China opens channel with Jamaat-e-Islami ahead of Bangladesh polls: What’s driving Beijing and why India should be concerned

Chinese envoy to Bangladesh Yao Wen meets Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh chief Shafiqur Rahman - File Photo

China's envoy met Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh's chief ahead of national elections, signaling Beijing's intent to hedge its interests amid political uncertainty. The move worries India, as Jamaat's anti-India stance could impact regional stability and ties.

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A recent meeting between Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen and Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh chief Shafiqur Rahman has set off quiet alarm bells across South Asia. According to government sources cited by CNN-News18, the interaction is being read not as routine diplomacy but as a calculated move by Beijing to hedge its bets ahead of Bangladesh’s high-stakes national elections.

CNN-News18 quoted sources saying China is fully aware that Jamaat-e-Islami remains one of the most effective street-mobilisation forces in Bangladesh during election cycles. Even when its electoral tally is limited, Jamaat’s organisational depth and disciplined cadre give it the ability to paralyse streets, shape protest narratives, and tilt post-poll stability. Beijing, sources add, sees this capacity as a practical “force multiplier” that can be leveraged during political churn.

Officials indicate that China’s outreach reflects unease about the uncertainty of a post-election power configuration in Bangladesh. With alliances fluid and outcomes unclear, Beijing is engaging a wide spectrum of actors to protect its strategic and economic stakes. Contact with Jamaat, sources say, offers China a fallback channel with an entity that can either disrupt or help manage unrest if persuaded.

Stability is critical for Beijing because of its deep investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese-backed ports, power projects, and connectivity infrastructure are especially vulnerable during prolonged protests or violent confrontations. Government sources believe the meeting sought informal assurances to limit risks to Chinese assets and personnel during a volatile election phase.

Sources also point to Jamaat’s long-standing ideological hostility towards India as another factor. From Beijing’s perspective, keeping channels open with anti-India actors helps preserve strategic leverage in Dhaka and counterbalance New Delhi’s influence if Bangladesh’s foreign policy tilts after the polls.

The outreach is also seen as a warning to Dhaka’s political establishment that China has alternative options and is prepared to work with multiple power centres. Sources stress that this does not amount to open endorsement but reflects Beijing’s transactional approach to politics, prioritising leverage over democratic norms.

Why this should concern India

For India, the meeting underscores a troubling convergence. China’s willingness to engage an Islamist party with a history of street violence and anti-India positions raises concerns about regional stability and hostile influence in India’s eastern neighbourhood. Any empowerment of Jamaat-linked street power risks spillover effects, radicalisation, and renewed pressure on India-Bangladesh ties. New Delhi is likely to view Beijing’s hedging strategy as another attempt to insert itself into South Asian domestic politics at India’s expense.