Uri to Baramulla and onward to Pattan was the most direct western approach to Srinagar. In October 1947, when tribal fighters backed by Pakistani officers surged eastwards after the fall of Muzaffarabad, this axis became the invasion’s main artery. Baramulla fell on October 26, opening the possibility that the raiders could reach Srinagar within days. The Maharaja’s accession and the Indian Army’s airlift into the Valley on October 27 changed the political framework, but the military reality remained brutal: the enemy was already deep inside Kashmir.

What followed was not a single sweeping counter-offensive but a series of sharp, local actions. Company and platoon commanders, often with minimal intelligence and improvised logistics, were tasked with stopping, slowing and then pushing back a force that was numerically large, mobile and ruthless.

Budgam and the race to block

The first Indian troops flown into Srinagar were elements of 1 SIKH. Their immediate task was to block the road west of the city while more forces were flown in. At Budgam on November 3, 1947, a company under Major Somnath Sharma faced repeated attacks by raiders attempting to break through to Srinagar. Sharma’s decision to hold ground despite being heavily outnumbered bought critical time. His death in action and subsequent award of the Param Vir Chakra is often remembered at battalion level, but the fight itself depended on junior leaders keeping sections in position, redistributing ammunition, and holding men together under pressure.

Budgam set the tone for what would follow westward. The Indian Army was not yet strong enough for a deep push. It needed time, and time was bought by small units standing fast on tactically awkward ground.

Baramulla: clearing a shattered town

Baramulla was not retaken in a single stroke. When Indian troops entered the town in early November, they found devastation, looting and scattered enemy groups rather than a neat defensive line. Company commanders had to break their forces into platoon-sized packets, clear buildings, secure bridges and reassure civilians, often simultaneously.

Leadership at platoon level mattered enormously here. Urban combat, even in a small Himalayan town, demanded discipline. Firing had to be controlled. Identification of hostile elements was difficult. Junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers became the Army’s face to traumatised civilians, while also ensuring that stragglers and infiltrators did not slip back into the countryside to regroup.

Pattan and the fight for the river crossings

East of Baramulla, Pattan sat astride key crossings over the Jhelum. Control of these bridges and ferries was essential to protect the approach to Srinagar. The advance toward Pattan was therefore cautious and methodical. Companies were tasked with dominating approaches, clearing adjacent villages and holding ground against night raids.

Platoon leaders in this phase were effectively independent commanders. Communications were fragile. Orders were often broad. A platoon might be told to secure a hamlet or a bend in the road and then left to work out the details. Leadership here meant reading ground, posting sentries intelligently, and resisting the temptation to chase raiders into unknown terrain where ambush was likely.

Uri and the long pull west

Once Baramulla and Pattan were stabilised, attention shifted to Uri. The town guarded the approach to the Hajipir and Haji Pir Bulge areas and was a gateway back toward Muzaffarabad. The advance toward Uri through late 1947 and early 1948 was slow, contested and exhausting.

Company commanders faced a different challenge here. The enemy was no longer a loose mass of raiders alone, but increasingly organised elements with better weapons and local support. Positions on ridges overlooking the road had to be taken one by one. Platoon attacks often went in at first light or under cover of darkness, climbing steep ground with limited fire support.

In such actions, the platoon commander’s role was intimate and immediate. He led from the front, chose routes, decided when to press and when to pause. Losses were felt personally. Replacement was not easy. Units fought with what they had.

Leadership without glamour

What distinguishes the Pattan–Baramulla–Uri advance is how unglamorous it was. There were no sweeping armoured thrusts, no dramatic airborne assaults beyond the initial Srinagar airlift. Instead, there was infantry work in its purest form: advancing along roads overlooked by hostile heights, clearing villages where the enemy might be farmer by day and fighter by night, and holding ground in bitter weather.

Company commanders had to balance aggression with caution. Push too hard, and a thin line might snap. Move too slowly, and the enemy might regain initiative. Platoon leaders had to keep men fed, rested and alert in a landscape where the line between front and rear barely existed.

The cumulative effect

By early 1948, the Indian Army had secured the Srinagar-Baramulla-Uri axis. The immediate threat to the Valley was lifted. This was not achieved by a single decisive battle but by a sequence of small actions whose cumulative effect was decisive. Each village cleared, each bridge held, each night attack beaten back reduced the enemy’s momentum.

The contribution of company and platoon leaders in this process is often overshadowed by higher command narratives. Yet without their decisions, often taken in isolation and under fire, the broader strategy would have collapsed.

Why this advance still matters

The Pattan–Baramulla–Uri axis remains strategically significant today. It runs close to the Line of Control, through terrain that has seen repeated tension and violence over the decades. The lessons of 1947-48 remain relevant: that control of roads and river crossings in Kashmir depends on infantry leadership at the lowest levels, and that holding ground often matters more than dramatic advances.

The early Kashmir war forced a young Indian Army to learn these lessons quickly. Company and platoon leaders were its sharp end. They improvised, adapted and endured, shaping outcomes far beyond their immediate horizons.

In remembering the defence of Srinagar and the westward advance that followed, it is worth looking past the map arrows and political milestones. The real story of Pattan, Baramulla and Uri lies with the officers and men who fought through them step by step, ensuring that the Valley did not fall in the war’s first, most dangerous weeks.